My thesis briefly presents a literature overview based on different socio-economic arguments, and moral philosophy for the purposes of critically examining the justice of executive remuneration regulation, drawing accordingly possible instructive conclusions on this topic. In this Section, the current political challenge on the legitimacy of very high executive remuneration will be also summarised, which highlights the tension between majoritarian democracy and individual freedom of contract in the UK. In determining the possible outcomes and an overall evaluation of the objectiveness of the rules on remuneration, the focus will be to look at those normative frameworks and the general evidence.
It is the thesis of the author to conjecture that the process of defining a coherent concept of fair executive remuneration in a more social manner can be achieved by making use of the Rawlsian view of distributive justice. This would eventually link the issue of monitoring managerial rewards, and more specifically the fact that the institutions should maximise the wealth of the least privileged people in society. Therefore, and by arguing that income inequality is most likely to exist within the current system, then Rawls’ concept seems like a potential alternative solution, rather than the morality of deservingness. That is not to say that the latter concept is being underestimated, but Rawls’ principle can effectively constitute the normative basis against the purposes of examining excessive inequality and the unpleasant circumstances that some employees of the companies are facing.