The 2024 US election: What happened?

Dr Adam Quinn explains how a new coalition of voters, and unfavourable headwinds for Democrats delivered Trump a second term.

Donald Trump waving at a crowd (facing the left).

Republicans rejoiced the morning after election day, and Democrats despaired, as it became clear that Donald Trump had won a decisive victory that left no scope for the kind of delay and dispute that afflicted 2020.

In the run-up to the vote, analysts of polling averages had declared the contest too close to call. On election night they were largely vindicated, as it became clear early in the counting that there was no true landslide hiding beneath the public opinion data. All the same, the final vote was markedly less close than last time. Fairly quickly after counting started, the path to 270 electoral college votes for Kamala Harris shrank to a ‘blue wall or bust’ requirement to squeak out a win by holding Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Before long, it evaporated altogether as it became apparent Trump was on course to win all three of those states. As a live contest, the election was all over well before breakfast time.

Across the world, parties who were in power during the immediate post-pandemic years of 2021-22 have been hammered by electorates aggrieved and exasperated at the painful experiences of those years...

Dr Adam Quinn, University of Birmingham

So, what went right for Trump, and wrong for the Harris campaign? For starters, the outcome underlined that the Democratic Party went into 2024 facing an unforgiving electoral environment. By Wednesday, tabulated results indicated a meaningful swing toward Republicans in almost every part of the country geographically, and across most demographic groups. Such a consistent nationwide pattern should dispel the notion that tactical missteps at the level of campaign operations were pivotal. There was a ‘red wave’ of sorts, even if it was no tsunami.

As the serving Vice President in the Biden administration, and having replaced the ailing president on the ticket, Kamala Harris was running with some of the trappings of incumbency at a time when those were decidedly electorally outweighed by its burdens. Across the world, parties who were in power during the immediate post-pandemic years of 2021-22 have been hammered by electorates aggrieved and exasperated at the painful experiences of those years and the choppy and uneven economic recovery that followed.

Blame for deep economic discontent is one of the toughest hurdles for any incumbent party to overcome, and Republicans attacked hard on the issue, reminding voters incessantly that times had been better when Trump was in the White House.

Adam Quinn, University of Birmingham

Although the United States has fared far better than most economies in this period, achieving impressive growth and low unemployment, it was afflicted by an intense period of high inflation which many citizens experienced as an assault on their living standards. This was compounded by rises in interest rates aimed at getting inflation under control, and likely aggravated by a surge in government spending conceived by Biden and Congressional Democrats early in his tenure. In the end, many voters believed the economy had performed poorly over the last four years, at least in key regards, and were not about to be convinced otherwise. And they held Democratic office-holders responsible. Blame for deep economic discontent is one of the toughest hurdles for any incumbent party to overcome, and Republicans attacked hard on the issue, reminding voters incessantly that times had been better when Trump was in the White House.

The Biden administration also bequeathed heavy baggage to the Harris campaign in other areas. A big share of the electorate blamed Democrats for inciting and then mismanaging a crisis of disorderly illegal immigration at the border. They also viewed Biden as having failed foreign policy tests, such as the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and fresh conflict in the Middle East. It did not help that during his tenure, President Biden was visibly fading, weakened by an age-related medical condition that has never been officially acknowledged, and thus unable to be a reliably energetic and articulate advocate for his own policies. His eventual, too-late decision to renounce his party’s 2024 presidential nomination due to infirmity was a welcome bow to the inevitable, but also raised awkward questions about how long senior Democrats, including the vice president, had been aware of Biden’s decline.

All of this is to say that the table was laid for 2024 to be a good year for Republicans, and all things being equal one should have expected their presidential candidate to do well. There were two potential spanners in the works, however. One was that Republican primary voters re-nominated Donald Trump, who had previously lost a presidential election, refused to accept the result, and been charged criminally for his actions in seeking to violently overturn that election. If that were not liability enough, he had also spent years establishing a deserved reputation for racist and sexist demagoguery. The second snag for Republicans was that in 2022 a Supreme Court majority of conservative justices appointed by Republican presidents, including Trump himself, had tossed out constitutional protections for abortion rights, opening the door to tight restrictions imposed by numerous state governments.

With these two unusual factors in play, Democrats were hopeful they might be able to row successfully against the anti-incumbent tide, harvesting gains among voters repulsed by Trump specifically – as a figure of exceptionally bad character unfit for high office – and Republicans generally, as the party that wanted to prevent women making their own choices on abortion. Add some conventional Democratic messages about healthcare and social security, and perhaps it would be enough.

Trump overperformed among constituencies not previously within his tent. Where previously his strength was concentrated among white voters, especially those without college degrees, this time he expanded his reach deeper into other ethnic groups.

Dr Adam Quinn, University of Birmingham

In the end, it was not. Harris did perform reasonably strongly with the affluent, highly educated voters who have increasingly become a core component of her party’s coalition. And women, including young women, showed up to vote for her in impressive numbers. At the same time, however, Trump overperformed among constituencies not previously within his tent. Where previously his strength was concentrated among white voters, especially those without college degrees, this time he expanded his reach deeper into other ethnic groups. Most strikingly, he won a majority of Hispanic men, though that was just the most impressive example of a wider trend. He also reaped big gains in support further down the age-curve than he had managed before, with young men in particular providing a new column of support. Combined with running up the score even higher than before in rural strongholds, these significant bites into previously Democratic-leaning demographics gave Trump a big boost toward an overall majority of the national electorate.

Harris, meanwhile, though she by no means oversaw a collapse in the Biden coalition, stagnated at best among those groups from whom she would have needed to attract far greater margins of victory to compensate for losses to Trump elsewhere. Sometimes she underperformed Biden’s margin slightly, even among these slices of the electorate.

The aftermath of defeat is always a time when accusations fly among the defeated, and undoubtedly Harris will attract personal blame for having failed to bring victory home. Her lack of facility in extemporaneous interviews, critics will note, cost her opportunities to introduce herself favourably to undecided voters. She shied away from the media for too long at the beginning of her campaign, then when she finally did step up gave several sub-par performances. On policy, she never produced a deft answer to the question of why her positions had changed on many issues since her previous run for president in 2019, or in what areas of substance she was different from President Biden. Her choice of Minnesota governor Tim Walz as running mate was a safe ‘do no harm’ pick designed to keep all party factions on board, but given a Republican-leaning environment perhaps a bolder choice was merited.

These are not unreasonable complaints, particularly the charge that she was not adept at articulating issue positions convincingly when deprived of a script and faced with follow-up questions. In mitigation, defenders might note that Harris was thrust into being the candidate far later in the electoral cycle than usual, only after Biden’s forced withdrawal following a catastrophic June debate performance. After that she executed a good launch, convention speech, and debate performance, she fundraised well, and her team organized what was, by all accounts, a strong ‘ground game’ to get the vote out. Given all this, she surely deserves a measure of credit for doing the most essential things to a high standard under difficult circumstances. Certainly, it would be churlish to deny that she performed better than Biden could have, had he been allowed to stick it out.

In the end, though, it was simply not enough. Trump, having done a flamboyantly terrible job in performing the same tasks, proved that none of that need be fatal if you have caught the electorate at a moment when they are predisposed to buy what you are selling.

Fear is widespread and well-founded that his corruption and authoritarian instincts will undermine the foundations of American democracy.

Dr Adam Quinn, University of Birmingham

Turning to the consequences of the election result, three stand out. First and most obvious is that Donald Trump will get to assume the powers of the presidency for a second non-consecutive term, only the second president ever to do so and the first since the nineteenth century. He has made clear his intent to use the office to punish his enemies, in politics and American society more widely. Fear is widespread and well-founded that his corruption and authoritarian instincts will undermine the foundations of American democracy. He will also have a better chance of enacting a more radical policy agenda than during his first term, aided now by greater experience and more carefully selected personnel. On a range of issues, from immigration enforcement in the interior, to trade, to overseas military commitments, the coming Trump term may be highly consequential in policy terms.

A second consequence of the result is that both parties will be prompted to reflect on the changing shape of their voter coalitions, and hence the political battle lines most advantageous to them in the future. It has been understood for some time that American politics is becoming polarized along educational lines, with Democrats increasingly the party of college degree holders and Republicans attracting ever more support from those without. Before now, however, this phenomenon was far less discernable among non-white voters. This election may have signaled the beginning of greater sorting of Latino, Asian, and Black voters along similar educational lines to whites. Recent Democratic campaigns have been criticized for relying too much on identity-based appeals to ethnic minority groups, rather than appealing to them as voters with similar interests to any other. How to win back some of the minority voters lost to Trump this cycle will be high on the list of questions preoccupying Democratic strategists over coming years. In parallel, the intensifying polarization of young people by sex may also prove a highly significant development for future cycles. As young women move left, and simultaneously young men shift right, even at higher educational levels, the parties will have choices to make about how far to lean into this polarization with their messaging, or whether to seek greater balance in their appeal.

Central to intra-party struggles will be the question of whether ownership of the coalition Trump has assembled over a decade of campaigns can be successfully transferred to another Republican candidate, or if its cohesion is inseparable from the unique alchemy of Trump’s personal brand.

Dr Adam Quinn, University of Birmingham

Thirdly, with Trump limited to two presidential terms, speculation and maneuvering as to his eventual successor as Republican standard-bearer will set in earlier than usual in a ‘new’ administration. Central to intra-party struggles will be the question of whether ownership of the coalition Trump has assembled over a decade of campaigns can be successfully transferred to another Republican candidate, or if its cohesion is inseparable from the unique alchemy of Trump’s personal brand. Donald Trump has extended his own political career for another four years. The viability of ‘Trumpism’ beyond that remains an open question.