2024 Joint Session Programme

12th July – 14th July 2024

UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Contents

General Information



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Contact Details

Emergency services: **The national phone number in an emergency is 999.**

Medical issues: If you need non-emergency medical treatment, you should call phone 111.

Dental emergency: We cannot recommend a dental service providing emergency treatment, but you may wish to try Night & Day Emergency Dentist (07542 118222). Please note that we cannot attest to the quality of this service.

Chamberlain Hall Accommodation: The number for the campus accommodation is 01214158520.

Conference Organisers: In an emergency that cannot be solved with any of the above contact details, you can phone the conference organisers on TBC. They will be available 24 hours a day throughout the conference period.

WhatsApp Groups

Announcement WhatsApp Group: There is a WhatsApp Group for important announcements about the conference e.g. room changes or cancellations. Join it here: TBC

Social WhatsApp Group: Delegates wishing to talk to other delegates via WhatsApp, e.g. to arrange dining plans, can make use of this group. TBC

Social Media

Twitter/X/Bluesky: The hashtag for posts is #jointsession24

Getting to the Conference

Directions to the University of Birmingham and to our Edgbaston campus are available on this webpage (including rail, bus, taxi, air, and car). That page also includes parking information.

Conference Location

You can download the University of Birmingham Campus map from here. The conference takes place in the Alan Walters building (R29 on the map) and Teaching and Learning Building (R32). The Friday night conference dinner is at the Edgbaston Park Hotel (G23).

Registration

The Registration Desk for the Conference will be open the following hours:

- Friday 12th of July: 12.00-17.00 (Alan Walters building atrium, R29 on the campus map).
- Saturday 13th of July: 08.00-17.00 (Teaching and Learning Building, ground floor, R32 on the campus map).

- Sunday 14th of July: 08.30-17.00 (Teaching and Learning Building, ground floor, R32 on the campus map).

Accommodation

Delegates who have taken accommodation with us will be dormed in Chamberlain Hall, which is roughly 2km north of campus.



Delegates arriving at the University Train Station: If you leave the station by the back entrance (*not* the shiny new station building!) you will be right next to a staircase leading to the canal path. Heading north along that canal path, you will arrive at the bridge (pictured); crossing it and heading east should take you close to Chamberlain Tower. Delegates with a lot of luggage might be best off getting a taxi.

Registration: Delegates check in at the Chamberlain Reception, which is based on the Chamberlin Tower Lobby (as marked on the map above). Reception is open 7am-10pm. After 10pm, you can check in at the reception of the Shackleton building, which is opposite the Chamberlain (see HERE).

Delegates will need to produce Proof of Identification when checking in.

You can check in from 4pm on the day of arrival and must check out by 10am

Contact Information: 01214158520

Luggage Storage

There is luggage storage available both at Chamberlain Tower (for delegates who have taken accommodation) and storage available at the conference itself. Please do not leave luggage overnight and all luggage is left at your own risk.

Facilities

Printing: INSERT

Banking: There is no bank on campus. There is a Cash Machine in University House, which is open on the Friday and may be open on Saturday. Please note that most places on campus do take card!

Local Shops: A Spa convenience store is located in University House, which will be open on Friday. Beyond that, you have two options. There are shops in Selly Oak, which is nearby campus. There are also shops in Harbourne, which is only slightly further but might coincide with your preferred location for a restaurant or pub. Both are a fair walk from your accommodation, both being approximately 35 minutes from your Halls.

Drinks/Pubs/Bars

The Bratby Bar will be open on campus for every evening of the conference.

Delegates looking for food and drink venues beyond the Bratby Bar can consider the following venues. The Selly Oak venues are near the conference on campus in the student area. Harborne is slightly further away from the conference but offers superior quality. City Centre venues have been listed for delegates passing back through the City Centre. A brewery has been listed for delegates looking specifically for high quality craft ale.

- *The Hop Garden (Harborne)*. 19 Metchley Lane. Excellent craft ales, not too far from campus and roughly as far from your accommodation as Selly Oak pubs.
- *The Bell (Harborne).* 11 Old Church Road. A further distance away, but it offers a quaint English drinking experience.
- *Goose/The OVT (Selly Oak).* 561 Bristol Road. Has the benefit of being nearby campus.
- *The Bristol Pear (Selly Oak).* 676 Bristol Road. Has the benefit of being nearby campus.
- *Bacchus Bar (City Centre).* Burlington Arcade. Located right next to the train station.
- *The Victoria (City Centre).* 48 John Bright St. Located close to the train station.
- *Tilt (City Centre).* 2 Union St. Further into the city centre, this boasts real ale plus pinball machines.
- *The Attic Brewery. (Stirchley).* 29B Mary Vale Rd. If you're staying a while, and are willing to venture out further, you can come to this excellent brewery craft ale pub. Accessible via either taxi or a train to Bournville station.

Delegates looking for venues that open later than 11.00pm will need to venture into the bars in the City Centre.

Eating/Restaurants

Further to the food laid on by the conference, the following are some recommended places for eating. The closest venues are Harborne.

Harborne: A short taxi ride or a 30-minute walk from your accommodation.

- THE PLOUGH: Birmingham's most popular gastro-pub. Fairly expensive, but high quality. The pizzas are recommended, although their menu has a variety of options.
- RUDY'S PIZZA: Moderately priced high-quality pizza.
- HABORNE KITCHEN: Contemporary cuisine.
- BUONISSIMO RESTAURANT: Italian cuisine.
- THE JUNCTION: Gastro-pub food.

City Centre: Either a taxi ride or train ride away, there are a number of places to eat in the city centre. Further to the standard array of large-scale chain restaurants (Pizza Express, Wagamamas, Nandos, Pho, Ask, Bella Italia etc.), we recommend:

- RUDY'S PIZZA: Moderately priced high-quality pizza.
- There is also an alternative Rudy's Pizza in Brindley Place, which is also in the city centre.
- FRANCO MANCA: Moderately priced good-quality pizza.
- THE INDIAN STREATERY: Indian street food. (Think Tapas.)
- BUNDOBUST: Craft ales alongside Indian food.
- LOST AND FOUND: High quality British food.

Stirchley: A short taxi ride or you can catch a train journey (~5 minutes) from University station to Bournville station (which is located in Stirchley).

- EAT VIETNAM: Excellent Vietnamese food, although expensive.
- SOI 1628: Thai street food.
- KOLKATA LOUNGE: Indian food.

Mosley: A taxi ride away.

- THE FIGHTING COCKS: Gastro-pub.
- LA PLANCHA: Spanish tapas.
- ZINDIYA STREATERY: Indian street food.

Tourist Information

Narby campus there are three places that we can recommend, all associated with the University.

Lapworth Museum. From rocks and fossils to volcanoes, earthquakes, and even dinosaurs, the Lapworth Museum captures the imagination of all visitors as they explore life over the past 3.5 billion years.

Opening Hours: Weekdays 1000-1700; Weekends 1200-1700.

Winterbourne. Experience an Edwardian historic house and garden nestled in a leafy corner of Birmingham.

Opening Hours: 1030-1700.

Barber Institute of Fine Arts. The Barber Institute of Fine Arts houses a leading art gallery and concert hall within its Grade-1 listed building, on the University of Birmingham's Edgbaston campus.

Opening Hours: TBC

Schedule



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Friday 12th of July

Time	Session	Location
12.00-17.00	Registration	Alan Walters Atrium
12.00-13.00	Lunch	Alan Walters Atrium
12.30-16.00	Society Meetings	Alan Walters (103 and 111)
15.30-16.30	Refreshments	Alan Walters Atrium
16.30-18.00	Inaugural Address: Quassim Cassam (Warwick) Chair: Heather Widdows	Alan Walters G03 Lecture Theatre
18.15-19.15	Wine Reception	TBC
19.30-21.45	Conference Dinner	Edgbaston Park Hotel, Lloyd Suite
18.45-23.30	Drinks in Bratby Bar	Staff House

Saturday 13th of July

Time	Session	Location
08.00-17.00	Registration	Teaching and Learning Building Reception
09.00-10.50	Symposium I: Cécile Laborde (Oxford) and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Aarhus) – Freedom and Domination Chair: Hallvard Lillehammer	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
09.00-10.50	Symposium II: Gillian Russell (Australian Catholic University) and Sara Uckelman (Durham) – Logical Consequence Chair: Alexander Paseau	Alan Walters, G03
10.20-11.10	**Refreshments**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
11.10-13.00	Symposium III: Linda Martín Alcoff (CUNY) and Robin McKenna (Liverpool) – Political Epistemology Chair: Jonathan Floyd	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
11.10-13.00	Symposium IV: Jussi Suikkanen (Birmingham) and Neil Sinclair (Nottingham) – Metaethics and the Nature of Properties Chair: Helen Beebee	Alan Walters, G03
13.00-14.00	**Lunch**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
13.00-14.00	Aristotelian and Mind Association Joint Meeting II	TLB, 109
14.00-15.00	Mind Fellow Lecture: Alessandra Tanesini – Commitment on-line: On	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2

	taking responsibility for one's words on social media	
Open Sessions (First of Three)		
14.00-16.00	1: Praise & Blame	TLB, LG03
	2: Applied Ethics I	TLB, 109
	3: Moral Philosophy I	TLB, 118
	4: Moral Philosophy II	TLB, 119
	5: Institutions & Marketplaces	TLB, M208
	6: Philosophy of Race/Political Philosophy	TLB, M209
	7: Mixed Mind Issues	TLB, M218
	8: Action	TLB, 202
	9: Philosophy of Mind I	TLB, 211
	10: Cognitive Science	TLB, 212
	11: Philosophy of Time	Alan Walters, G03
	12: Metaphysics I	Alan Walters, 103
	13: Epistemology I	Alan Walters, 111
	14: Philosophical Methodology	Alan Walters, 112
16.00-16.30	**Refreshments**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
Open Sessions (Second of Three Blocks)		
16.30-18.30	15: Responsibility	TLB, LG03
	16: Applied Ethics II	TLB, 109
	17: Moral Philosophy III	TLB, 118
	18: Moral Philosophy IV	TLB, 119
	19: Reasons & Autonomy	TLB, M208
	20: Philosophy of Psychology	TLB, M209
	21: Philosophy of Mind II	TLB, M218
	22: Philosophy of AI	TLB, 202
	23: Epistemology II	TLB, 211
	24: Testimony	TLB, 212
	25: Necessities & Contingencies	Alan Walters, G03
	26: Metaphysics/Logic	Alan Walters, 103
	27: Ancient Philosophy	Alan Walters, 111
	28: Aesthetics	Alan Walters, 112
16.30-18.30	Society for Women in Philosophy Session I	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
18.30-20.00	**Pizza**	**TBC**
18.00-23.00	**Drinks at Bratby Bar**	**Staff House**

Sunday 14th of July

Time	Session	Location
08.30-17.00	Registration	Teaching and Learning Building Reception
09.00-10.50	Symposium V: Stephen Grimm (Fordham) and Lilian O'Brien (Helsinki) – The Humanities Chair: Eileen John	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
09.00-10.50	Symposium VI: MGF Martin (Oxford/Berkeley) and Donovan E Wishon (Mississippi) – Bertrand Russell on Experience Chair: Genia Schönbaumsfeld	Alan Walters, G03
10.50-11.15	**Refreshments**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
Open Sessions (Third of Three Blocks)		
11.15-13.15	29: Moral Philosophy V	TLB, LG03
	30: Democracy & Society	TLB, 109
	31: Moral Philosophy VI	TLB, 118
	32: Philosophy of Perception	TLB, 119
	33: Epistemology III	TLB, M208
	34: Metaphysics II	TLB, M209
	35: Freedom	TLB, M218
	36: Science & Metaphysics	TLB, 202
	37: Philosophy of Science	TLB, 211
	38: Philosophy of Language	TLB, 212
11.15-12.45	Society for Women in Philosophy Session II	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
13.15-14.30	**Lunch**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
13.15-14.15	British Philosophical Association Open Meeting	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
14.30-16.30	Postgraduate Sessions (Theoretical) Chair: Jessica Leech	Alan Walters, G03
14.30-16.30	Postgraduate Sessions (Practical) Chair: Michael Hannon	TLB, Lecture Theatre 2
16.30-17.30	**Refreshments**	**TLB, First Floor Catering Area**
19.20-23.00	Drinks at the Bratby Bar	Staff House

Postgraduate Sessions (Sunday)		
Practical Session (Teaching and Learning Building, LT2)		
14.30	Zachary Brants	A Version of Aversion Aristotle Would Not Be Averse To
15.00	Owen Clifton	Contractualism and Two Types of Non-Identity
15.30	Lauren Miano	Musical Education
16.00	Joseph Sibley	Choice and Character Constitution in the Republic's Myth of Er
Theoretical Session (Alan Walters, G03)		
14.00	Frederik J. Andersen	Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality
14.30	Jacopo Berneri	Predicative Russell-Myhill and the Ramified Hierarchy
15.00	Christabel Cane	Statues and Lumps: What's The Matter?
15.30	Wouter Cohen	Russell and the roots of higher-order existence

Society for Women in Philosophy Sessions		
Session I (Saturday 16.30-18.30, TLB, Lecture Theatre 2)		
16.30-17.00	Irati Zubia Landa	Why Not Everyone Can Afford To Be A Bullshitter A Feminist Approach On Bullshit
17.00-17.30	Bengü Demirtaş	With Pleasure: A Feminist Contractarian Supplement to the Nonideal Theory of Consent
17.30-18.00	Jessica Masterson	Understanding the Sexual Grey Area: Consent As a Mental Act
18.00.18.30	Sara Marina Kok	Blame and Colonialism
Session II (Sunday 11.15-12.45, TLB, Lecture Theatre 2)		
11.15-11.45	Lauren Stephens	We Should Act Like Artists: Simone de Beauvoir's 'Artist' as Ethical Ideal
11.45-12.15	Huaiyuan Susanna Zhang	*Maior Vestra Voluptas Est* (Your Pleasure Is More) —The Moved Temporality of the Feminine in Levinas' Phenomenology of Eros
12.15-12.45	Emanuela Carta	Conceptual Amelioration in Feminist Phenomenology

Open Sessions Block One (Saturday)		
1: Praise & Blame (Teaching and Learning Building, LG03)		
14.00	Gunnar Björnsson	Rebalancing: From distributive to retributive desert
14.30	Anna-Katharina Boos	Blameless responsibility: Who owes what to the victims of morally permissible AI-systems?
15.00	Yi-Cheng Lin	Whose Actions, Whose Responsibility?
2: Applied Ethics I (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 109)		

14.00	Brian Berkey and Kritika Maheshwari	The Ethics of Partner Hiring in Academia
14.30	Huub Brouwer	Can Investment Income be Deserved?
15.00	Jasper Friedrich	On Misdirected Anger
15.30	Costanza Porro	What is care? A practice and attitude-based account
3: Moral Philosophy I (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 118)		
14.00	Samantha Godwin	Grounding Consent: A Two-Stage Model of Consent as Authoritative Address
14.30	Daniel Vanello	The Authority of Moral Witness
15.00	Heather Widdows	Body shame as moral shame
15.30	Max Khan Hayward	Jam Tomorrow and the New Repugnant Conclusion: Puzzles for Longtermism
4: Moral Philosophy II (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 119)		
14.00	Drishtti Rawat	Moral motivation and the virtuous person
14.30	Andrés Garcia	Neutral but Better: On the Logic of Neutrality
15.00	Gerald Lang	What is All or Nothing About the All or Nothing Problem?
15.30	David Matthew	Role Ethics and consequentialism
5: Institutions & Marketplaces (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M208)		
14.00	Johann Go	Bureaucratic Burdens and Bureaucratic Injustice
14.30	Michele Bocchiola	The Guise of Institutional Trust
15.00	Amanda Greene	Social Media and Mass Empowerment: Towards a Theory of Digital Legitimacy
6: Philosophy of Race/Political Philosophy (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M209)		
14.00	Jonathan Kwan	The Eco-Political Wrongs of Colonialism
14.30	Noell Birondo	Race, Hatred, and the Preservation of Ignorance
15.00	Maya von Ziegesar	Animality as Racialization and Resistance
15.30	Alexander Bryan	Protesting Together
7: Mixed Mind Issues (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M218)		
14.00	Mohammad Amin Mostajir	Nida-Rumelin's View of Phenomenal Transparency: A Defence
14.30	Ross Patrizio	Apples, Oranges, and Trust
15.00	John A. Barnden	Evolutionary Implications of the Meta-Causal Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
8: Action (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 202)		
14.00	Robin T. Bianchi	The Scope of Agency
14.30	Vanessa Carr	Believing in Success Against the Odds
15.00	Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette	Action for Ethicists
15.30	Hichem Naar	The Puzzle of Emotional Reasons-Responsiveness
9: Philosophy of Mind I (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 211)		
14.00	Niccolò Nanni	Multimodality and the Emotional Lives of Others
14.30	Matthew Kinakin	Affective Motivation and Normative Knowledge
15.00	Julian Hauser	Towards I and you: differentiation and joint attention

15.30	Kathleen Murphy-Hollies	Confabulation and reasons for love
10: Cognitive Science (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 212)		
14.00	Gabe Dupre	Indicator and Coverage Models in Cognitive Science
14.30	Henry Taylor	Attention is a Patchwork Concept
15.00	Benjamin Henke and Casey O'Callaghan	Why and How to Study AI Pain
15.30	Jacob Beck	Two Perception-Cognition Borders
11: Philosophy of Time (Alan Walters, G03)		
14.00	Emily Thomas	G. E. Moore's Common Sense Time Realism, Presentism, and A-Theory
14.30	Sergi Oms	A Dialetheist Solution to the Problem of Change
15.00	Natalja Deng	The ineffability of time
15.30	Raamy Majeed	Love as a Four-Dimensional Worm
12: Metaphysics I (Alan Walters, 103)		
14.00	Yuang Chen	How to Explain the Quality-Power Grounding
14.30	James Ross	Grounding and Causation: A Metaphysical Analogy
15.00	Maciej Sendłak	Unification of Dependence
15.30	Karol Polcyn	Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem
13: Epistemology I (Alan Walters, 111)		
14.00	Alec Siantonas	For Knowledge-Governed Full Belief
14.30	Francesco Praolini	Beliefs, Reasons, and Positive Epistemic Obligations
15.00	Rory Harder	Knowledge-First Mindreading and Epistemology
15.30	Michael Markunas	Cognitively Homeless Russell
14: Philosophical Methodology (Alan Walters, 112)		
14.00	Dr Ellie Robson & Dr Peter West	Aristotelian Naturalism: A Counter-Tradition in Twentieth-Century British Philosophy
14.30	Matyas Moravec and Peter West	What is 'Western Philosophy'?
15.00	Tina Firing	Achieving Philosophical Progress- What Good is the Method of Argument?
15.30	Piotr Szalek	Intellectual Humility

Open Sessions Block Two (Saturday)		
15: Responsibility (Teaching and Learning Building, LG03)		
16.30	Roberto Keller	Reasons, Importance, and Time
17.00	Dominik Boll	The Pluralist View of Taking Responsibility
17.30	Michael Da Silva	Agent-Regret and Responsibility Gaps
18.00	Maximilian Kiener	Responsibility and the Special Question 'Why?'
16: Applied Ethics I (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 109)		
16.30	Joseph Millum	Proportional chances for scarce health care resources
17.00	Michal Masny	Work and the Good of Detachment

17.30	Martin Sticker	A Defence of Overdemandingness Considerations in Climate Ethics
18.00	Tarek Yusari	What is (Distinctively) Wrong with Entrapment?
17: Moral Philosophy III (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 118)		
16.30	Sophie Keeling	How motivation can be praiseworthy
17.00	Benedict Rumbold	Careful What You Wish For: Consequentializing and Falsifiability
17.30	Toby Solomon	Options must be internal (but don't blame me if I don't always do what I ought)
18.00	Eline Gerritsen	Questioning the normative status of social norms
18: Moral Philosophy IV (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 119)		
16.30	Dong-il Kim	A Third Conception of Self-ownership
17.00	Leo Eisenbach	On the Temporality and Graduality of Blameworthiness
17.30	Thomas Rowe	What's Wrong with Imposing Risk of Harm?
18.00	Jordi Fairhurst Chilton	Deep disagreements and moral progress
19: Reasons & Autonomy (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M208)		
16.30	Thomas Schmidt	Contrastive Normativity Without Contrastivism
17.00	Katherine Caldwell	A Dilemma for Internalists: Reasons Nihilism and the Self
17.30	Kenneth Silver	Attending to a Reason's Weight
18.00	Annalisa Costella	Autonomy and Robust Self-attributability: How Pre-commitment Does, and Does not, Limit Autonomy
20: Philosophy of Psychology (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M209)		
16.30	Anneli Jefferson	'Terminal Anorexia' or the desire to justify treatment choices with a medical label
17.00	Joe Gough	What constitutes an impairment of the mind in the eyes of the law?
17.30	Eleanor Palafox-Harris	Epistemic Hypervigilance and the Psychiatrist
21: Philosophy of Mind II(Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M218)		
16.30	Andreas Mogensen	How to resist the Fading Qualia Argument
17.00	Agata Machcewicz-Grad	A miracle of mindreading. On Adam Toon's mental fictionalism
17.30	James Openshaw	Referential confabulation: A new case for post-causal theories of remembering?
18.00	Matt Farr	Forgetting what it's like: qualia and the temporally-limited self
22: Philosophy of AI (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 202)		
16.30	Dr. Jonas Bozenhard	A Post-Wittgensteinian Approach to Large Language Models and Linguistic Understanding
17.00	Todd Moody	AI and the Multiple Realizability of Understanding
17.30	Raphaël Millière	Mechanistic Explanation in Deep Learning
23: Epistemology II (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 211)		
16.30	Chenwei Nie	Why Rational People Obstinately Hold to Irrational Beliefs: A New Approach
17.00	Taylor Matthews	Courage in Defeat
17.30	Thomas Raleigh	Witnesses, Beliefs and Rule-Coherentism

18.00	Luca Alberto	Mind, World, and Paradox
24: Testimony (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 212)		
16.30	Giorgia Foti	Testimonial Injustice: towards a Modal Account
17.00	Alice Monypenny	Tactical Testimonial Smothering and Epistemic Agency
17.30	Angela O'Sullivan	Don't Trust ChatGPT! The Epistemic Problem of Stochastic 'Testimony'
25: Necessities & Contingencies (Alan Walters, G03)		
16.30	Farhad Alavi	Discovering 'Absolute Necessity': Hume on Arithmetic Demonstrations
17.00	Martin Pickup	Leibniz on Contingency, Analysis, and Infinite Divisibility
17.30	Harry Cleeveley	The Deep Incoherence of Strong Necessities
18.00	Andrea Salvador	Mereological Harmony and Higher-order Identities
26: Metaphysics & Logic(Alan Walters, 103)		
16.30	Yucheng Li	Nihilism about Determinacy at All Orders
17.00	Pietro Berardi Gili	A Truthmaker Semantics for the Propositional Modal Logic of Necessity
17.30	Wolfgang Sattler	Ontological Priority without Separation in Aristotle
18.00	Nuno Maia	Arithmetical Pluralism, Consistency and Omega-consistency
27: Ancient Philosophy (Alan Walters, 111)		
16.30	Nicola Cirulli	Oneness as Continuity: A New Interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Continuity
17.00	Akira Kawashima	Dianoia and the "Intermediate": Non-propositional Knowledge in Plato's Divided Line
17.30	Andrea Buongiorno	Being per se v being per accidens in Metaphysics Δ7
18.00	Sadie McCloud	A Problem for Moral Reformation in Seneca's Epistles
28: Aesthetics (Alan Walters, 112)		
16.30	Giulia Lorenzi	Listening with familiar ears
17.00	James Lewis	Aesthetic community and appreciation (or vice versa)
17.30	Mark Windsor	Beauty Unframed: An Argument for Aesthetic Anti-Realism
18.00	Maikki Aakko	The Appearing of the Other: On the Disinterestedness of Aesthetic Perception and The Moral Recognition of the Other

Open Sessions Block Three (Sunday)		
29: Moral Philosophy V (Teaching and Learning Building, LG03)		
11.15	Adham El Shazly	Moral Understanding & Humility in Iris Murdoch
11.45	Anna Hotter	Women's Self-Defeating Behavior as a Breakdown of Practical Reason
12.15	Clarissa Muller	The Spatiality of Othering: A Crip Reading of Embodiment and the Phenomenology of Belonging

12.45	Dimitrios Dentsoras	The Craft Analogy in Plato's Euthydemus
30: Democracy & Society (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 109)		
11.15	Elena Icardi	Limit Inheritance to Protect Democracy: A Limitarian Account
11.45	Todd Karhu	Temporal Partiality and the Veil of Ignorance
12.15	Enrico Biale, Gloria Zuccarelli	A Relational Account of Democratic Equality in an Ageing Society
12.45	Dr Rebecca Lowe	Are There Prisons in Utopia?
31: Moral Philosophy VI (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 118)		
11.15	Jeremy Williams	Moral Status and Objectivity
11.45	James Laing	The Desire for Admiration
12.15	Chen-Wei Chang	Two Kinds of Inescapability
12.45	Bill Wringe	Never Mind the Gap: Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility and the Quantum of Blame Error
32: Philosophy of Perception (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 119)		
11.15	Auke Montessori	Mixed Views and Multisensory Experience
11.45	Giulia Martina	Perceiving and misperceiving properties
12.15	Paweł Grad	Presentational and Phenomenal Forces of Perception
33: Epistemology III (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M208)		
11.15	Marie-Helene Gorisse	Knowledge and liberation in Jainism
11.45	Giada Fratantonio	Asking questions and expecting retractions
12.15	Samuel C. Fletcher	The Similar Role of Values in Legal Epistemology and Statistical Testing
12.45	Rory Aird	On the perils of engaging
34: Metaphysics II (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M209)		
11.15	Margarida Hermida	Animalism and what matters in survival
11.45	Phillip Meadows	Plural Instantiation and Parsimony
12.15	Andrea Lupo	A Puzzle for Aristotelian Universals
12.45	Carlo Rossi	Events and the Individuation of Powers
35: Freedom (Teaching and Learning Building, Mezzanine M218)		
11.15	Thomas Mitchell	Distinguishing Persuasion from Manipulation
11.45	Zain Raza	Reasoning is Coercive
12.15	Matthew Heeney	The Value of Contrarational Freedom
12.45	Giacomo Andreoletti	Acting in the Garden of Forking Paths
36: Science & Metaphysics (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 202)		
11.15	Vanessa Seifert	Metaphysics of Chemistry: What are chemical reactions?
11.45	Sami Tayub	Repealing Naturalised Metaphysics and Liberating the A Priori
12.15	Jan Westerhoff	Idealist implications of contemporary science
12.45	Yihan Jiang	Reconciling Process and Structure: Towards a Process-based Ontic Structural Realism
37: Philosophy of Science (Teaching and Learning Building, Room 211)		
11.15	Christopher Earley	The Ethos of Art and the Ethos of Science
11.45	Hadeel Naeem	Responsible and seamless reliance on technology

12.15	Bon-Hyuk Koo	Reasons to Opt for Selective Realism
12.45	Will Stafford	Theory equivalence and the question of whether computation is arithmetic
38: Philosophy of Language (Teaching and Learning Building, 212)		
11.15	James Ravi Kirkpatrick	Generic Uses of Indefinite Singulars as Homogeneity Presuppositions
11.45	Jonathan D. Payton	Imagination and Arbitrary Reference
12.15	Tom Williams	Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Descriptive Names

Inaugural Address



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Quassim Cassam: Liberation Philosophy

Liberation philosophy seeks to contribute to the liberation of the oppressed and to the creation of a more just society. A meliorative philosophy is one that improves human lives. A liberation philosophy can be regarded as meliorative only if it has a compelling theory of change. A theory of change for philosophical interventions should explain how they can contribute to social, political, or economic change. The main components of such a theory are identified and shown to be present in the work of the best liberation philosophers, such Martin Luther King Jr.. A meliorative philosophy improve human lives by, among other things, providing the kind of guidance that leads to better decision-making and improved conduct. Philosophy should conceive of the guidance it offers as co-created and reflect on the conditions for effective co-creation. The distinctive virtues of meliorative philosophy, including liberation philosophy, are personal qualities that enable co-creation. These include humility, practicality, an openness to diverse perspectives, and an instinct for lived complexity. There are philosophical purists who reject the demand that philosophy should answer to practical needs. We should be sceptical about some of the claims made by philosophical purists.

Mind Fellow Lecture

Alessandra Tanesini: Commitment on-line -- On taking responsibility for one's words on social media

Social Networking Sites (SNSs), such as Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, or TikTok, are designed to make communication at scale easy and fast. The creation of vast networks that promote the generation and strengthening of social ties has had several unforeseen consequences. First, it has created an environment in which each user competes with others for attention. Second, the same features of the network that facilitate social bonding with vast numbers of people have eroded our ability to undertake some of those commitments that are pre-requisites for the successful performance of our speech acts on-line.

The main aim of this talk is to argue that several of the main design features of SNSs are inimical to the creation and preservation of conversational contexts where speakers and their audiences are able to undertake commitments in the making of, and responding to, speech acts on-line. Its subsidiary aim is to provide a taxonomy of the most common families of speech acts facilitated by SNSs. This taxonomy is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. It is guided by the thought that communicative acts on-line are primarily in the service of enhancing a sense of belonging to some community or social group, which in turn presupposes that one is paid attention or noticed by other members of that group.

Symposia Abstracts

Ordered by Symposia



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

I. Freedom and Domination

Cécile Laborde

Members of racial and sexual minorities often live in the fear of arbitrary interference from others – rogue police officers or sexual harassers. Are they unfree, by dint of believing they are unfree? I draw on the republican theory of freedom – according to which we are unfree if we are subjected to a risk of arbitrary interference – to offer a qualified positive answer. I clarify the role of probabilistic judgements about risk in republican political theory. I argue that under specific circumstances, diagnoses of republican freedom can be indexed to a certain belief about probability – what it is warranted for someone to believe, in light of their distinctive epistemic perspective.

Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view 'answers' the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism.

II. Political Epistemology

Linda Martín Alcoff

Coming Soon.

Robin McKenna

In her article in this issue Linda Martín Alcoff makes the case for a form of political epistemology that denaturalises, in the sense of historically and socially situating, procedures of knowledge production and distribution. She pursues this project via a discussion of three 20th-century thinkers (Horkheimer, Habermas, Foucault) who she argues pursued this form of political epistemology, albeit in different ways, and to different ends. In this article I pursue a similar project, but within a different tradition, one that grows out of naturalised epistemology.

III. Metaethics and the Nature of Properties

Jussi Suikkanen

This paper explores the connection between two philosophical debates concerning the nature of properties. The first metaethical debate is about whether normative properties are ordinary natural properties or some unique kind of non-natural properties. The second metaphysical debate is about whether properties are sets of objects, transcendent or immanent universals, or sets of tropes. I argue that nominalism, transcendent realism, and immanent realism are not neutral frameworks

for the metaethical debate but instead lead to either metaethical naturalism or non-naturalism. We can therefore investigate the metaethical question on its own terms only within the framework of the trope theory.

Neil Sinclair

This paper explores connections between theories of morality and theories of properties. It argues that: (1) Moral realism is in tension with predicate, class and mereological nominalism; (2) Moral non-naturalism is incompatible with standard versions of resemblance nominalism, immanent realism and trope theory; (3) The standard semantic arguments for property realism do not support moral realism. I also raise doubts about trope-theoretic explanations of moral supervenience and argue against one version of the principle that we should accept theories that maintain neutrality.

IV. Bertrand Russell on Experience

MGF Martin

Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of ‘egocentric particulars’, his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception.

Donovan E Wishon

Neutral monism is the view that ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are composed of, or grounded in, more basic elements of reality that are intrinsically neither mental nor material. Before adopting this view in 1918, Russell was a mind-matter dualist and pointed critic of it. His most ‘decisive’ objection concerns whether it can provide an adequate analysis of egocentricity and our use of indexical expressions such as ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘now’ and so on. I argue that M. G. F. Martin (2024) and other recent interpreters cannot make proper sense of Russell’s shifting views about egocentricity because they misascribe to his early dualism the thesis that experience is in some sense ‘diaphanous’ or ‘transparent’. Against this, I make the case that (1) Russell rejected the diaphaneity of experience as a dualist, (2) this rejection played a key role in his early objections to neutral monism, and (3) several decades later Russell takes his neutral monism to have key resources for answering his prior objections.

V. The Humanities

Stephen Grimm

The sciences aim to get at the truth about the nature of the world. Do the humanities have a similar goal–namely, to get at the truth about things like novels, paintings, and historical events? I consider a few different ways in which the humanities aim at the truth about their objects, in the process giving rise to epistemic goods such as knowledge and understanding. A work of history (Tyler Stovall's 1996 book Paris Noir) is used as a test case, to consider the ways in which narrative often plays an essential role in leading us to understanding.

Lilian O'Brien

Coming soon.

VI. Logical Consequence

Gillian Russell

In this paper I ask what logical consequence is, and give an answer that is somewhat different from the usual ones. It's natural to wonder why we need a new conception of logical consequence, and so I begin by explaining the work that I want the answer to do and why the standard conceptions aren't well-suited to the task. Then I articulate a replacement view which is. This paper is a contribution to a conversation that has included Alfred Tarski, John Etchemendy, and Gila Sher, but the view that I articulate and argue for here differs substantially from each of theirs. First, it is a hybrid of the more common semantic and metaphysical approaches, and second (and perhaps this is initially more shocking) it rethinks the distinction between logical and non-logical expressions, and takes this to be an idealisation of a very different phenomenon in natural language. The result is a conception of logical consequence well-suited to capturing the entailment relation on both formal and natural languages, and on which there is no principled discontinuity between logical and analytic consequence.

Sara Uckleman

Logical Consequence (Slight Return)," Gillian Russell asks "what is logical consequence?", a question which has vexed logicians since at least the 12th century, when people first began to wonder what does it mean for one sentence (or proposition) to follow from another sentence (or proposition; or set of sentences; or set of propositions), or whether it was possible to put down rules determining \emph{when} the relation of "follows from" (or "is antecedent to") holds. Her aim is threeofld: (1) to explain what an answer to the question "what is logical consequence?" would need to be able to do in order to be a satisfying answer, (2) to identify previous answers to the question, (3) to demonstrate why these previous answers are inadequate to do what the answer needs to be able to do, and to offer a new answer. In the present paper, we respond to these aims in two ways. The first is to say something about where Russell's central question even comes from, because this is not a topic that is often discussed by 20th- and 21st-century logicians, and

even historians of logic tend to not have had much to say about when—and why—this question even comes about in the first place. The second is to evaluate the accounts proposed and discussed by Russell, including her new proposal. In the end, we will argue that she has reached the right account of the nature of logical consequence, but not necessarily for the right reasons.

The Postgraduate Sessions

Ordered by session



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Practical Session

Zachary Brants

A Version of Aversion Aristotle Would Not Be Averse To

Despite the apparent difference between aversion and desire as two separate ways in which we can be motivated, a notorious passage in De Anima III.7 seems to identify their respective faculties, claiming that they are 'the same but different in being.' In this paper I defend a new way to understand the identity of the faculty of aversion and the faculty of desire that takes inspiration from the two-way rational capacities, such as medicine, that enable two contrary activities. I suggest that aversion and desire are analogously two aspects of a single two-way conative capacity that can be active as either pursuit or avoidance. This interpretation clarifies the sense in which aversion and desire are 'the same but different in being' while also making sense of Aristotle's tendency to compare pursuit and avoidance to affirmation and denial.

Owen Clifton

Contractualism and Two Types of Non-Identity

Intuitively, it would be wrong to create a person whose life would be worth living, when the alternative is to create a numerically different person whose life would be better. "The Non-Identity Problem" is, roughly, the problem of explaining why this would be wrong, given that it would be worse for no one. Many believe that Scanlonian contractualism solves the Non-Identity Problem since, according to that theory, whether a choice is wrong is insensitive to the numerical identities of the individuals it stands to affect. I show this is a mistake. In the relevant respect, numerical non-identity is beside the point of the Non-Identity Problem. What generates the Non-Identity Problem is instead the apparent absence of a different type of non-identity, which I call "standpoint non-identity": whatever we choose, whoever comes into existence will instantiate one and the same standpoint, namely that of someone for whom our choice has not made things worse. I argue contractualism cannot solve the Non-Identity Problem, properly understood.

Lauren Miano

Musical education

The standard view of early education in Books II and III of the Republic is that it aims exclusively at the spirited part of the soul in order to instill a discriminatory sense between fine and shameful items. However, we find evidence in Book III that the aim of early education is to fit together the spirited and philosophic parts of the soul, suggesting that early education targets at least one other part of the soul. In this paper, I will briefly provide textual evidence that this philosophic part is indeed that rational part before turning to my focus of the paper: exploring how early education, specifically that in music, affects the rational part in order to carry out this aim. I will argue, perhaps surprisingly, that musical education does instill in the soul a discriminatory sense between fine and shameful, but that this sense is instilled in the

rational part, contra the standard interpretation. I will do this by raising some problems for the standard interpretation and then will conclude by showing that my interpretation fits better with the picture that we get in the Republic of the rational part as a guide for the spirited part.

Joseph Sibley

Choice and Character Constitution in the Republic's Myth of Er

In this paper I present an allegorical reading of Plato's Republic's Myth of Er which shows it to be a philosophically sophisticated and plausible account of character formation. That is, the Myth offers us an account of the interplay between our choices and characters in our present life; and, as one should expect, it acts as a protreptic towards justice. Though not the dominant reading, the claim that the Myth of Er represents choice(s) made in our present lives has been suggested in the literature, yet there has not been a full account of this representation. Some have noted that our choices influence our character, but these general statements fail to attend to the details of Plato's Myth. In fact, I shall argue, the Myth represents two choices, both made in our current lives: one concerning what kind of a person to be, the other concerning our particular actions. Once this is recognised, the obvious question is how these two choices are related. I shall argue that choice has two roles to play: first, in constituting our characters; second, in forming our characters. But quite apart from an analysis of choice, the Myth of Er acts as a protreptic, exhorting us to choose the life of justice. It does so by making us aware of the catastrophic effects of a life of injustice, effects which are instantiated within a lifetime. Particularly, the Myth shows that only by choosing justice can we possess a stable and unified psyche.

Theoretical Session

Frederik J. Andersen

Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality

A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justification holism due to the revival of an abductivist approach to the epistemology of logic. This paper presents an argument against holism by establishing a foundational entailment-sentence of deduction which is justified independently of theory choice and outside the context of a whole logical theory.

Jacopo Berneri

Predicative Russell-Myhill and the Ramified Hierarchy

The standard version of the Russell-Myhill paradox is blocked by implementing logical restrictions associated with a traditional understanding of predicativism. Uzquiano has recently shown that these restrictions are not safe: another version of the Russell-Myhill paradox still goes through. I argue that it can be blocked by a more thoroughgoing understanding of predicativism, as implemented, for example, by ramified type theory. The upshot is that predicativism, properly understood, avoids the paradox.

Christabel Cane

Statues and Lumps: What's The Matter?

What is the difference between an ancient lump of marble, and the newly-sculped statue it constitutes? The 'standard' answer can be divided into two categories of property instantiated by each: historical and modal. The lump has a greater age, and the statue can survive various counterfactual scenarios that the lump could not. The literature that surrounds this question, places much significance upon the latter, but little is said about the former. My paper will begin to rectify this imbalance.

Worm-theoretic perdurantists provide a neat answer to the above: the new statue is a temporal part of the marble. However, though the worm-theoretic account deals very well with cases of temporary coincidence, where an ancient lump of is fashioned into a higher-order object, it runs into trouble when confronted with cases of permanent coincidence, where the object and the are created and destroyed at the very same instants. In this case, the historical properties of the object and the lump are exactly co-extensive, even though the modal properties are not.

My paper examines arguments from worm-theoretic perdurantists for denying that modal properties count when assessing the indiscernibility of purportedly identical objects. I demonstrate that these arguments apply to historical properties too, and therefore undermine worm-theoretic perdurantism. Perdurantists are committed to historical properties, as according to them, objects are identical to fusions of their temporal parts, which means that historical properties determine an object's boundaries. The worm-theoretic perdurantist must therefore reject these arguments.

Wouter Cohen

Russell and the roots of higher-order existence

Russell's higher-order theory of existence is among his most influential ideas. Its central thesis is that existence is not a property of objects, but a property of properties, or, to use Russell's terminology, a property of propositional functions. A propositional function has this property if and only if it is true in at least one instance. Existence thus essentially becomes existential quantification. In this short paper, I examine part of Russell's route to this theory, which he first fully endorses around 1918. I show that Russell accepted two important existential distinctions in his early philosophy: a distinction between being and existence, and a distinction between

philosophical and mathematical existence. Scholars have mainly focused on the first distinction, but I argue that the second distinction is more illuminating when we are concerned with understanding the origins of Russell's higher-order theory. In particular, I argue that his notion of mathematical existence, which he was already using in 1903 and so before the theory of descriptions, is a higher-order notion of existence and so an important root of Russell's mature higher-order theory. In the final section, I argue that he got his mathematical notion of existence from the Boolean logicians Lewis Carroll and John Venn. Altogether, the paper places Russell's influential higher-order theory of existence in a new historical narrative that starts in the 19th-century and thus shows that his theory did not simply arise with theory of descriptions, as is still commonly assumed.

Society for Women in Philosophy

Ordered Alphabetically by Surname



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Emanuela Carta (emanuela.carta@kuleuven.be)

Conceptual Amelioration in Feminist Phenomenology

The question ‘What is a woman?’ has always been one of the most debated questions within feminist philosophy. While Judith Butler and others have highlighted the risks of any attempt to define 'woman' and have rejected this task altogether, analytic feminist philosophers such as Sally Haslanger have reshaped the discussion. According to Haslanger, feminist philosophers should not analyze what women are but should consider which concept of 'woman' we should adopt to end sexist oppression. This is precisely thwe focus of what she refers to as ‘ameliorative inquiry’.

In my paper, I defend the importance of carrying out ameliorative inquiries in Haslanger’s sense, and I argue that feminist and critical phenomenologists too should explicitly focus on ameliorating gender concepts. Given the role that concepts play in shaping how we see, judge, feel, and interact with others, critical and feminist phenomenologists cannot attempt to “repair the world” [Weiss, Murphy, Salomon 2019: xiv] without intervening in them. Their attention to interrupting habitual modalities of seeing and revising types is necessary but insufficient. Furthermore, I argue that engaging with the task of ameliorating the concept of 'woman' from a feminist and critical phenomenological perspective opens up new, concrete strategies for ameliorative inquiry. In this regard, in the last part of my presentation, I sketch some desiderata for a phenomenological approach to the conceptual amelioration of the concept of 'woman'.

Bengü Demirtaş (bengu.demirtas@bilkent.edu.tr)

With Pleasure: A Feminist Contractarian Supplement to the Nonideal Theory of Consent

This paper offers a feminist contractarian supplement to Quill R. Kukla’s nonideal theory of consent by focusing on mutual dispositions towards pleasure for the evaluation of the justice of a sexual encounter. Considering Kukla’s advocacy in favor of sexual communication for increased sexual agency under nonideal conditions, the absence of mutual positive dispositions towards pleasure in the scaffolding of consent is a considerable gap. The supplement I am proposing favors an equitable distribution of sexual costs and benefits and ensures positive expressions of agency that go beyond safety, trust, and epistemic capability. First, I argue that collaborative accounts of sexual agency must acknowledge the differences in the breadth of space allowed for women’s and nonbinary people’s pleasure versus men’s in the broader social context where sexual communication occurs. To showcase the influence of heteronormative and patriarchal scripts of sexual action on women’s and nonbinary people’s claims toward pleasure, I focus on feigned pleasure cases where patriarchal notions of good sex between heterosexual partners threaten consensuality. Then, adapting Jean Hampton’s feminist contractarianism to the sexual domain, which brings forth the moral evaluation of private relationships as motivated by self-interest, I offer a supplement to Kukla’s scaffolding of sexual agency. Through this supplement, I locate pleasure among the main motivations for sexual action. I further argue that each

partner’s positive dispositions towards their own and their partner’s pleasure help promote the expression of the positive agential powers of oppressed groups in sexual settings. Lastly, I respond to objections from cases of asexuality, sex work, and procreation, where dispositions towards pleasure seemingly play a much smaller part as motivating reasons for sexual action.

Sara Marina Kok (sara.kok@unibe.ch)

Blame and Colonialism

When discussing blame for colonialism, a tension seems to arise. Those who were, and are, most affected by colonialism—those who were colonized and their descendants—are the ones whose blame is most often not heard: it is those who have most to blame for who are often denied participation in these practices. In this article, I examine why this tension exists, and what this means for the ethics of blame. I argue that exclusion from blaming practices constitutes a kind of claimant death, following Medina's (2017) conception of epistemic death, and Carbonell's (2019) conception of claimant injustice. I conclude this problem is twofold: firstly, the harm inflicted upon the colonized is often not seen as wrong. Secondly, blame by the colonized is generally not received. To illustrate this, I engage with decolonial and postcolonial theory, specifically with the work of Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961), Judith Butler (2009), Achille Mbembe (2019) and Aníbal Quijano (2007). I argue that the colonized and their descendants are often not seen as moral subjects in a way that enables them to participate in blaming practices, because colonialism requires them to be stripped of this status. They are—in the Fanonian sense—the wretched of the earth, people who exist in a zone of nonbeing, which does not enable them to exist in relation—as the Other—but solely outside of this Self-Other dichotomy (Gordon, 2007). Their exclusion from this relationship relates to their status as ungrievable lives, as living dead, as those upon whom harm can easily be inflicted. By illustrating this, I raise the question of whether blame as we know it is appropriate in decolonial contexts. Even if generally inappropriate I argue that there is a certain conception of blame—blame as empowering and value-affirming—that might be apt in certain situations (Franklin, 2013; Houston, 1992; Talbert, 2012).

Irati Zubia Landa (iratizubia11@gmail.com)

Why Not Everyone Can Afford To Be A Bullshitter A Feminist Approach On Bullshit

Feminist epistemology and feminist philosophy of language have shown that, when analyzing language, who the speaker is matters a great deal. By situating participants in their historical and social position, it becomes clear that power also permeates our conversations, giving rise to phenomena like epistemic injustices (Fricker 2007). I argue that similar dynamics are reproduced in the bullshit phenomenon.

Bullshit is a speech characterized by the indifference toward truth, distinguished from lying (Frankfurt 2005). I propose that this can be understood as indifference toward the responsibility that one’s utterances entail. Speakers bear discursive responsibility

to address legitimate challenges posed by hearers, such us "What do you mean?" or "Get to the point" (Marsili 2021). These challenges are a compelling reason to care about truth. While liars cannot, bullshitters manage to evade them.

Bullshitters enjoy a higher degree of tolerance in comparison to liars (Frankfurt 2005), which seem to be an underlying factor that allows them to act in such a careless manner. However, this tolerance is intertwined with social norms and expectations. In concrete, can be affected by imbalances on the economy of credibility (Fricker 2007, Medina 2011). By analyzing bullshit examples, I will show that power grants some speakers impunity, enabling them to utter bullshit statements without concern. In contrast, those who are in powerless position not only will be subject to higher scrutiny, but will find more difficult to make legitimate challenges, even when they believe it is legitimate to do so. In this sense, bullshit is close to phenomena such as testimonial injustice (Fricker 2007) and testimonial smothering (Dotson 2011).

Jessica Masterson (drjessicamasterson@outlook.com)

Understanding the Sexual Grey Area: Consent As a Mental Act

The sexual “grey area” refers to instances in which, after a sexual encounter, one party feels violated or wronged by the other in some sense, but does not categorise the encounter as rape. This kind of sexual encounter is experienced by the violated party as distinct from other instances of consensual sex, but is not labelled as rape. Thus, grey area sex is sex that is, in a seemingly contradictory way, not-consensual-sex and also not-rape (Cottone 2023). There have been many attempts by philosophers and feminist theorists to make sense of this grey area, typically either by understanding it as a new category of sexual encounter or by upholding existing rape categorisation (Cahill 2014; Gavey 2005). In this paper, I discuss the attitudinal approach to sexual consent and explore the idea that this approach may offer a way of understanding the grey area from the perspective of violated parties. I start by explaining how the attitudinal, or mentalistic, approach understands consent and its mechanisms. I then show how, for obvious practical reasons, this approach deviates substantially from the legal standard of consent. Using these two distinct understandings of consent, I explain how an individual might feel wronged after a sexual encounter that is at once consensual (legal approach) and non-consensual (attitudinal approach). The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility that the attitudinal approach to consent enables us to better understand grey-area sexual encounters from the perspective of violated parties.

Lauren Stephens (l.stephens@liverpool.ac.uk)

We Should Act Like Artists: Simone de Beauvoir’s ‘Artist’ as Ethical Ideal

There has been diverse existentialist emphasis on ethical ways of being, such as Kierkegaard’s ‘knight of faith’, Nietzsche’s ‘Übermensch’, and Sartre’s ‘committed artist’. In this paper I argue for the importance of Simone de Beauvoir’s claim that if we aim to act ethically, we should act like artists. First, I begin by referencing de

Beauvoir's arguments from The Ethics of Ambiguity about artists and creativity as ethical action, compared to her concepts of unethical ways of being like 'serious men' or 'passionate men'. Second, I argue de Beauvoir's emphasis on artists greatly informs her other ethical claims, such as her concept of ambiguity or differentiating ontological freedom from moral freedom. I conclude with recommending we all follow de Beauvoir's arguments and should aim to act like artists.

I will begin by explaining de Beauvoir's views that 'serious men' take refuge in ready-made values of the world, while 'passionate men' fail to realize there is more to the world than their own projects. I emphasize de Beauvoir's further claims that artists creatively use the ready-made values of the world in order to realize their projects, underscoring the ethical importance of acting in this way in life. I further argue de Beauvoir's ethical ideal of artists informs her concept of ambiguity, since she compares the acceptance of ambiguity to accepting an 'aesthetic attitude'. I additionally argue the ethical ideal of artists informs de Beauvoir's distinction between ontological and moral freedom: artists act by recognizing the importance of both ontological and moral freedom, while the recognition of ontological freedom without moral freedom is akin to her arguments about 'passionate men'. To conclude, my paper highlights de Beauvoir's ethical support of the 'artist' as not only an ethical ideal, but a concept which greatly informs her other ethical claims.

Huaiyuan Susanna Zhang (hqz5229@psu.edu)

Maior Vestra Voluptas Est (Your Pleasure Is More)—The Moved Temporality of the Feminine in Levinas' Phenomenology of Eros

This paper argues that Levinasian ethics assigns significant value to feminine pleasure. Despite hasty accusations of Levinas' sexism in his phenomenology of eros, the feminine serves both as the interruption of the virility of being and a foundational model for the ethical Other. While Katz (2003) and Chalier (1982) emphasize maternity in Otherwise than Being as the ethical locus, I propose that the love of the feminine in Totality and Infinity, in its authentic form, is inherently ethical, even without motherhood. Following Chanter (1990)'s directive to seriously consider feminine temporality, I provide a comprehensive account of the feminine temporality of "being moved [attendrissement]" (TI 259), decrypting Levinas' assertion that "This future of death in the present of love is probably one of the original secrets of temporality itself and beyond all metaphors" (EN 217). Otherwise than preceding eros linearly, temporality is the manner in which eros unfolds, enabling the subject to transcend temporal and intersubjective intervals.3 The erotic temporality traces my synchronous responsibility for the Other, where "the past of the other, which has never been my present, 'concerns me'" (EN 115) back to the diachronic pre-history of the self. The erotic temporality of "the future in the present" (TI 258) portrays the subject being moved by the Other as a secret never present but always to come, while the temporality of the Other as "the future in the present" characterizes the Other's irrecusable approach in the frank presence of the face. In the interconnectedness of love, ethics, and death, the face of the feminine, already abandoning itself to dying, embodies the ethical faith as strong as death. Levinas love of the feminine transcends

ethics in an original sense by fulfilling the ethical end in love itself, “beyond the present instant and even beyond the person loved” (DF 36).

Open Session Abstracts

Ordered alphabetically by surname



UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM

Maikki Aakko (maikki.aakko@campion.ox.ac.uk)

The Appearing of the Other: On the Disinterestedness of Aesthetic Perception and The Moral Recognition of the Other

In his paper ˜Transcendental Anti-theodicy' (in eds. J.P. Brune, R. Stern & M.H. Werner Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017) Sami Pihlström argues that recognition of the other as other is a transcendental condition for inhabiting the moral perspective. Connecting Pihlström's insight with a Murdochian analysis of the centrality of vision for the moral life, I argue that much of moral life depends on perception. In order to recognize the other as other the agent must be able to engage in a perceptual practice which can be characterised as a disinterested letting-appear: the perceiving agent's epistemic environment, structured by agent-related aims and interests, must yield so that the other can appear in their subjectivity. Developing this kind of disinterested perception requires formation.

I argue that this formation can be aided by engagement with art because aesthetic perception also requires, according to many classical accounts of it, disinterestedness. In philosophy of art, however, this disinterestedness is juxtaposed with cognitive and practical aims: looking can only be disinterested if the perceiver relinquishes all other AIMS than the looking itself, directing her attention to the object in its appearing, the play of its appearances (Martin Seel, Aesthetics of Appearing [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2005], 37). Hence, it would seem that aesthetic letting-appear is not easily compatible with the letting-appear of the other because the latter has distinct cognitive and practical aims, e.g. the recognition of the other.

In contrast, I suggest that there are certain kinds of knowledges such AS knowledge of other subjectivities which requires disinterestedness like that of aesthetic perception: some things can only be known by relinquishing the aim to know. In other words, and perhaps less paradoxically, by letting go of specific epistemic aims and expectations, I can practice receptivity to what's not already me or mine, e.g. the other. My paper thus also challenges two common assumptions in philosophy of art: that cognitive aims and aesthetic perception do not align, and that the domain of the moral and the aesthetic are completely divorced from each other.

Rory Aird (r.aird.1@research.gla.ac.uk)

On the perils of engaging

Recent work in social epistemology has discussed obligations to engage with challenges to our beliefs like climate change denial or anti-vaccine sentiment, and the potential benefits to and dangers for both the engager and the engaged from doing so. The spotlight being trained so in this literature, however, has elided a key issue: the possible risks from engaging relating to third-party observers, not merely the engager and the engaged. In this paper, I argue that not only are these risks an underappreciated aspect of engaging that should be discussed, it is in fact especially concerning that they have been neglected as the potential negative epistemic fallout threatens to overwhelm any possible benefits that may be gained from engaging. In particular, I show that no matter how the engagement goes for the interlocutor,

negative epistemic effects will likely abound on third-party observers, meaning the overall outcome of an engagement will regularly be epistemically deleterious. I draw a variety of theoretical and practical upshots from these conclusions, including a warning to any grounding obligations to engage in consequentialist frameworks, and sketch a few strategies to conceivably avoid the problems outlined in the paper.

Farhad Alavi (Farhad.alavi@ed.ac.uk)

Discovering 'Absolute Necessity': Hume on Arithmetic Demonstrations

For Hume, there are two distinct forms of belief that mark objects of Knowledge and certainty on the one hand and matters of fact on the other. Borrowing his terminology from Locke, Hume often speaks of demonstration in contrast to probability as a different way through which our understanding forms judgments that yield knowledge and certainty (E 6.0n10). There is compelling textual evidence suggesting that for Hume, the notion of demonstration is crucially tied to his account of absolute necessity, and certainty. On top of that, Hume also separates arithmetic as an abstract science which through demonstration preserves perfect exactness and certainty (T 1.3.1.5). The only objects of demonstration, Hume posits, are quantity and numbers (E 12.27).

In this paper, I intend to investigate Hume's notion of demonstration by looking into his ideal case for demonstrability, the more perfect species of knowledge that can be gained in arithmetic. If one can take Hume to posit that the demonstrability of a proposition P amounts to P's absolute necessity and therefore certainty, I want to see how Hume's philosophy would accommodate such a claim, specifically in the ideal case of arithmetic. I structure my presentation as follows: I will first try to define demonstration both modally in terms of necessity, possibility, impossibility, and descriptively in terms of its constituting intuitions that form a chain of reasoning. In a second step, I attempt to see whether and how, if at all, in the ideal case of arithmetic, the descriptive definition of demonstration can meet the modal definition. Arithmetic demonstrations, I argue, can best illustrate Hume's account of absolute necessity. Drawing on Owen (1999)'s semantic interpretation of demonstration, I will then discuss how my suggested reading goes against an anti-realist reading of "absolute necessity" e.g., in Holden (2014)- by still upholding the import of Hume's fork.

Luca Alberto (lar27@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Mind, World, and Paradox

In Mind and World (1994), J. McDowell promotes a conception of facts as conceptually structured entities. This essay shows that such a conception leads McDowell directly into the web of the Paradox of Knowability (i.e., the idea that if all truths are knowable, then they are all already known).

Giacomo Andreoletti (giacomo.andreoletti@protonmail.com)

Acting in the Garden of Forking Paths

The Garden of Forking Paths is a popular picture of agency which consists of two elements. The first is to see time as branching towards the future; the future is composed of several alternative continuations of the present, viz. the alternative paths. The second element has to do with the role of agents: agents have sometimes the ability to make things go the way they want. That is, agents can act in ways that determine which future will be selected and actualized.

Despite its popularity, I argue that the Garden of Forking Paths is, upon closer inspection, inherently implausible. More precisely, the view is incompatible with some minimal necessary conditions for agency that a proponent of the view must be committed to endorse.

Here are the three necessary conditions. An agent a performs an act A (ending at m) only if: 1) at some moment prior to m, a decided to A" acts require prior decisions, 2) at some moment prior to m, alternative future courses of action were available to the agent – one can deliberate only about what is contingent, and 3) some of a's mental events occurring prior to m explain why A, instead of one of the other alternatives, occurred – acts make a difference with respect to which branch is actualized.

I show that independently of where in a branching structure we place the moment of choice mC and the moment of the subsequent act mA – the plausible options being: 1) both mC and mA after the relevant branching point, 2) mC earlier than the branching point with mA after it, and 3) mC right at the branching point and mA after it – acts cannot meet all the tree necessary conditions above. Thus, the inherent implausibility of the Garden of Forking Paths picture of agency.

John A. Barnden (jabarnden@btinternet.com)

Evolutionary Implications of the Meta-Causal Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Views about the evolution of [phenomenal] consciousness are diverse: it didn't evolve because it always existed anyway; it did evolve, but only as a non-beneficial side-effect of other developments; it evolved through being adaptively beneficial. I take this last view, appealing to distinctive features of a physicalist theory of consciousness—called "MCC" here—that I have developed [in recent journal papers] though without claiming evolutionary advantages there.

In MCC, a conscious process is, at any moment in its progress, directly, causally sensitive to its own prior internal causation as a physical entity in its own right. The sensitivity is thus meta-causal. MCC identifies causation with the basic-physical productivity or dynamism of the world, and, radically, takes it to be a "first-class citizen" of the world, able to engage in causal interaction as cause or effect. Meta-causation, discussed only sporadically even in causation research, had not previously been proposed for explaining consciousness.

The prior causation above must itself involve meta-causation like that above. Consequently, consciousness (in a core, primitive, non-conceptual form) is type-

identical to a “whirl” of meta-causation that continuously meta-causally affects itself, with that very self-affecting being an affected constituent of the whirl. MCC’s claims about adaptive value concern the protective benefit of pain and other [conscious] discomfort. The meta-causal whirl has an auto-sustaining tendency, and discomfort consists of the whirl positively attempting (unsuccessfully) to destroy itself, fighting the auto-sustaining. Consequently, it is normally difficult for conscious processes to suppress their discomfort—such attempts would themselves count as auto-destruction pressure, tending ironically to consolidate discomfort. Such difficulty is adaptively beneficial. It might arise under other theories, but arguably evolves more easily and stably under MCC. Relatedly, MCC distinctively explains pain’s difficult-to-ignore quality. Finally, MCC renders conscious systems better evolvable than non-conscious zombies that merely simulate the systems' external behaviour.

Jacob Beck (jbeck@yorku.ca)

Two Perception–Cognition Borders

The distinction between perception and cognition is part of common-sense. When your COVID test is positive you see two lines but must infer that you have COVID. The distinction is also central to debates in philosophy and cognitive science – for example, about whether causation can be perceived. But how should the border between perception and cognition be characterized?

I will contrast two views. The first holds that perception and cognition are distinguished by their formats: whereas perception is iconic or analog, cognition is discursive or digital. Versions of this view have been defended by Fred Dretske and more recently Ned Block. I will argue that this format-based view is ill-suited to mark the border between perception and cognition in general, though it might distinguish one special type of cognition – propositional thought – from both perception and nonpropositional cognition.

The second view holds that perception is stimulus-dependent in a way that cognition is not. Perception involves the use of the senses (vision, audition, etc.), which extract information about the external world from proximal stimulation (light, sound, etc.). By contrast, cognition can run offline, without the operation of the senses and in the absence of proximal stimulation. Thus, you cannot see Times Square with your eyes closed, though you can think about or imagine it just fine. I will argue that this view is better suited to distinguishing perception from cognition in general. In so doing, I will show how this view can handle recent objections due to Jake Quilty-Dunn, Tyler Burge, and Ned Block.

The upshot is the recognition of two borders: one grounded in stimulus-dependence between perception and cognition in general; and another grounded in format between propositional thought and everything below it. Both borders, I will argue, are important for different reasons.

Brian Berkey (co-authored with Kritika Maheshwari)
(bberkey@wharton.upenn.edu)

The Ethics of Partner Hiring in Academia

Partner hiring is fairly widespread in universities in certain countries, perhaps most notably the United States. In typical cases, a department that has offered a job to a candidate either offers a job to that candidate's partner or spouse as well, or arranges for the partner to be offered a job in another department at the university. In other cases, partner hires are offered as a means to retain a faculty member who may otherwise leave for a job at a different university.

Most commonly, partner hiring policies are defended by suggesting that they are often necessary to ensure that a department's top-choice candidate accepts a job offer, or to retain a faculty member that a department does not want to lose. In addition, the practice is sometimes defended on the grounds that it is responsive to the employment needs of dual-career couples, and/or that it makes academia more family-friendly, and/or that it helps increase the number of women who are hired and remain in academia.

In this paper, we consider whether we ought to endorse the practice of partner hiring in academia. We focus on the question of whether a set of norms roughly like those in place in the United States, which treat the practice as entirely legitimate, are preferable, ethically speaking, to having a generally accepted norm against the practice, such that partner hires do not occur anywhere. We argue that there are a number of underappreciated reasons that count against partner hiring. Our tentative conclusion is that the force of these reasons is sufficient to outweigh the reasons on the other side, so that all things considered we ought to oppose the practice and support the development of norms against it.

Enrico Biale and Gloria Zuccarelli (gloria.zuccarelli@uniupo.it)

A Relational Account of Democratic Equality in an Ageing Society

The world's population is ageing, leading to a decline in the social, economic, and political power of younger people. Here we focus on the democratic power imbalance between age groups and the unfairly reduced opportunities for young people's political voices to be heard. Political philosophers have proposed various solutions to this problem, addressing the numerical imbalance between age groups, youth participation, and responsiveness – such as age-weighted voting, lowering the voting age, positive and negative incentives to vote, and youth quotas. We argue that these proposals (a) share a simplistic and minimalist interpretation of democracy, (b) treat the challenges faced by young people in a way that is problematic, as it is similar to how historically marginalized groups are treated based on their gender, race, class, sexual orientation, etc, and (c) have an underlying distributive logic that overlooks the relational injustices young people face. To overcome these problems and ensure political equality between age groups we develop a relational account of equality, that is grounded on Lafont's view of democratic co-authorship, and justify complex institutional changes. According to this perspective citizens are treated as equals if they can control the decision-making process. This view does not simply require that people have equal opportunities to influence the electoral process, but it entails that they can shape the political debate by politicizing their demands and challenging policy decisions when their relevant interests are not taken into account. To achieve this aim in an ageing society and

ensure that young people are treated as equals, democratic institutions need to be deeply transformed. In particular, we claim that contestatory panels are necessary to allow young people to challenge decisions that do not consider their interests and to create participatory forums that can politicize their demands.

Robin T. Bianchi (robin.bianchi@unine.ch)

The Scope of Agency

According to a standard causalist intuition when agents act, they make things happen. Some of the things that happen are essential to one's actions and some are merely caused by one's exercise of agency. This corresponds to the well-known distinction introduced by von Wright between the result of an act – the change that must have occurred for the act to have been performed – and the consequence(s) of an act – the changes caused by the performance of my act but which are neither essential to it nor necessary for its occurrence. For instance, the death of the queen is the result of the act of killing her, while it is also the consequence of the act of shooting her and the act of pulling the trigger, while the ensuing revolution is a consequence of these acts, but the result of no act of the agent. As the example illustrates, not everything that happens as a result of action needs to be the result of an act. What is the difference then between what is made to happen by the agent in acting and what happens as a mere consequence of it? In this paper, I shall argue that the excepted answers to that question are found wanting: the difference is not explained by differences between intended and unintended effects or between foreseen and unforeseen effects. My proposal is that the limit of what we make happen in acting is set by the extent of our causal contribution to the things that happen when we act. When our causal contribution to what happens dries up, the effects become mere consequences of our actions and the rest is up to nature. After explaining the concept of causal contribution and applying it to our question, I end by defending my proposal against objections.

Noell Birondo (nbirondo@utep.edu)

Race, Hatred, and the Preservation of Ignorance

Racial hatred need not be based on ignorance, far from it. But racial hatred is often the product of ignorance – the product of various failures of knowledge or understanding. Indeed, white supremacist hatred seems to depend essentially upon the preservation of ignorance. The targets of white supremacist hatred do not merit the highly aversive attitudes that are plausibly constitutive of intense forms of hatred: a desire for the destruction of the hated target or the perception that the hated target is incapable of positive change.

In this paper I draw on recent discussions of epistemologies of ignorance in order to highlight the constitutive forms of ignorance that pervade the hatred found in the white supremacist tradition. But my thesis is much more specific: that morally justifiable hatred is highly asymmetric with respect to social power, given the constitutive forms of ignorance possessed by white supremacist haters. Two kinds of ignorance will be central to the discussion: (1) cases in which a person's ignorance is broadly her own responsibility, e.g. willful hermeneutical ignorance, and (2) cases in

which her ignorance results from systemic features over which she has little control, e.g. her community's imperialist memorials; its support for racially biased policies, educational content, and so on; or the general paucity of concepts in the ˜shared hermeneutical resource' tailored to understanding the experiences of marginally-situated individuals.

The paper indicates that morally justifiable hatred (if such there be) is highly asymmetric with respect to social power. It provides a perspicuous explanation of the not-uncommon suspicion that while 'bottom-up' hatred can be morally justifiable in a wide variety of cases – given our all-too-knowledgeable familiarity with the character and characteristics of the dominant group – 'top-down' hatred reveals only the white supremacist's glaring defects of character and intellect, and a generally culpable commitment to ignorance.

Gunnar Björnsson (gbjorn@su.se)

Rebalancing: From distributive to retributive desert

The blameworthy, it seems, deserve blame. They deserve being the target of indignation over what they have done, and to feel the pangs of guilt in the case of self-blame. Or at least they do, as long as the blame is proportionate to their blameworthiness.

The notion of desert at play in these common thoughts seems to imply that being the target of blame is pro tanto bad for one, but that it is good, as a matter of justice, that the blameworthy are subject to it in proportion to the badness of their action. Moreover, it is commonly thought that the blameworthy agent's accepting the blame and suffering the pangs of guilt is part of what goes into setting things right after the wrongdoing. In brief, the notion of desert at play seems to be one of retributive desert.

My concern in this paper is to identify the structure and normative presuppositions of this notion of desert. I argue that it presupposes that it is important that individual moral agents and groups give a certain comparative weight over time to people and other values. This explains how the blameworthy's moral transgressions change the weight that should be given to their interests and point of view, and why it can be good as a matter of justice that the blameworthy suffer the pangs of guilt. It also explains why what a perpetrator deserves, fundamentally, is to be given less weight compared to values that they gave too little weight in their culpable wrongdoing, and why what they deserve is relative to different weight givers: they might deserve to suffer setbacks at the hands of their victims even if not at the hands of third parties, or setbacks at their own hands even if not at the hands of their victims.

Michele Bocchiola (michele.bocchiola@unige.ch)

The Guise of Institutional Trust

Contemporary political philosophers have traditionally examined the trust citizens place in public institutions (e.g., healthcare facilities, governmental agencies, educational entities like schools and universities etc.), predominantly adopting an external perspective. This viewpoint analyzes and assesses the (level of) trust

directed towards public institutions as perceived by those who interact with them but are not integral members. While this external viewpoint is undeniably valuable for appraising the functioning of public institutions, this paper explores a more nuanced and often overlooked conceptual challenge: understanding the nature of trust within public institutions, addressing the question of what it means for officeholders within these institutions to trust each other.

To illuminate this internal facet of institutional trust, the paper proceeds as follows. First, it elucidates how public institutions, characterized as systems of interrelated rule-governed roles, generate networks of mutual dependence among officeholders. These networks of mutual dependence necessitate internal trust for public institutions to function, especially in situations where public offices wield discretion in fulfilling institutional roles. Second, the paper argues that within this framework, for officeholders to trust each other, they need to cultivate a disposition – call it a 'pro officio' attitude – to diligently fulfill their institutional roles. This entails adherence to established rules as well as ethical norms governing institutional action. More specifically, for officeholders cognizant of the interrelatedness of their institutional roles, trusting each other means presuming that a 'pro officio' attitude from those trusted will be deemed a weighty reason for acting as entrusted. This establishes a crucial link between institutional trust and the acknowledgment of shared institutional responsibilities. The paper concludes by defending the practical relevance of institutional trust against the potential objection that trust among officeholders is merely a consequence of strict compliance with, and reliance on, well-designed institutional rules.

Dominik Boll (d.boll@vu.nl)

The Pluralist View of Taking Responsibility

What is it for an agent to take responsibility? Call this the constituent question. My aim in this essay is to provide a novel answer to this question. While the topic is not entirely new, there has been a flurry of recent interest in taking responsibility. Why do we take responsibility for inadvertence if we are faultless (Wolf 2001; Raz 2011; Mason 2019)? Is it ineligible to take responsibility for someone else's actions, results of AI, or historical injustices (Enoch 2012; Goetze 2021; Kiener 2022)? Even for clear agential wrongdoing, what taking responsibility involves is more complicated than initially apparent (Sliwa 2024; Hieronymi 2024). This essay advances the debate with three contributions. First, I provide a systematic overview over the questions relevant to taking responsibility, and thereby specify desiderata an account should meet. Second, I advance objections against both prominent types of views – what I call the Attitudinal View and the Actional View – and argue that they fall short of the desiderata. I disarm the worry that they are concerned with different things, showing that they aim to theorise the same phenomenon. Third, I propose and defend the Pluralist View. Taking responsibility involves three components which manifest in different ways according to object and context: (a) an acknowledgement of significance (both of one's role and its impact), (b) steps towards normalisation, in the case of wrongdoing typically repair (materially, symbolically, and interpersonally), and (c) an appropriate attitudinal response (affectively, cognitively, and

motivationally). Characteristic elements of taking responsibility like compensation, apologising, or adverse feelings can take the role of different and multiple of these components. I discuss these elements, show that the view successfully meets the desiderata, and outline independent advantages. The Pluralist View is thus preferable over its rivals but retains the main attractions of both.

Anna-Katharina Boos (anna.boos@uzh.ch)

Blameless responsibility: Who owes what to the victims of morally permissible AI-systems?

State and private organizations are increasingly deploying AI-systems capable of performing tasks and making decisions without direct human involvement. While this advancement holds promise, it also introduces the possibility of unforeseen accidents, causing physical and psychological harm to individuals. It is crucial to acknowledge that individual and collective errors will be always involved to a certain extent, but as AI-systems gain greater autonomy, the sum of individually and collectively attributable blame may not be in proportion to the harm occurred. Nevertheless, affected individuals have a legitimate claim to redress. This paper develops an account of strict moral responsibility, specifically applicable to the context of AI. It argues that AI deployers bear responsibility for the harm caused by AI-systems, even if the deployed AI-systems are prima facie morally permissible and thus even if deployers cannot be considered morally blameworthy. In contrast to traditional responsibility accounts based on blameworthiness, the proposed account of strict responsibility is not predicated on a prior duty violation but on a proactive duty to provide redress in case individuals are being harmed. It is a relational duty that arises from what I call the accidental relationship, which highlights the intrinsic connection between AI-deployers and the harmed individuals.

Jonas Bozenhard (jonas.bozenhard@tuhh.de)

A Post-Wittgensteinian Approach to Large Language Models and Linguistic Understanding

Despite their impressive capacity to generate realistic-sounding text, large language models (LLMs) are widely denied the capacity of linguistic understanding, both by philosophers and AI researchers. To a large extent this is due to a seminal paper by Bender at al. that compares LLMs to “stochastic parrots” for “haphazardly stitching together sequences of linguistic forms […] without any reference to meaning” (2021: 617). Adopting a more explicitly philosophical outlook, Bender recently defended this claim by invoking Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language (Weil 2023). In line with that, Wittgenstein is commonly interpreted to contend that a “computer […] neither knows nor understands anything” (Hacker 1997: 53).

Challenging this predominant view, my talk argues that LLMs are capable of linguistic understanding – and it does so by drawing on the late Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, linguistic understanding is inextricably linked to the ability to follow rules. Yet, he rejects mentalistic explanations of rule-following and understanding that rely on mental representations. Similar to McDowell (1984) and Stroud (2012), I therefore contend that Wittgenstein presents a non-reductionist, practice-based

approach to rule-following. However, I argue that the ramifications of this viewpoint concerning the attribution of linguistic understanding are not adequately acknowledged. In the context of this argument, I provide a new reading of Wittgenstein's famous statement that, "[i]f a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (PI: 225) and grapple with a lesser-known thought experiment featuring two chimpanzees, with one of them teaching the other how to follow a rule (RFM: 345).

On this basis, I present a post-Wittgensteinian account of linguistic understanding which challenges the prevalent view in Wittgenstein scholarship by directly engaging with Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following. The talk concludes with a defense of the idea that current LLMs are in interesting, but substantive respects capable of linguistic understanding.

Huub Brouwer (h.m.brouwer@tilburguniversity.edu)

Can Investment Income be Deserved?

Is it morally justifiable to let 'your money work for you' by providing capital and then keeping the proceeds? This question is at the center of debates about the growing wealth inequality in many countries. In this paper, we approach the morality of receiving investment income from the perspective of desert. More specifically, we ask: can investment income can be deserved?

Several philosophers have answered this question with a resounding 'no': they argue that whereas providing labor is a productive activity that can give rise to desert, providing capital is not (Schweikart 1996; Christman 1994, chp. 4). We call this the marxist intuition. At the same time, several other philosophers and neoclassical economists have argued that providing capital is, in fact, a productive activity that can give rise to desert (see Arnold 1987; Narveson 1995; Shapiro 2018; Mankiw 2013; Kershnar 2005). We call this the neoclassical position. In this paper, we take up an intermediate position between the marxist and neoclassical position.

Our main claim is that passive income can be deserved, but the degree of deservingness hinges on the level of activity of the deserving individual. Rather than basing our argument on the conventional capital-labor split, we posit a continuum that spans between active and passive income. The closer an investment aligns with active income on this continuum, the higher the likelihood that it can be deserved. Two categories of passive income – termed Passive but active and Active turning passive – can, on some common economic desert bases, be deserved. The case for deserving investment income that falls into a third category – which we refer to as Always passive – is weaker, however, as it resides at the extreme end of the active-passive continuum.

Alexander Bryan (alexbryanemail@gmail.com)

Protesting Together

Protesting together involves making some shared claim or demand. But can the justification of a protest be affected by other political claims espoused by some of those participating in it? And do we have a duty not to protest alongside those who

have deeply objectionable beliefs? I provide an analysis of these cases. I suggest both that the deeply objectionable beliefs of others can generate duties on us not to protest alongside them, and that there are ways in which we can protest which circumvent these duties.

I focus on two aspects of protest which can alter the ways in which protestors relate to the beliefs of those alongside whom they protest. The first of these is the nature of the relationship between protestors. When this relationship is strong, our endorsement can be taken to extend beyond the target claim of the protest. As shared members of a group we might reasonably be taken to endorse the views and aims of the group as a whole, including reprehensible beliefs of some which are tolerated by the group.

Thinner relationships need not involve such endorsement. I argue that when we protest in solidarity, we need not directly endorse the claims made by the primary protesting group; rather, our protest can be based on their mistreatment, or at bringing their complaints into the public eye. We can permissibly protest in solidarity with those who hold reprehensible views, in these circumstances.

The second aspect of protest I focus on is the claims themselves. I argue that in some cases political claims made by others can be relevant to the permissibility of protesting alongside them. We have duties not to protest with certain others when doing so would indirectly amplify other hateful views they hold, or would prevent us from effectively engaging in counterspeech.

Andrea Buongiorno (andrea.buongiorno@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

Being per se v being per accidens in Metaphysics Δ7

In Metaphysics Δ7, Aristotle draws a uniquely comprehensive set of distinctions between uses of the verb ˜to be'. Something is said to 'be': either per accidens or per se [1017a7-30]; by being true (or: not to 'be', by being false) [1017a31-35]; either potentially or actually [1017a35-b9]. This is an undeniably important cornerstone of Aristotle's metaphysics. It is also notoriously difficult to understand. A particularly controversial aspect of Δ7 lies in the distinction between per se and per accidens 'being'. This has been interpreted in widely different ways by various commentators: some (like Kirwan) take Aristotle to distinguish between two uses of the 'is' of existence; others (like Ross) take him to distinguish the 'is' of essential from that of non-essential predication. However, both lines of interpretation face insurmountable textual difficulties. I shall present an alternative and arguably more plausible interpretation, by drawing on Aristotle's discussion of per se and per accidens predication in Posterior Analytics A4. On this basis, I reject the existential in favour of a predicative reading of Δ7's distinction between per se and per accidens 'being'. Moreover, I reject a specific predicative approach, which treats it as a distinction between essential (or per se1) and non-essential (or per accidens1) predication. Instead, I introduce and defend an alternative predicative approach, which treats it as a distinction between genuine (or per se3) and non-genuine (or per accidens3) predication: something is said to 'be' per se just in case an attribute is predicated of a substance (e.g. when a human is said to 'be cultivated'); something is said to 'be' per

accidens just in case an attribute is predicated of a non-substance (e.g. when a just thing is said to ‘be cultivated’). I conclude by presenting the main merits of this proposal and by overcoming a possible objection.

Katherine Caldwell (kcaldwell@gradcenter.cuny.edu)

A Dilemma for Internalists: Reasons Nihilism and the Self

Internalists about normative reasons are committed to some version of the following claim: whether an agent has a reason to φ depends in some important way on her desires, motivations, or projects. Here, I’ll argue that the plausibility of internalism rests on a substantive assumption about the nature of the self. More specifically, for internalism to work as a theory of normative reasons, it requires a conception of the self which is real enough to ground a sense of what Bernard Williams called ‘inner necessity’ – the feeling that one must φ because φ-ing is a matter of ‘who one really is.’

First (§1), I’ll articulate a view of internalism neutral enough for any internalist to accept (even if they don’t agree with the letter of Williams’s own view). Next, (§2) I’ll formulate a dilemma: either internalism is vacuously true with respect to our most important deliberations (call this horn Reasons Nihilism), or the internalist must ground the normative force of our internal reasons somewhere in the self. Then, (§3) I’ll critically present a few different strategies for the internalist to grasp the second horn of the dilemma. No strategy is wholly successful, but together they at least help to limit the number of cases threatened by Reasons Nihilism. Finally, (§4) I’ll conclude by considering a potential upshot of my argument. We can relocate some disagreements between internalists and externalists from the meta-ethical level of practical rationality to the metaphysical level of the self and personal identity. This upshot might explain why some externalists tend to favor more fragmented, abstract, or absent conceptions of the self (e.g. Nagel and Parfit).

Vanessa Carr (vncarr@gmail.com)

Believing in Success Against the Odds

We sometimes intend to do things that we anticipate to be difficult, in that the odds of failure are significant. For example, I might intend to go to the gym five days for a week for the next month, recognising that, given my history of failed gym resolutions, the odds of my failing to do this are significant.

This raises some questions: when intending to do something in the face of significant odds of failure, can one rationally believe that one will succeed “against the odds”? What is it to hold such a belief? I argue here that an agent can rationally believe that they will succeed in doing what they intend “against the odds”, where this is a matter of believing both (i) that they will do what they intend to do, and (ii) that there is a significant chance that they won’t.

I first spell out specific conditions for the rationality of the above conjunctive belief: (a) the agent rationally believes that they have the ability to do what they are committed to doing, and (b) their evidence concerning the success rate of prior more-or-less similar attempts indicates a significant chance of failure.

Then, drawing on Buchak's (2014) work, I highlight independent support for the coherency of believing both that p and that there is a significant chance that not-p, in certain contexts.

Finally, I make the case that we should favour my proposal regarding rational belief in success against the odds over alternative positions. In particular, I consider and oppose Marušić's (2015) position that, when conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied, the agent should believe that they will do as they intend, and they should not believe that there is a significant chance that they won't.

Chen-Wei Chang (erwincwchang@gmail.com)

Two Kinds of Inescapability

In recent years, philosophers have found a promising approach to establishing normativity, or even moral normativity. The approach is called constitutivism. The kernel of constitutivism is the thesis that the ultimate source of normativity lies in the constitutive condition of acting. However, the thesis encounters serious challenges, and one of them is the well-known shmagency challenge David Enoch proposes. Although constitutivists have responded to the challenge in many ways, the challenge is still alive, especially when Luca Ferrero concedes that the thesis is too simple to vindicate normativity completely. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the whole picture of constitutivism by distinguishing two kinds of inescapability: the inescapability of acting (IA) and the inescapability of the constitutive condition of acting (ICCA).

The paper is divided into three parts. First, I distinguish IA from ICCA and argue that ICCA characterizes the constitutivist way to establish normativity by critically examining Ferrero's understanding of the simple constitutive move. His (mis-)understanding of the move, which underestimates the strength of the constitutivist way to establish normativity, originates from the confusion about the nature of necessity that constitutivists appeal to, that is, a conceptual necessity. Second, based on the distinction between IA and ICCA, I revisit the shmagency challenge and show that the challenger begs the question because he denies ICCA at the very beginning. Not only the challenger but also most defenders of constitutivism miss the point, for their dispute revolves around whether IA, rather than ICCA, makes the question Why do I have reason to act? unintelligible. Last, I compare my distinction between ICCA and IA and David Velleman's distinction between constitutive and natural inescapability and conclude the paper by delineating a more plausible possible strategy to exhibit that it is really inescapable for us as human beings to be rational agents.

Yuang Chen (chenyuang@link.cuhk.edu.hk)

How to Explain the Quality-Power Grounding

In explaining the relation between qualitative properties and dispositional properties, *The Grounding Theory of Power* claims that the former ground the latter. A meta-question naturally follows: what explains the grounding? I propose a novel and explicit construction of this question, in terms of Arbitrariness. After arguing that the

common strategy for answering this question leads to a dilemma, I argue that this question can be plausibly answered by appealing to meta-grounding-theoretic ideas.

Jordi Fairhurst Chilton (jordi-f@hotmail.com)

Deep disagreements and moral progress

Deep disagreements are systematic and persistent disagreements rooted in contrary worldviews where there may be no mutually recognized method of resolution because disputants reason and analyze evidence using different frameworks and/or principles. They are central to our life, plaguing our interactions with people pertaining to different cultures, societies, and social groups. Despite increasing interest in moral progress (see Sauer et al. 2021) and the implications, significance, and value of moral disagreements (see Rowland 2017; 2021), little attention has been paid to the threat deep disagreements may pose to moral progress. These disputes are instances where our moral frameworks prevent us from going together, potentially stagnating moral development. Moreover, deep disagreements often polarize disputants, either by making the contents of their positions more extreme or held with greater confidence, contributing to moral regress.

This paper defends that we need not fear moral deep disagreements since they can contribute to moral progress. Initially, it outlines multiple strategies (e.g., argumentation, rational persuasion, interframework dialogue) for constructive dialogue in deep disagreements and details how they may contribute to moral progress without rationally resolving the dispute. Subsequently, it argues that the potential success of each strategy depends on the specific challenges of, and the unique opportunities offered by, each moral deep disagreement. It is shown that said challenges and opportunities revolve around four aspects of deep disagreements:

(i) the epistemic features of the disagreement (e.g., the object of the dispute, the disputants' attitudes to this object); (ii) the character of the disputants (e.g., the epistemic virtues or vices they display); (iii) the common ground shared by disputants (e.g., the joint beliefs, preferences, conceptual frameworks or competences enabling them to make productive exchanges); (iv) the social context of the disagreement (e.g., the power dynamics and social proximity between disputants, their (dis)trust in relevant social institutions).

Nicola Cirulli (n.cirulli@studenti.unisr.it)

Oneness as Continuity: A New Interpretation of Aristotle's Theory of Continuity

The continuum is one of the principal per sé meanings of the one discussed in Metaph. V6-X1. Aristotle's theory of physical continuity is universally considered the foundation of the theory of motion developed in his Physics. Nevertheless, a systematic study of Aristotle's continuity addressing the connection of the physical and metaphysical notions of the continuum has not yet appeared in the contemporary debate.

The still-dominant operational interpretation of continuity, first presented in Wieland, 1962, surreptitiously resorts to an Idealistic assumption to reduce the many meanings of the continuum to its negative definition found in Phys. VI1-2, stating –

with no supporting textual evidence – that the principle because of which a continuum exists is the intellect that divides it. This interpretation fails both to acknowledge the diversity of the accounts of continuity offered by Aristotle (Phys. VI1-2, Phys. V3, Metaph. V6-X1, DA III6) and to understand that continuity, for Aristotle, provides the foundation of change insofar as it is the strongest possible meaning of unity. A sketch of a conception of kinds and species as continua – that I propose to call a theory of logical continua – is, indeed, drawn at Metaph. X7-8, as some interpreters have recognised (e.g. Chiaradonna, 2005), to satisfy the metaphysical need for an anti-Platonist conception of universals whose unity is not over and above the unity of particulars.

This talk intends to present a new interpretation of Aristotle's theory of continuity, which maintains that (1) continuity is said in many ways, the primary of which being unity, (2) no continuum is a relation, contra Wieland, and (3) continuity is a physical, metaphysical, and logical concept, providing the foundation to change, the immanence of species in kinds, and the eternity of intellection.

Harry Cleeveley (harrycleeveley@yahoo.co.uk)

The Deep Incoherence of Strong Necessities

Modal rationalism is the claim that for all p, if it is ideally conceivable that p, then there is a metaphysically possible world, W, in which p is true. This will be true just if there are no strong a posteriori necessities ('strong necessities', for short), where a strong necessity is a proposition that is conceivably false, but which is true in all metaphysically possible worlds. But are there any strong necessities? Various alleged examples have been proposed and argued over in the literature, but there is no consensus on whether any is genuine. I aim to move the debate forwards and support modal rationalism by proving the negative: that there are in fact no strong necessities. I argue that there are no strong necessities because they are metaphysically impossible, and they are metaphysically impossible because the very notion is ultimately incoherent. Thus, I argue, it is an a priori truth that there are no strong necessities, and that modal rationalism is true.

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette (simon-pierre.chevarie-cossette@unine.ch)

Action for Ethicists

To act is to cause a change – nothing more, nothing less. That's the thin conception of action (1). If a causing can be attributed to X, then X acted, and X is an agent, whether X is a human or the Moon. That's not to say that any change happening in my body is the result of an act of mine: my heart pumps blood, not me. Nor is it saying that the Moon has intentions; intention is irrelevant to defining action on the thin view.

Some react to the thin conception by saying that they are interested in a different sense of action because they do ethics – they can recognise that plants are active, but that's not what they're after. (2)

My aim is to show that even if one only cares about ethics, one should go thin. I have four related reasons:

1. If to act is to cause a change, then we can easily categorise human conduct by asking two questions: is X a causing or its absence? and does it cause a change or its absence?

	Causing...	The absence of causing…
… a change	Acting (doing)	Omitting
… the absence of a change	Preventing	Allowing

2. With these categories we can make some progress on the debates on the moral distinction between doing and allowing harm.

3. We can also open up new questions, two for each line, column and diagonal of the tables, e.g. “do we have stronger reason to omit to do good than to prevent the doing of good”? or “do we have stronger reason to prevent harm than to allow good”?

4. If action is defined thinly, it becomes much easier to understand some ethically relevant predicates such as “voluntary”, “deliberate”, and “intentional” because none of these predicates plays the role of defining action as the thick view claims.

(1) See Thomson (1987), Alvarez and Hyman (1998), Mayr (2011), Hyman (2015), and Skow (2018, 147“48).
(2) See Raz (2011, 1), Korsgaard (2014), Katsafanas (2013, 114).

Annalisa Costella (costella@esphil.eur.nl)

Autonomy and Robust Self-attributability: How Pre-commitment Does, and Does not, Limit Autonomy

Accounts of autonomy are unable to capture the intuition that a weak-willed individual who is dependent on pre-commitment to govern herself is less autonomous than someone who can successfully act against her weakness of will without needing to pre-commit. I argue that the reason is that they fail to account for a self-regarding attitude, *robust self-attributability*, as constitutive of autonomy. Pre-commitment devices are partly incompatible with robust self-attributability. Recognizing that robust self-attributability is constitutive of autonomy has broader implications both for conceptualising autonomy and for the re-evaluation of the legitimacy of ingrained intra- and interpersonal practices that are taken to be uncontroversial on grounds of autonomy.

Michael Da Silva (m.da-silva@soton.ac.uk)

Agent-Regret and Responsibility Gaps

Responsibility gaps appear where there is a mismatch between the amount of responsibility one can properly attribute to someone on standard models of responsibility and the amount one would otherwise desire to attribute. Claimed gaps arise in many domains, appearing in debates concerning government, corporate, and other forms of group agency and concerning new technologies. These are

purportedly problematic where and because those harmed cannot be adequately compensated for harms they experience absent a responsible party. Many accordingly call for means of ˜filling' gaps by holding someone responsible for the harms.

Bernard Willams's work on moral luck and agent-regret is central to debates on whether/when to and who can fill gaps. This work argues that agent-regret and gap-filling may each call for similar forms of compensation but the former cannot fulfill the latter. Agent-regret, recall, is a form of ill-feeling in reaction to the negative outcomes following from performance of an objectively non-blameworthy action. Some working on responsibility gaps suggest the conditions for aptly feeling agent-regret provide a way of identifying persons who can be called upon to 'fill' gaps. However, agent-regret plays a different role in moral discourse and is justified for different reasons. Agent-regret and gap-filling seek to address harms that would otherwise be unaddressed. Yet agent-regret responds to the harmful effects of all-things-considered justified actions. It is a fundamentally personal phenomenon oriented around the apt moral psychology of agents whose acts produce harms. Gap-filling, by contrast, addresses a functional problem arising from the lack of a fully responsible party. That functional problem concerns a lack in fulfilling the purposes of responsibility attributions. It can be addressed without orienting analysis around the apt psychological responses of particular actors. The parties who can be called upon to fulfill the functions are not coextensive with those who may feel agent-regret.

Natalja Deng (nmdeng@gmail.com)

The ineffability of time

The relation between time and temporal experience lends itself to interdisciplinary study, and interdisciplinarity sometimes involves difficult methodological choice points. In the case of time, a central choice point concerns how to treat the question of whether time really passes, or flows, or is dynamic in a way that space is not. Analytic metaphysics gives this question pride of place, in a McTaggart-inspired A-versus B-theory formulation, which arguably has roots stretching all the way back to Heraclites and Parmenides. Meanwhile, philosophers of physics either ignore it or explicitly call for philosophers of time to 'move past' the As and Bs. This talk will explore a metaphysical view with an anti-metaphysical upshot. The view is somewhat radical with respect to mainstream philosophy of time paradigms. In a nutshell, it says that time's nature with respect to the question of dynamicity is ineffable, or beyond the conceptual grasp. My motivation is to provide a foundation for the kind of stance that aims to transcend (and move beyond) the As and Bs, but in way that takes the question seriously and thereby manages to stay relevant to metaphysics. I will suggest that this stance is already implicit in both the metaphysics and philosophy of physics literatures, in the guise of a variety of 'Tenseless Passage' approaches that aim to somehow locate dynamicity within the block universe (Examples include, but are probably not limited to (Savitt, 2002), (Dieks, 2005), (Dorato, 2006), (Maudlin, 2007), (Harrington, 2009), (Deng, 2013), (Oaklander, 2015), (Mozersky, 2015), (Ismael, 2016), (Fazekas, 2016), (Arthur, 2019), (Rovelli, 2019), (Saudek, 2020); (Leininger, 2021).) Given current frameworks, TP

approaches can't really amount to more than a cheap re-labelling of (B-)succession as '(A-)passage'. But there is a genuine and worthwhile insight contained in TP. Ineffability allows us to make it explicit.

Dimitrios Dentsoras (dimitrios.dentsoras@umanitoba.ca)

The Craft Analogy in Plato's Euthydemus

The essay sketches out some lessons from Socrates' use of the craft analogy in the first hortatory speech of Euthydemus (278d-282e), where Socrates attempts to convince young Clinias to devote himself to the pursuit of wisdom and virtue. Drawing a parallel between virtue and crafts such as navigation and medicine, Socrates tries to show that virtue is both necessary and sufficient for happiness. The passage is both significant and controversial. Interpreters of the passage fall in two broad camps. The first maintains that virtue is able to provide a wide range of bodily and psychic goods, which constitute happiness. This view, while in line with the craft analogy, makes the sufficiency claim implausible. The second camp tries to bolster the sufficiency claim by presenting virtue as the source of psychic goods, rather than any external possession. This focus on virtue's internal effects seems to be in contrast with the craft analogy.

The essay provides a new interpretation of the passage that retains the craft analogy and the idea that external and psychic possessions have a role to play in achieving and increasing one's happiness, although their role is secondary to and dependent on the possession of virtue. Additionally, the essay offers an argument in favor of virtue's sufficiency for happiness, based on the idea that virtue functions in a manner that is sensitive to one's circumstance and can adapt one's expectations and possessions to the situation. According to this adaptive model, happiness includes the possession of both external and internal goods, but the amount and scope of these possessions might vary according to circumstance. Virtue is sufficient for happiness because it unfailingly provides the maximally beneficial amount of goods one could secure, under a given set of conditions.

Gabe Dupre (ggdupre@ucdavis.edu)

Indicator and Coverage Models in Cognitive Science

I distinguish between two methodological approaches to cognitive science: 'the indicator model' and 'the coverage model'. These differ on their answers to the question: how does data relate to theory? On the coverage model, data are viewed as a pre-theoretical 'filter' on theory confirmation: the best theory is that which best coheres with or explains the range of amassed data. On the indicator model, the theory itself is appealed to in determining which data are relevant. Relevant data are those which reflect the workings of the specific target system under investigation, while much of the data are excluded from consideration as being interaction effects, reflecting the confounding influence of a range of non-target systems.
Many debates within cognitive science and the philosophy thereof hinge, in underappreciated ways, on disputes about which of these methodological styles are appropriate, and so clarity can be gained, and progress made, by explicitly spelling out these methodologies and the cognitive theories they cohere with.

I illustrate the distinction with examples from the history of cognitive science, specifically from the work of Jerry Fodor. I then apply this distinction to current debates about the relevance of the successes of Large Language Models in replicating human-like linguistic behaviour to the status of generative linguistic theory. Steven Piantadosi has argued that these successes refute longstanding assumptions of Chomskian linguistics. I show that this argument presupposes the coverage model. If we instead adopt the indicator model, as Chomsky and generative linguists have suggested for decades, this argument loses its force. Thus, the debate between Piantadosi and Chomsky turns not merely on empirical considerations, but methodological ones: what is the mark of successful theory-construction?

Christopher Earley (christopher.earley@liverpool.ac.uk)

The Ethos of Art and the Ethos of Science

Within philosophy of art, ‘cognitivism’ names the research project that attempts to answer two questions: 1) how do artworks improve our epistemic standing?; 2) does an artwork’s cognitive value contribute to its value qua art? In this presentation, I aim to draw attention to an aspect of learning from art that has hitherto been ignored by cognitivists. In other domains where agents have to coordinate their cognitive labour to realise epistemic achievements, communities put certain practical norms in place that govern how they go about inquiry, how they interact with other inquirers, and when they should sanction those who lead inquiry astray. This is writ particularly clearly in the natural sciences, where researchers widely endorse what Robert Merton called a ‘scientific ethos’: the set of institutionally endorsed prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions that bear upon scientists, and aid them in collectively reaching their epistemic goals. I propose that whilst cognitivists have made great progress in finding many surprising commonalities between the epistemic goals and methods of the arts and other domains of inquiry, they have not characterised the practical norms that might operate within the epistemic communities formed within the arts. I argue that an ‘art ethos’ is likely to be extremely difficult to characterise. This is because artworlds regularly encourage artists to exempt themselves from existing norms and to make their reasons for these exemptions opaque. I will end by reflecting upon what the obscurity of the ‘artistic ethos’ should mean for those interested in seeing art a source of insight.

Leo Eisenbach (eisenbal@hu-berlin.de)

On the Temporality and Graduality of Blameworthiness

When a person is blameworthy to a certain degree for an action, can this degree diminish over time? This paper lays out ways in which the degree of blameworthiness can fade throughout time. It thereby makes a case for the terminability of said normative property. Moreover, it is shown that this has important upshots for conceptual analyses of blameworthiness.

In the first part of the paper, I argue that certain facts can make it the case that an agent becomes less blameworthy for a past action. To identify which facts do so, and in which ways, it is important to disambiguate what it means that an agent becomes less blameworthy over time: it can mean that the agent becomes worthy of less blame, or that the agent becomes less worthy of blame, or both. I argue that the duration and intensity of already instantiated blame can attenuate how much blame an agent is worthy of, whereas reparations and apologies made by the blameworthy agent can attenuate how worthy of blame she is.

In the second part of the paper, I show that this has important upshots for analyses of blameworthiness. An analysis of blameworthiness in terms of the truth of the blame-attitude's content fails to account for the specific ways in which blameworthiness can fade. In contrast, an analysis in terms of desert-based reasons for blaming is well-suited to account for them: while the graduality of blame can be used to accommodate that some facts attenuate how much blame an agent is worthy of over time, the graduality of desert-based reasons can be used to accommodate that other facts attenuate how worthy of blame an agent is over time. The paper thus provides an argument for reasons-based analyses of blameworthiness.

Matt Farr (mwef2@cam.ac.uk)

Forgetting what it's like: qualia and the temporally-limited self

In debates about qualia, it's often taken for granted that if I have had some experience, then I know what it's like to have that experience. For example, I know what it's like to give my first Joint Session talk, and to go on my first school trip, because these are things that I have experienced. But do I really know what it's like to do these things? Certainly I have episodic memories of these parts of my life that are replete with a certain level of detail, but I am not the same person that did these things, and I don't have access to the feelings, thoughts, and ways of thinking of my younger self who did so. There are almost certainly other people who currently have a closer sense of what these episodes of my life were like than I currently do. So, am I constantly in a process of forgetting what it's like?

This talk assesses what I call the temporally-limited self – the (rough) period of time across which we can consider ourselves the same person-stage ", and the temporal extent of qualia – the rough period of time across which we can legitimately claim to know what some experience is like. I focus on two related issues. (1) I argue that certain kinds of transformative experience prohibit us from being able to put our current selves in the shoes of our earlier selves. (2) I argue that by symmetry, the

inability to ‘know’ what imagined future experiences are like, via future-directed mental time travel, carries over to our ability to reconstruct what our past experiences were like via episodic memory. I use this to raise doubts about the wider coherence of qualia-based knowledge.

Tina Firing (tina.firing@ntnu.no)

Achieving Philosophical Progress- What Good is the Method of Argument?

Philosophers sometimes romantically self-describe as lovers of wisdom. More boastfully, and perhaps more commonly, we pride ourselves on being in possession of good arguments in support of our philosophical convictions. In this presentation, I ask whether the self-flattery is warranted. What, precisely, has been achieved in philosophy through the use of arguments? More specifically, have the arguments constructed and debated by philosophers in the past resulted in philosophical progress?

This presentation will be an attempt to concisely present and partly assuage a worry recently raised in two separate metaphilosophical debates; the debate on philosophical progress and the debate on knockdown arguments. This is the worry that valuable cognitive achievements, such as philosophical knowledge or philosophical wisdom, cannot be achieved by means of argumentation. I begin by presenting an influential version of the worry due to David Chalmers. Chalmers’ main claim is, roughly stated, that we may blame the so-called 'method of argument' for our failure to produce progress in philosophy. I intend to argue, contra Chalmers, that we are not yet in a position to know whether or not there is an argument shaped methodological barrier to philosophical progress. Indeed, the main aim of the presentation will be to demonstrate just how difficult it is to argue for pessimism about philosophical progress via facts about the power of philosophical arguments.

Samuel C. Fletcher (scfletch@umn.edu)

The Similar Role of Values in Legal Epistemology and Statistical Testing

A major problem in legal epistemology is the proof paradox: both laypeople and professionals view judgments of guilt or culpability that rest on bare statistical evidence as unwarranted even when this evidence seems to provide the same or more support for the guilt or culpability of the defendant compared with what is required in other cases. For example, the fact that a bus company owns 70% of the buses in a certain town is insufficient to find the company liable for harm in a bus accident without witnesses. When the bare statistical evidence is absent but there is a 70% reliable witness who claims to have seen a bus from said company in the accident, by contrast, both courts and laypeople are inclined to judge the company liable.

We bring the perspective of philosophers of science to bear on this problem, arguing for two main conclusions. First, the concept of bare statistical evidence is crucially ambiguous between statistical in the sense of descriptive population statistics and statistical in the sense of inferential statistics. We affirm that descriptive population statistics cannot provide a reliable universal foundation for (legal) decision-making,

but deny that the same holds of inferential statistics. Second, considerations of values analogous to those in science can, do, and should play a crucial role in the courts' response to bare statistical evidence. Like (classical) statisticians, courts must balance the risks of different types of error, and we suggest that both the general practice and apparent exceptions can be explained by value judgments about the costs of different errors.

Thus science may be a more productive analogue of legal decision-making then an individual epistemic agent is. After all, both science and the law turn on what can be intersubjectively proven in a way that individual epistemology is not normally thought to.

Giorgia Foti (2720168F@student.gla.ac.uk)

Testimonial Injustice: towards a Modal Account

Which norms govern our credibility judgements? Answering this question is crucial for understanding how testimonial injustice works. In this paper I will look at the normativity of credibility judgements by asking two related questions. The first is: when does a credibility judgement constitute a testimonial injustice? According to the standard account developed by Fricker (2007) only credibility deficits due to negative identity prejudice constitute a testimonial injustice. Sorting through some influential objections to the standard account, I will outline three desiderata for a normative account of credibility judgements in the context of testimonial injustice: extensional adequacy (cf. Dotson 2016), relational treatment (cf. Medìna 2011, Lackey 2023) and normative fit.

Then, I will turn to the second question: when is a credibility judgement epistemically appropriate? Drawing on cases of accurate but modally fragile credibility judgements, I will try to make room for a hitherto underappreciated modal assessment of credibility judgements, according to which even correct credibility judgements may be negatively assessed if they manifest a defective epistemic disposition (cf. Aarnio forthcoming). Enriching our evaluation of credibility judgements with a modal component will pave the way for a new answer to the first question. According to the Modal Account I am going to sketch, testimonial injustice consists in an inaccurate credibility judgement relative to what the speaker(s) would have received had they had dominant social group membership. I will conclude by showing how this Modal Account of testimonial injustice meets all three desiderata outlined above.

Giada Fratantonio (giada.fratantonio@glasgow.ac.uk)

Asking questions and expecting retractions

When someone makes an assertion, we sometimes challenge it. These challenges often take the form of a question, for example: What's your evidence for p?; How do you know that p?. The standard expectation is that either one defends her claim for the challenge, or one is expected to retract the claim (cf Smith forthcoming; Rescorla 2019; Williamson 2000; Brandom 1994; Sellars 1963). Call this the Defend or Retract norm. This paper aims to investigate the limits of this well-established conversational practice.

To do so, I consider cases of testimony given by victims of trauma, and I argue that the implementation of the practice in these cases looks uncomfortable. I formulate a new puzzle: on the one hand, the victim is unable to appropriately defend herself from a challenge the hearer raises her; given Defend or Retract, she should retract her claim. On the other hand, there's intuitively something uncomfortable about this situation.

After clarifying the scope of the Defend or Retract norm, and the nature of the puzzle, in the second half of the paper, I consider two deflationary responses to the

puzzle, both of which aim to show that the victim has an appropriate defence of her claim. I argue that they are both unsuccessful.

I then offer a semi-deflationary diagnosis of what's going on in these cases: whether the puzzle arises or not depends on whether the specific question is epistemically defective in a relevant sense that I explain. The puzzle dissolves when the victim is asked an epistemically defective question, but it remains otherwise.

I conclude the paper by investigating the consequences of this puzzle and the semi-deflationary diagnosis I propose. In particular, I show that merely asking a question can be epistemically harmful in a way that hasn't been appreciated before.

Jasper Friedrich (jasper.friedrich@politics.ox.ac.uk)

On Misdirected Anger

Sometimes anger directed at wrong or innocent targets may nevertheless tell us something about genuine injustice. A common example is the idea that the white working class is angry because they are exploited and marginalized under capitalism, but sometimes 'misdirect' their ire at immigrants or minorities. But what does it mean for anger to be 'misdirected'? And how does one identify the 'correct' target? One answer is that anger's proper target is determined by correctly assigning responsibility for the relevant injustice. Yet, many of the phenomena described as misdirected rage cannot be thus explained: for example, the white working class's anger may be caused by exploitation but frequently does not include any representation of economic injustice. This anger is not best described as misattributing blame for injustice, but rather of 'lashing out' against innocent targets. It is tempting instead to appeal to Freudian models of unconscious emotion where a feeling is initially repressed and then finds expression in a distorted way. But the idea that angry xenophobes, for instance, were originally angry at capitalist exploitation but had to repress this feeling is question-begging and empirically unsupported. Instead, I outline an alternative account that understands anger as an embodied response to everyday frustrations. Anger is constituted not by an evaluative attitude, but by certain relations between self and world involving affordances for aggressive action. Such anger turns political when informed by an understanding of one's frustrations as socially caused. The question of which social-structural explanation of anger is the 'correct' target is not settled on the level of individual psychology. Rather, I argue, we need to explain this on a sociological and pragmatico-political level: rage is ˜mistargeted' when its expression exacerbates, rather than alleviates, the social causes of anger.

Andrés Garcia (andres.garcia@fil.lu.se)

Neutral but Better: On the Logic of Neutrality

Some philosophers accept that one thing could be better than another even though they both contribute neutrally to their broader context. Within the context of population axiology, the claim is that one life could be better than another even though both contribute neutrally to the value of the world. Philosophers tend to stop short of admitting that those things could be strictly neutral themselves since this

would allow for hierarchies within the neutral domain. The consensus appears to be that if two items are neutral, then it is necessarily the case that they are equally good or incommensurable. In the following paper, I defend the possibility of evaluative hierarchies within the neutral domain while outlining some general options for accounting for the concept of strict neutrality. In so doing, I hope to clarify the logic and patterns of fitting attitudes that underpin reasonable judgments of neutrality and to thereby highlight a gap in the ethical literature. It may seem paradoxical to suggest that among the things that do not matter, some of them matter more than others, but I do not take this to be my claim; instead, my suggestion is that to be neutral is to matter in a certain way and that this way of mattering admits to evaluative hierarchies. In order to capture this way of mattering, I will be appealing to the fitting-attitudes analysis of value, which also allows me to identify the concepts of strict neutrality available to us.

Eline Gerritsen (eline.gerritsen@uni-hamburg.de)

Questioning the normative status of social norms

Social norms are plainly normative: they prescribe what to do, brand actions as allowed or disallowed, and regulate many aspects of our lives as social beings. However, not all normativity is created equal. Metanormative theorists now emphasise a distinction between norms that are simply prescriptive and norms that *really* determine what we ought to do. In the debate on this distinction between mere formal normativity and authoritative normativity, it has been accepted without much critical discussion that social norms are not normative in the significant sense. The consensus is that we are free to ignore social norms and do not make any genuine mistake in violating them. Yet, social norms play a major role in our everyday lives, constantly shaping what we do and what we even recognise as possible actions.

The aim of this paper is to combine the strengths of social ontology and metanormative theory by building an assessment of the normative status of social norms on insights about the ontology of these norms. I will explore what claim to normativity is suggested by different analyses of social norms and social ‘oughts’, as well as whether these claims are warranted from a metanormative perspective. To do this, I will differentiate a range of perceived criteria for the authoritative form of normativity, such as appropriateness of blame, objectivity, being non-conventional, and being irreducibly normative. I will argue that each of these either is not a true requirement for authoritative normativity, or is potentially applicable to social norms. The upshot is that the normative status of social norms is an open question, which needs to be answered with more serious attention for social reality.

Pietro Berardi Gili (pietro.berardi.gili@usi.ch)

A Truthmaker Semantics for the Propositional Modal Logic of Necessity

In this paper I provide a truthmaker semantics for the language of propositional modal logic by building upon the truthmaker semantics for both intuitionistic and classical propositional logic introduced by Kit Fine.

In §1 I begin with an informal presentation of the core ideas behind Fine's truthmaker semantics for propositional languages. I then extend Fine's approach to modal propositional languages in which the 2 operator stands for necessity via the notion of Exact Modal Frame. An Exact Modal Frame is a tuple ⟨S, ⊑, Nec⟩ in which S is a set of states, ⊑ is a relation of inclusion between states, and Nec: S→S is a function associating each state s to the state of s's being necessary.

In §2 I argue in favour of the following clause for exact verification of a necessitation by a state: • s verifies □φ iff s=Nec(t) for some t which is the greatest upper bound under ⊑ of a non-empty set of states that verify φ.

Lastly, I conclude the informal part of the discussion by justifying my definition of validity as truth in all maximal consistent situations.

In §3 I present the semantics formally, and I show that the K-system is both sound and complete with respect to the class of Normal Frames, which I define. I then show that stronger systems of modal logic (such as KT, S4 and S5) are sound and complete with respect to classes of frames defined by algebraic conditions on the function Nec.

In §4 I compare my approach to extant ones in the literature (namely Korbmacher's, Zylstra's and Hale's) and to the classical "possible worlds" approach to modal logic. Lastly, I conclude by sketching some directions for further research.

Johann Go (johann.go@strath.ac.uk)

Bureaucratic Burdens and Bureaucratic Injustice

Bureaucracy is everywhere. We experience its burdens when we access (or attempt to access) vital public services such as healthcare and social welfare, apply for visas and driving licenses, attempt to cancel a subscription for a private service, and in many other instances. This paper highlights that not only can bureaucracy be burdensome, but it can also be unjust. When bureaucratic burdens disproportionately impact certain groups (such as disabled citizens or those from poorer backgrounds) or unduly impair our ability to access our rights, they are prima facie unfair and hence unjust. This phenomenon is what I shall call bureaucratic injustice.

This paper provides a conceptualisation of bureaucratic injustice by drawing our attention to the kinds of burdens experienced by citizens attempting to access public services. These burdens operate along at least five interrelated dimensions, which I call epistemic, financial, physical, psychological, and value-based burdens. Together, these costs constitute bureaucratic burdens.

Epistemic burdens refer to the knowledge needed to access public services. Financial burdens are the costs related to accessing public services. Physical burdens are the physical barriers one experiences when accessing public services (e.g. having to travel a significant distance). Psychological burdens refer to the emotional toll of accessing a service. Value-based burdens refer to the impact on one's personal values when trying to access public services (e.g. being unable to observe an important cultural occasion because it coincides with a meeting with one's caseworker).

Not only are these burdens often excessive on their own terms, but they also tend to disproportionately affect disadvantaged groups. This is what gives rise to bureaucratic injustice. Ultimately, I argue that justice is not just about enacting the right policies and having the right institutions in place, but also about paying attention to the way citizens interact day-to-day with these institutions and policies.

Samantha Godwin (samantha.godwin@yale.edu)

Grounding Consent: A Two-Stage Model of Consent as Authoritative Address

Consent is understood to make the otherwise impermissible permissible. Some theorists maintain that the normative transformation takes place via the formation of the right mental state, such as intending to waive a claim-right against another's action. Others propose that consent accomplishes its normative transformations when it takes the form of the right performative – such as an appropriate speech act. Mental state accounts of consent have an advantage in that they can take seriously the presence or absence of the subjective harms that seem to give rise to the power to consent, and explain the wrong of failing to respect another's refusal to consent. It is unclear, however, how mental states, absent their manifestations, modify the permissibility of another person's action: the reasons that change the permissibility of an action should be epistemically accessible to the actor if that actor is to be morally

accountable to them. Performative accounts do not have this difficulty, but risk treating evidence of consent as if identical to consent in miscommunication cases. This paper introduces an account of consent that accommodates these problems: a consenter first waives their claim-right in a manner addressed to the consentee, but the consentee is only released from their corresponding duty upon receipt of this waiver. I term this two-stage model of consent as "consent as authoritative address": in consenting, a consenter asserts a type of authority, a Hohfeldian power-right, which they address to one or more consentees. In receiving consent, a consentee who understands themselves to have a Hohfeldian liability in relation to the consenter updates their normative reasons with regard to how they ought to act in deference to the consenter's authority.

Marie-Helene Gorisse (m.gorisse@bham.ac.uk)

Knowledge and liberation in Jainism

Classical philosophy in Jainism develops along two main textual traditions, one stemming from the Tattvārthasūtra (TS), Treatise on Categories, a Sanskrit work attributed to Umāsvāti (350-400 CE); and the other from a group of works composed in Jain Śaurasenī and attributed to Kundakunda (from early 4th c. CE to 8th c. CE). This last group notably includes the Samayasāra (SSā), Essence of the Self. In both textual traditions, the seminal works are manuals of soteriology within which the acquisition of correct knowledge has a determining position. This will lead to a vast tradition of systematic epistemology. Next to this, Jainism advocates a dualism that distinguishes between the self (jīva), which is unobstructed consciousness, and the non-self stuff (ajīva), which deals with matter and its organisational principles. Thanks to this categorisation, Jain philosophers discriminate between the states of the soul, which are the efficient cause of bondage, and karmic matter, which is its material cause.

This talk first aims at clarifying some aspects of the centrality of knowledge and of the dualism developed in these manuals and, from this, at assessing how this affects Jain conceptions of knowledge. I will notably show that knowledge is theorised as the natural accompaniment of unimpeded activity of the self and that, while the Essence of the Self seems to promote a type of gnosticism, the Treatise on Categories conceives knowledge as indirectly acquired by means of practices that essentially secure a removal of karmic matter, like the settling of dust at the bottom of muddy waters makes it possible to see through clearer waters. Second, I will suggest some ways in which Jain conceptions could contribute to current discussions concerning the nature and the scope of knowledge.

Joe Gough (joe.gough@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

What constitutes an impairment of the mind in the eyes of the law?

The 2005 Mental Capacity Act (MCA) is a body of legislation that governs the treatment of individuals who have been deemed to lack the capacity to make a particular decision. To lack the ability to make a particular decision, an individual must fail to meet one of the four criteria laid out in the MCA. Importantly, according to

the MCA this must be because of an ‘impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’.

The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court is used to deal with a different set of cases where a person is unable to make a decision. It is applied in cases of social interference with decision-making, that is, cases where an individual’s decision-making is undermined because of abuse, undue influence, or coercion by others.

Arguments that an individual’s decision-making is undermined because of an impairment, and arguments that an individual’s decision-making is undermined because of social interference, are entirely legally distinct under UK law. However, in many instances, individuals before the Court of Protection have had a brain-impairment and undergone social interference, and these are only jointly sufficient for undermining the individual’s decision-making. This is a problem, because legally, there is currently no way to acknowledge the interaction of impairments and social interference, at least as the MCA has generally been interpreted. Interestingly, Singapore adopted the MCA and has recently ruled that such interaction should be legally acknowledged.

I argue that the best solution to the problem in UK law is to allow that social interference can constitute an impairment of, or disturbance in, the functioning of the mind, and hence that the problem with the UK’s enforcement of the Act rests on an overly narrow view of what constitutes an impairment in the functioning of the mind.

Paweł Grad (pawelgrad@uw.edu.pl)

Presentational and Phenomenal Forces of Perception

What grounds the power of perceptual experience to immediately justify beliefs about the external world? In this paper, contrary to both phenomenalists and denialists about epistemic power of perceptual experience, I argue for the following answer to that question:

Presentational Ground: Epistemic power of good and bad cases of perceptual experience is grounded in its phenomenal presentational property that is uniquely possessed by the experience in the good case rather than by the presentational phenomenology common to both good and bad cases.

This thesis enables me to show that relations between presentational forces and phenomenal forces of perception are more complicated than it is suggested by standard phenomenalist views, but without claiming that the epistemic role of phenomenal consciousness is negligible. The intuition I would like to convey is that instead of analysing epistemic powers of good cases as some kind of epistemic bonus added to the basic defeasible phenomenal force possessed by both good and bad cases, we should take the phenomenal force exhibited by the bad cases to be downgraded with respect to and dependent on the basic conclusive presentational force of the good cases.

My plan for the paper is as follows. In the first section, against the phenomenalist conception of presentational phenomenology, I argue for the view that the phenomenal force of the bad cases of perceptual experience is dependent on the

presentational property possessed uniquely by the good cases. In the second section, against denialists, I motivate the view that epistemically significant presentational property is essentially a phenomenal property. In the third section, I address some potential objections against Presentational Ground from the phenomenalist (Smithies, 2019, ch. 3) and denialist perspective (Ghijsen, 2014; Berger 2020; Teng forthcoming).

Amanda Greene (greene.amanda@gmail.com)

Social Media and Mass Empowerment: Towards a Theory of Digital Legitimacy

Many people are concerned about the legitimacy of digital technology companies like Meta. In this paper we show that two existing models for characterizing power – sovereign power and structural power – are inadequate when it comes to digital technology companies. This is because they fail to accommodate something crucial: the uniquely empowering nature of digital power. Companies like Meta empower users to interact by providing them with versatile systems defined by minimalist permission structures. Drawing on Searle's theory of institutions and Hart's theory of law, we show how these permission structures facilitate the creation of new powers, as well as new institutions, through the emergence and recognition of new social norms. This means we must ask how entities that provide us with such versatile – and thus unsteerable – means of empowerment can come to be legitimate. We argue that a custodial framework for digital legitimacy can assign responsibility for the patterns of empowerment that are sustained by companies like Meta.

Rory Harder (roryharder@gmail.com)

Knowledge-First Mindreading and Epistemology

Psychologists use the label mindreading – alternatively theory of mind and mentalizing – for the abilities underlying our appreciation of others' mental lives. An aspect of mindreading traditionally focused on is the ability to attribute (false) beliefs, where according to tradition that ability is unique to humans and develops only after infancy. Moreover, recent studies suggest that human infants and nonhuman primates can appreciate others' states of knowledge. In combination with the traditional view, the recent results suggest that the ability to attribute knowledge is more basic than the ability to attribute belief. That empirical insight has been used to motivate that (i) the concept knowledge is more basic than the concept belief (Phillips et al. 2021) and even further that (ii) knowledge itself is more basic than belief (Nagel 2013).

The further (ii) is especially interesting, at least from a philosophical point of view, because Nagel (2013), by motivating (ii) empirically, seems to have found empirical support for Williamson's (2000) knowledge-first epistemology.

This paper argues that the results do not in fact support (i) and (ii). I begin by explaining the results and how they are supposed to provide that support, alongside critically discussing extant objections. I then develop my objection. In brief, my objection is that – while the claim that the ability to attribute knowledge as such is more basic than the ability to belief as such motivates (i) and (ii) – the results do not

support that claim over the claim that the ability to identify another's mental state that in fact amounts to knowledge is more basic than the ability to identify another's mental state that is in fact a belief falling short of knowledge. I conclude by showing how the latter claim provides a positive upshot for theorising mindreading.

Julian Hauser (julian@julianhauser.com)

Towards I and you: differentiation and joint attention

Joint attention is characterised by *openness*: when you and I jointly attend to an object, we are fully aware of our shared attentional states. In this paper, I argue that we should account for openness by seeing it rooted in infants' limited self-other differentiations, more specifically, in their failure to differentiate between themselves and the other as subjects of attention. Because of this indifferentiation, infants behave as if the other were aware of their attentional state and attended to the same object: infants *tacitly assume* openness. Joint attention becomes possible as the infant develops the ability *not* to assume that openness obtains when this assumption isn't warranted.
Early social referencing provides one example of the link between indifferentiation and openness. Initially, infants take others' emotional expressions to be relevant even when the adult directs their attention elsewhere, and it's only later that infants become sensitive to others failing to attend to them. While this sensitivity does not require any sophisticated representations, other mechanisms responsible for detecting non-open situations " such as sensitivity to others not attending to the same object " do require a representation of oneself and the other as distinct subjects of attention. Once the infant becomes good enough at detecting non-openness, we say that she can engage in joint attention.

The proposed account has a number of advantages: First, it accounts for the mechanisms and representations involved in joint attention without requiring representations of individual mental states (demanded, for instance, by Gómez, 2005 and Battich & Geurts, 2021). Second, the account brings philosophical reasoning in line with findings in developmental psychology by showing why joint attention requires some – but not overly demanding (see Tomasello, 1995) – cognitive sophistication. And, finally, since some of the mechanisms involved do not involve representations of others' cognitive states, the account explains why such representation are never sufficient to experience openness (see León, 2021 and Peacocke, 2005).

Max Khan Hayward (m.hayward@sheffield.ac.uk)

Jam Tomorrow and the New Repugnant Conclusion: Puzzles for Longtermism

Longtermists think we should be impartial between the interests of those who live today and those who will live in the future. Such impartiality seems to require agents to accept deferring trade-offs, sacrificing the option to acquire smaller benefits in the present for the option to acquire greater future benefits. However, this principle may require us to perform an infinite series of deferring trade-offs, whereby no-one will ever come to enjoy the benefit. If we always choose more jam tomorrow over less

jam today, we will never eat jam. This is the first version of the Jam Tomorrow paradox.

This might not seem like a real problem, since we are unlikely to have the opportunity to make an infinite series of deferring trade-offs. That would only eventuate if the future of sentient life were infinite, if opportunities for benefit were always increasing, and if future planners were always rational act-utilitarians. However, Longtermists should hope for these conditions, and strive to bring them about. Yet doing so would mean the re-emergence of the paradoxical dynamic, and no one would get to eat any jam. This is the second version of the Jam Tomorrow paradox.

We could deny that we always have reason to make deferring trade-offs by rejecting act-utilitarianism. Or we could conclude that it would not be an inherently good thing if the future of sentient life continued forever. However, neither option is available to Total Act-Utilitarians. Indeed, their view implies that we should accept lives worth than death in order to increase the chances that sentient life survives into the future. But continuing to accept this trade-off would bring about an outcome even worse than extinction. This is the New Repugnant Conclusion.

I conclude that considerations of the long-term are deeply troubling for act-utilitarianism, and especially for Total Utilitarianism.

Matthew Heeney (matthew.heeney@nu.edu.kz)

The Value of Contrarational Freedom

Libertarians about free will claim that moral responsibility requires the ability to act against the balance of reasons within one's possession. One challenge for Libertarians is to explain the value of such contrarational freedom: what good does it do for an agent to act against the balance of reasons, and why should our account of free will leave room for its possibility?

My aim in this project is to draw upon the phenomenon of a practical resolution to answer this question. We form practical resolutions because our grasp of reasons is fallible and perspective-dependent. It is possible to decide rationally and correctly, only to lose contact with those reasons at the time of action. Resolutions allow us to remain wedded to the correct course of action even when we can no longer appreciate the reasons for it. This reliance is sometimes rational. But it is sometimes irrational: for in some cases, we lose touch with both the reasons that make an action correct and with the grounds for thinking our resolution trustworthy.

In these cases, a practical resolution to do what is in fact correct will strike the agent as irrational. Contrarational freedom is valuable because it allows us to act on such resolutions. Put metaphorically, contrarational freedom provides an agent leeway to 'gamble' on a practical resolution even when she cannot regard that resolution as trustworthy. This ability is valuable because such irrational bets sometimes pay off in our favor. Contrarational freedom is a type of freedom worth wanting because it allows us to obtain goods that are both (a) explained by a grasp of reasons 'in a cool

hour,’ but also (b) not limited by an agent’s fluctuating informational and motivational resources.

Benjamin Henke and Casey O'Callaghan (benhenke@gmail.com)

Why and How to Study AI Pain

We first motivate an investigation of AI pain and then lay out what we see as the major questions such an investigation should seek to answer. Section 1 articulates two reasons to study AI pain. First, pain is of direct moral concern and is thus an important component of AI risk assessment. Second, pain plays several important roles in human and non-human animal cognition, and therefore may prove useful to emulate in AI systems. Section 2 articulates the consensus view that pain has discriminative, affective, and motivational components. Each component likely requires different investigative practices and is differentially relevant to the motivations discussed in Section 1. In Section 3, we articulate two barriers to applying current pain research to AI. First, because current theories of pain describe only ˜central’ or essential features of pain (such as its mode of representation) without articulating differentiation conditions between pain and similar states, they either fail to provide guidance in novel cases or risk overgeneralization. Second, typical markers of pain – such as self-report (in the case of humans) or stereotypical behavior (in the case of non-human animals) – provide, at best, imperfect access to the presence or absence of AI pain. In Section 4, we suggest that the study of AI pain should address these problems by, first, focusing theorizing on differentiation conditions between the functional profile of pain and similar states and, second, determining markers of pain based on those functional profiles. That is, AI pain assessments will turn on those systems' internal workings, not just on their output behavior. Progress on these two issues will advance our understanding of pain in general and enable us to assess the risk of AI pain in present or near-future AI systems.

Margarida Hermida (margarida.hermida@kcl.ac.uk)

Animalism and what matters in survival

The question of what matters in survival is distinct from the metaphysical question of personal identity. Parfit argued that identity is not what matters, and that psychological continuity without identity is just as good as ordinary survival. Recently, Merricks has argued that what matters in survival is numerical identity with a conscious person at a future time. Here I develop an animalist take on Merricks’s view. Mattering is a question of value, and value is not restricted to persons, but is perceived by all sentient beings as feelings of positive or negative valence. Feelings have their origins in the preservation of biological life, motivating animals to avoid states that are detrimental to their survival, which are felt as painful, and to seek the satisfaction of biologically relevant goals, which is felt as pleasurable. The conscious experience of these states matters to any being that has the capacity to feel them. I argue that it is possible, in some cases, for a human being to cease to be a Lockean person, yet remain a conscious, sentient animal, able to feel pain and pleasure.

Therefore, numerical identity with a sentient animal at a future time is what matters in survival.

Anna Hotter (ahotter@gradcenter.cuny.edu)

Women's Self-Defeating Behavior as a Breakdown of Practical Reason

When a woman intends to live an emancipated life and believes that in order to do so she must stop shaving her legs, but does not intend to stop shaving her legs, she is practically irrational. My paper argues that we should prefer this practical rationality interpretation (PRI) of women's complicity in their own subjugation over the canonical adaptive preference interpretation (API). The API is used by feminist philosophers and economists to explain the self-defeating actions of oppressed groups through their deformed preferences: roughly, women shave their legs because patriarchal beauty standards have given them a desire to do so.
I argue the API fails, because it mischaracterizes the conative landscape of oppressed agents, who often have first and second-order preferences for emancipation and against the self-defeating behavior – many women's preferences are not deformed in the way the API theorists describe.

Instead, the PRI analyses women's self-defeating behavior as a conscious failure of practical reason, usually through simple means-ends incoherence. The PRI avoids attributing incompatible or self-deceived preferences to oppressed agents and explains their puzzling behavior as a lucid breakdown of agency. I argue this reading is preferable to the API, because it can grant women greater epistemic insight, and because it exposes systematic practical irrationality as a key harm of patriarchal oppression. Patriarchy harms women, in part, by 1) undermining their status as 'planning agents' (a phrase I borrow from Michael Bratman) and by 2) hindering their capacity for practical rational activity.

Elena Icardi (elena.icardi@elach.uminho.pt)

Limit Inheritance to Protect Democracy: A Limitarian Account

In contemporary Western democracies, public decisions tend to be biased toward the interests of the super-rich. Moreover, simply preventing the super-rich from investing their money in politics may not be enough to eliminate the unfair advantage they enjoy. Large amounts of wealth indeed provide their owners with a broad set of privileges, such as high-level education and access to influential networks (Halliday, 2018), which allow the wealthy to affect public decision-making even without investing in it. Therefore, I argue that to protect democracy, one should endorse a limitarian principle. Limitarianism is a theory of distributive justice that holds that no one should have more than an upper threshold of wealth. Specifically, a 100% top marginal tax rate should apply above this threshold to fully protect political equality (Robeyns, 2017).

However, there is no consensus on what should be taxed at this very high rate. I argue that inheritance would be an appropriate tax base, as large inheritances facilitate the accumulation and concentration of wealth in the hands of a few (Piketty, 2014). To support this argument, I will first defend this view against the objection that

inheritance is a late event in life and therefore cannot play a decisive role in one's opportunities for political influence. Inheritance should not be considered as a single event, but more appropriately as a "flow of wealth" (Halliday, 2018, p. 3). Secondly, I will argue that applying the limitarian principle to inheritance offers a possible solution to the well-known incentive objection. This objection suggests that heavy taxation discourages people from producing more wealth. Yet, leaving a fortune to one's children (or others) is only one motivation among many to produce and collect wealth (White, 2003). As huge inheritances have negative consequences in terms of political inequality, they should thus be limited.

Anneli Jefferson (jeffersona1@cardiff.ac.uk)

'Terminal Anorexia' or the desire to justify treatment choices with a medical label

While many people suffering from anorexia nervosa recover, some die and some suffer from the condition for years or even decades. Recently, a new diagnostic category of 'terminal anorexia' has been suggested for patients who are over 30, have persistently engaged with high quality multidisciplinary eating disorder treatment, have decision making capacity and clearly state their understanding that further treatment will be futile and that cessation of treatment will lead to death (Gaudiani, Bogetz, and Yager 2022). In cases of terminal anorexia, the authors argue, the patient should have the option to move to palliative end of life care, rather than receiving further treatment. In one of the case studies presented, this option is not only presented, the patient is encouraged to take this route. The proposal to diagnose anorexia as terminal and move to palliative care has drawn criticism from clinicians, activists and researchers. In my paper, I argue that this proposed diagnosis in essence tries to solve a moral problem in a way that makes it seem ethically palatable by introducing a scientific sounding diagnosis that invites associations with paradigmatic terminal illnesses such as late stage cancer or dementia. This helps doctor and patient gloss over the fact that there is no such certainty of death in mental health conditions such as anorexia. I suggest that a terminal anorexia diagnosis is in fact a hidden cost benefit analysis, where treatment success is considered sufficiently unlikely so that the cost and pain of treatment no longer feels worthwhile. Furthermore, there is a danger that in labeling anorexia as terminal, doctors are making this the case, given the extent to which mental disorders in particular are looping kinds that are responsive to the way they are conceptualized.

Yihan Jiang (pr20yj@leeds.ac.uk)

Reconciling Process and Structure: Towards a Process-based Ontic Structural Realism

The recent years have witnessed the rise of two prominent metaphysical views that are fundamentally contradictory to each other in the field of the metaphysics of biology. One is Mechanistic Metaphysics (MM), which is based on an ontology of objects (Glennan 2017; Krickel 2018). The other one is Processual Metaphysics (PM), asserting that all that exists are dynamic processes (Dupré 2021). The debate

between the two views has reached an impasse because both sides are supported by reasonable motivations that are not addressed by the other.

On the one hand, much of the practices in life sciences are driven by the search for mechanisms that consist of the interaction of objects organized in a certain way. MM aims to ground the successes in life sciences, achieved through manipulating objects involved in mechanisms, and to accommodate causality associated with mechanisms. On the other hand, PM finds its motivation from the observation that living systems never exist independently but are interdependent and always interact with many other things, challenging the idea that living systems are discrete objects with intrinsic properties.

In this paper, I dissolve this debate by developing what I call the process-based Ontic Structural Realism (OSR). OSR was initially motivated by certain concerns in the debate of scientific realism, and it quickly became a prominent metaphysical theory in the philosophy of physics. Similar to PM, OSR rejects objects as a part of our ontology and argues that all that exist are structures which can be broadly understood as modal relations (Ladyman and Ross 2007; French 2014).

I propose a reconciliation between processes and structures as a solution to the debate between MM and PM. It leads to a processual structural realism or process-based OSR in which structures are understood as dynamic processes or processes are understood as possessing inherent modal or causal force and being associated with modal or causal relations. I then demonstrate how these structured processes can serve as the metaphysical underpinnings of mechanisms through reconceptualizing relevant objects, which enables my view to explain the success of life sciences and accommodate the causality related to mechanisms.

Todd Karhu (todd.karhu@kcl.ac.uk)

Temporal Partiality and the Veil of Ignorance

A venerable tradition in moral and political philosophy holds that we can derive principles of distributive justice from what rationally self-interested individuals would prefer when situated behind a veil of ignorance. One basic feature of human self-interested reasoning is the disposition to want good things to be in the future rather than the past, and bad things in the past rather than the future (generally referred to as ˜the bias toward the future'). I demonstrate that – given any plausible assumptions about risk-aversion and how to apportion probabilities over outcomes – future-biased reasoners behind the veil would favour distributive policies that are manifestly unjust. In particular, they would favour policies which impose large burdens on individuals in their youth in exchange for only small benefits to them in old age, rather than policies which both produced more total resources and distributed them evenly across age groups. Since these policy choices are unjust, we should be sceptical of the idea that distributive justice mirrors rational self-interest behind a veil of ignorance – provided future bias is rational. At a minimum, then, my arguments show that proponents of the veil of ignorance must accept a strongly counterintuitive position about the structure of prudential rationality. However, I argue that even avoiding the challenges that way is more difficult than it appears. For one

thing, the mere rational permissibility of future bias is enough for the challenge I raise to go through with full force. For another, quite apart from its normative standing, future bias is a universal proclivity. And it is not obviously irrational to choose, under conditions of ignorance, to further what one anticipates will be one's actual preferences, even if one knows that those preferences are themselves irrational.

Akira Kawashima (akira.kawashima88@gmail.com)

Dianoia and the "Intermediate": Non-propositional Knowledge in Plato's Divided Line (REPUBLIC VI, 509d1-511e5)

In this presentation, I address one of the most controversial issues of the Divided Line in Plato's *Republic* VI, 509d1-511e5 to shed light on his epistemology. Each of the four subsections of the Divided Line seems to represent a certain type of entity (pace Fine). What does the second subsection, which corresponds to dianoia, represent? Following Burnyeat et al., I contend that it stands for mathematical entities that are intermediate between Forms and sensible things, rather than for Forms themselves (Ross et al.); for propositions concerned with Forms via sensible things (Gonzalez et al.); or for certain sensible things (Smith et al.). Two factors motivate me to take this line of interpretation.

First, this reading can provide a better understanding of the geometrician's practice: when dealing with a triangle, she does not deal with the visible triangle she drew, but with the intelligible triangle it represents. Yet this triangle is most likely different from the Form of Triangle, in that there are many such geometrical triangles whereas the Form of Triangle is unique. I also suggest that the geometrician's mastery of geometry (i.e., the content of dianoia) should be irreducible to knowing any geometrical proposition, just as the dialectician's epistêmê should be irreducible to knowing any proposition about Forms.

Second, the assumption that the object of dianoia is the intermediate aligns well with the *Republic*'s epistemological accounts. In line with Moss et al., I argue that Plato in the *Republic* principally differentiates various cognitive states in terms of the distinct classes of objects associated with them. This tendency is manifest not only in our passage but also in the Analogy of the Cave (514a1-516b6) and in the Book V argument designed to persuade the sight-lovers (476d7-480a13).

Sophie Keeling (sophie.keeling@fsof.uned.es)

How motivation can be praiseworthy

This paper introduces the question of how motivation can be praiseworthy.
The standard assumption is that motivation matters for moral assessment in determining the moral worth of one's actions. E.g., Kant (1785) discusses a shopkeeper who returns the right change to customers, but only to preserve his reputation – the shopkeeper does the right thing but his motivation means that his action lacks moral worth in that we wouldn't praise him for doing the right thing. The contemporary literature seems to largely assume this distinction between what we ought to do and what is the right thing to do on the one hand, and this being praiseworthy due to the right motivation (e.g., Arpaly 2015, Markovits 2010, Sliwa 2016 and highlighted in Tomlinson 2020).

Nevertheless, it's highly appealing to think that motivations themselves can also be praiseworthy: 1) Suppose you stop kicking Saira because it causes her pain but only because if she's in pain she won't give you a job. Here we might say that you did the right thing for the right reason but aren't creditworthy for acting for this reason, and also that the resulting action isn't creditworthy as a result. 2) It's predicted by the higher order reasons framework. 3) Motivations themselves can be praiseworthy even if the resulting action happens to be the wrong thing to do (Johnson King (2020) and Field (2022)).

I then suggest what an account of praiseworthy motivation would in fact look like. My hypothesis is that creditworthy motivation requires responding to good reasons such that you do so because they are good reasons, where this requires being responsive to further reasons that speak against it being the right reason. And creditworthiness can be undercut if you only respond to what is in fact a good reason because of bad reasons.

Roberto Keller (Roberto.Keller@unige.ch)

Reasons, Importance, and Time

Chances are that you no longer think about that really messy break-up you went through six years ago. And chances are that, when you do, you no longer feel angry about it. In fact, you might even think that it would no longer be rational for you to still be angry at your ex – though you may still think that, back then, and given the way things ended, it was perfectly rational for you to resent them. If this is right, reasons for the emotions would seem to fade with time, but it is unclear why this should be. Some say that this is because, over time, emotions like anger consume their own reasons (Na'aman 2021). Others, by contrast, hold that reasons for the emotions do not fade with time; with time, we simply acquire pragmatic reasons to no longer feel angry or sad about the past (Howard 2023). In this talk, I will reject both these views and defend a new take. To start, I will argue that what we find puzzling about people who are still hung up on past wrongs (or past losses, missed opportunities, etc.) is not that we no longer see reasons for them to be angry (or sad, disappointed, etc.), but rather that we no longer see reasons for them to still care. In short, with time, some past events may lose their importance, and we may consequently lose reasons to care about them. This, I think, is the best way of addressing the apparent disappearance of reasons for the emotions. And part of this view's appeal resides not only in its ability to vindicate ordinary judgements, but also in its ability to explain why reasons for the emotions sometimes seem to disappear overnight, while other times they appear to last forever.

Maximilian Kiener (maximilian.kiener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

Responsibility and the Special Question 'Why?'

Anscombe defined intentional action in terms of 'the special question Why?'. In this paper, we argue that Anscombe's special question can be used to define a much broader category of conduct, namely that for which one is responsible. To do so, we first critique Anscombe's view by arguing that, even if the special question is given

application to all and only intentional acts, as Anscombe claims, this needs to be explained by, and therefore cannot itself explain, the nature of intentional action. Otherwise, we reverse the correct explanatory order. However, a similar charge does not apply when we use the special question to define responsibility, understood in terms of 'answerability'. This is because 'question' and 'answer', including the 'special question' and 'answer-ability', stand in converse relations to each other. But like 'offence' and 'defence', and unlike 'buy' and 'sell', there is a definitional asymmetry between 'question' and 'answer', such that the latter can be defined in terms of the former. Thus, an analysis of converse logical relations allows us to repurpose one of the most influential ideas in 20th-century philosophy of action within a novel theory of responsibility. We then propose a responsibility-related view on when the special question 'Why?' is given application. We argue that the special question 'Why?' is given application unless the agent concerned has an 'exemption' or 'denial', that is, unless (i) the agent concerned lacks capacity or competence (a) at the time of the demand for an explanation or (arguably) (b) at the time of their alleged conduct; (ii) the agent lacks physical control (e.g. a tremor); (iii) the party requesting or demanding an explanation does not have the required standing; (iv) the agent did not do the act or omission, hold the belief, etc., in the first place.

Dong-il Kim (hurkim@gmail.com)

A Third Conception of Self-ownership

Self-ownership has been conceived as a right to property primarily by liberal tradition while republican tradition has employed it to bolster the value of equality. As we own ourselves as a private property, according to liberals, we should be free and protected from the coercion of our body and its use and products as far as it does not harm the same right of others. Republicans in general believe that we, as the owner of ourselves and no one else, should be free from domination by anyone, and thus be enjoying an equal political status. In addition to the liberal and republican conceptions of self-ownership, this paper aims to suggest a third conception of self-ownership, that is, the autonomy conception, and demonstrate its significance. This suggestion and significance are addressed with reference to the ideal identity of democratic decision-makers who make their own, collective, and public decisions for their political community which they have to follow. Liberals and republicans have figured out the property and the equality conceptions of self-ownership respectively, and contributed to the development of the democratic decision-makers in their own ways. However, they show some limits in completing the ideal identity of the democratic agents. Those who own their body as a property do not necessarily have the capacity to make collective and public decisions for the whole community, which is not guaranteed either by the equal political status based on the self-ownership of every one. The rights to both property and equality do not assure the democratic capacity. It is when we own ourselves in the sense that we exercise autonomy over our lives, this paper argues, that we are in a position where we can make our own, collective, and public decisions.

Matthew Kinakin (matthewkinakin@gmail.com)

Affective Motivation and Normative Knowledge

Here are four platitudes about unpleasantness: there is something-it-is-like to experience unpleasantness; unpleasantness is bad-for-you; the badness-for-you of unpleasantness is epistemically accessible by you; and you are moved to end our unpleasant experiences (e.g., to take painkillers). These four facts – call them Phenomenology, Normativity, Epistemic, and Motivation, respectively – all put constraints on each other. I argue here that a prominent account of Phenomenology, namely, strong representationalism (SR) is incompatible with Normativity, Epistemic, and Motivation: strong representationalists about affect cannot explain what makes unpleasantness bad, how subjects know their unpleasant pains are bad-for-them, and why they are moved to eliminate them.

Here's the plan. First, I lay out a theoretical commitment of SR's, namely, strong transparency, the view, roughly, that subjects cannot directly attend to the phenomenal character of their own experiences. Second, I show why representationalists cannot avail themselves of desire-based explanations of Motivation, Epistemic, and Normativity. Third, I draw out the following implications for representationalism. In the case of Motivation, representationalists must either say that representational contents can intrinsically motivate their own elimination (P) or that judgements about the badness of their unpleasant experiences can motivate elimination (Q). I claim that representational states which intrinsically motivate their own elimination are implausible (not-P). In the case of Epistemic, representationalists must either say that judgements about the badness of their unpleasant experiences (Q) are a posteriori justified (Q1) or are a priori justified (Q2). I claim that representationalism precludes a posteriori justification for normative judgements about the badness of unpleasantness (not-Q1). In the case of Normative, representationalists must say that the mere representation of some normative property a priori entails that the representation itself is bad (Q2). I argue that is not true (not-Q2). These possibilities exhaust representationalism's options, hence representationalism fails to account for Motivation, Epistemic, and Normative.

James Ravi Kirkpatrick (james.kirkpatrick@some.ox.ac.uk)

Generic Uses of Indefinite Singulars as Homogeneity Presuppositions

It is well-known that sentences with indefinite singular noun phrases (IS NPs) as subject terms (e.g., 'A raven is black') give rise to at least two readings: an existential reading, which expresses the claim that at least one individual raven is black, and a generic reading, which expresses a claim about ravens in general, say, that ravens generally are black. The standard account of IS NPs posits an ambiguity between existential and generic interpretations at the level of logical form: the existential reading is captured with an existential quantifier, while the generic reading is captured with a generic quantifier. Call the standard view the bifurcated view.

In this paper, I explore a radical alternative to the bifurcated view according to which IS generics are existential generalisations that carry a homogeneity presupposition that the relevant witness is representative of the relevant kind. Call this the unified view.

I shall argue that the unified theory has several advantages over the bifurcated view. First, it does not posit any ambiguity at the level of syntax nor semantics between existential and generic readings of sentences with IS subjects. Second, by extending the theory to bare plural generics (e.g., 'Ravens are black'), we can explain (i) distributive, cumulative, or collective predications as arising as properties of the matrix clause attribution, (ii) the fact that IS generics have a more limited distribution compared with BP generics (e.g., as witnessed by the contrast between the following minimal pairs: 'Madrigals/{a madrigal} are/is polyphonic' vs. 'Madrigals/{*a madrigal} are/is popular}), and (iii) the fact that only BP generics, and not IS generics, have kind-referring readings (e.g., as witnessed by the following contrast 'Dinosaurs/{*a dinosaur} are/is extinct'). I conclude that these considerations provide some prima facie support for the unified theory.

Bon-Hyuk Koo (bonhyukkoo@ksa.kaist.ac.kr)

Reasons to Opt for Selective Realism

Most recently defended realist positions in the scientific realism debate can be categorised under selective realism, taking certain parts of scientific theories as approximately true. However, some realists argue that the pessimistic induction (PI) has been overrated and is fallacious (Fahrbach 2011, 2017; Bird 2022; Park 2022), removing the motivation for selective realism. In particular, Park (2022) explicitly criticises selective realism as unworthy of the label 'realism' and attempts to undermine it. I focus on the challenges posed by Park (2022) and show that selective realism is still realist enough, and tenable.

Park's reasons for seeing selective realism as anti-realist are: 1) selective realism concedes too much to, and thereby collapses into, anti-realism; and 2) selective realism and anti-realist pessimism share the view that current science will succumb to refutation. In response, I first argue that selective realism is realist because it holds the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic commitments to the selected parts of scientific theories, the approximate truth of which explains and is confirmed by the success of the scientific theories. Secondly, selective realism (unlike anti-realism) still allows optimistic induction, predicting continuity in theoretical contents which had been responsible for generating the past successes.

Park furthermore presents seven problems to show selective realism as untenable, including that selective realism commits a fallacy of biased statistics in taking pessimistic induction seriously and that it disregards the epistemic superiority of current scientific theories. However, I find motivation for selective realism in another version of the pessimistic induction: just one counterexample where a theory is successful but is not approximately true will suffice to require an anti-realist explanation, and this may be inductively applied to other successes of science (Ladyman 2002:244). The other five problems can also be dealt with, leaving selective realism as the most plausible position in the debate.

Jonathan Kwan (jonathan.kwan@nyu.edu)

The Eco-Political Wrongs of Colonialism

The main accounts of the wrongs of colonialism in political philosophy and political theory, despite their disagreements, all conceptualize colonialist wrongs in purely political terms: whether as political domination, cultural imposition, exploitation, territory taking, or a mix of these features. This ignores the claims of Indigenous communities and scholars who frequently characterize the ecological violence of colonialism, not just its political dimensions, as fundamental to its wrongness. Building off Indigenous insights, I develop an eco-political principle of self-determination to explain some of the central wrongs of colonialism as at once both political and environmental. I argue that a people's right to self-determination over a given territory is normatively linked to a duty of ecological sustainability and a right of ecological integrity insofar as territory is partly constituted by ecosystems that are a material pre-requisite for human life and political society. This eco-political principle of self-determination unifies and explains many central wrongs of colonialism – such as forced displacement, the spread of infectious diseases, the building of pipelines, the dumping of toxic waste, climate change, etc. – which include but is not necessarily limited to the taking of territory. I end by responding to the objection that my view, insofar as it links self-determination with a duty of ecological sustainability, could license a kind of green colonialism if Indigenous peoples did not sustain their territories and if new settlers could do so instead. While I maintain that self-determination has ecological sustainability limits and should not be seen as an absolute right, strictly speaking, my account is neutral on whether such green colonialism is permissible. Such green colonialism may be impermissible on other grounds not having to do with violating eco-political self-determination. Or perhaps it is only temporarily justified if it aims to ultimately restore a people's right to eco-political self-determination in the future.

James Laing (james.laing@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

The Desire for Admiration

It is often said that, as social animals, we cannot but desire the admiration of others. In this paper I distinguish two ways of interpreting this thesis, drawing upon Bernard Williams's distinction between moral and psychological incapacities (Williams 1993). I argue that this thesis is unpersuasive and normatively idle when interpreted in terms of the concept of a psychological incapacity, but more promising when interpreted with reference to the concept of a moral incapacity. I end by outlining what such an interpretation might look like.

Gerald Lang (g.r.lang@leeds.ac.uk)

What is All or Nothing About the All or Nothing Problem?

The central case: the building is on fire and two strangers will perish in the flames unless you save them. There are three options: doing nothing; saving both of them; and saving just one of them. Due to the serious injuries you would sustain, imagine that doing nothing is permissible. It is also clearly permissible, as a heroic supererogatory act, to save both. Saving just one of them, by contrast, is impermissible: there can be no excuse for saving one and then abandoning the other at no further cost to you. Let us imagine that, for reasons best known to yourself, you

have excluded saving both from your deliberation. What then? The only remaining permissible option is to save neither, since saving one is impermissible. So, if you are not prepared to save both, you should save neither. And that looks like the wrong advice for morality to give. This is the 'All or Nothing Problem'.

The All or Nothing Problem may be less all or nothing than the name of the problem suggests. First, the fact that you have excluded saving both from deliberation does not require morality to cease to pay attention to this option. Having saved one, you should save the other one as well. Morality was saying that at the beginning, and it can continue to say it even when you seek its advice in this context. Second, your implicit demand – absolve me for not saving both, since saving one is better than saving neither – does not present morality with any sort of headache. Morality cannot exploit the admirability of saving one at considerable cost to offset or neutralize the non-admirability of not saving the other at no cost. Morality simply cannot cut you that kind of deal. This is a strength, not a weakness.

James Lewis (jhplewis@gmail.com)

Aesthetic community and appreciation (or vice versa)

Aesthetic practices afford social goods, principally, communion. We sing and dance together, we tell stories to, and make handsome objects for one another. Creative expression is (or at least often seems) a social act for which the appreciation of another person is an internal goal. This insight has prompted some aesthetic theorists – recently including Nick Riggle (2022, 2024, forthcoming) and Jessica Williams (forthcoming) – to develop theories of the nature of the aesthetic domain which treat the social function of aesthetic practices as foundational. These views call themselves aesthetic communitarianism. Aesthetic communitarianism holds that the social goods afforded by aesthetic practices play a central role in explaining the normativity of aesthetic value. In this paper, I argue that such theories get the explanatory relation the wrong way around. Social goods do not explain aesthetic value, but they are explained by it.

Through a series of examples, I consider why it is that aesthetic practices can be a site of communion, or togetherness. Drawing from a broader project about the nature of such social goods, I articulate the role of joint attention and external value in what it is like for people to commune with one another. Attending to this subject matter reveals that communion must have an object: something with respect to which parties are joined together. The examples also show that the value of communion must be understood with reference to the value of its object. The value of the principal social goods of aesthetic life are grounded, partly, in that of their aesthetic object: the song, the dance, or whatever. It follows, I argue, that the aesthetic value of those objects cannot also be grounded in that of the social goods they afford – contrary to aesthetic communitarianism.

Yucheng Li (ynj3av@virginia.edu)

Nihilism about Determinacy at All Orders

It is vague whether 200 grains of wheat make a heap. It is determinate that 10,000 grains of wheat make a heap. The determinate can be vague or determinate: It may be determinately determinate, and hence second-orderly determinate, that 10,000 grains of wheat make a heap. The same reasoning extends and we may accept determinacy of even higher orders. According to nihilism about determinacy at all orders (and hence nihilism), there is no absolute determinacy: no proposition is determinate for every order of determinacy.

Andrew Bacon (2020) recently addressed nihilism as a solution to Sainsbury's (1996) problem for higher-order vagueness, according to which we cannot express the vagueness of things that are determinate at all orders and things that are not determinate at all orders --- If nothing is determinate at all orders, then Sainsbury's charge is not a threat to advocates of higher-order vagueness. Bacon rejects nihilism, as his (2018, & Zeng 2022) higher-order theory of necessities proves that some propositions are determinate at all orders.

The goal of this paper is to reformulate nihilism based on Williamson (1994) and Keefe's (2002) suggestion that Sainsbury's problem can be resolved by abandoning the common practice of capturing the determinacy of some determinacy operator using this operator itself. The reformulation of nihilism accepts two principles governing determinacy operators. The first principle suggests that any conjunction of any orders of determinacy is itself an order of determinacy; the second principle suggests that the vagueness of any order of determinacy can be captured by some new determinacy operator. I will show that nihilism reformulated this way avoids Bacon's objection, and thus suffice for a solution to Sainsbury's problem.

Yi-Cheng Lin (yclruce@gmail.com)

Whose Actions, Whose Responsibility?

Suppose a group performs an action. The question is, when is the group responsible for the action and when is its member responsible for the action? I call this the Responsibility Question. The answer appears simple- whoever performs an action is responsible for it. If a group performs an action, then the group is responsible for it. If a member performs an action, then the member is responsible for it. However, things are not always that straightforward. How can we determine whether an action should be attributed to a group or its members? I call this the Action Question. This paper argues that we should consider membership conditions to answer both of these questions. Moreover, when formulating membership conditions, one must include the concept of identification. Only when one identifies as a member, can they be considered a member of a group.

Giulia Lorenzi (giulia.lorenzi.1@warwick.ac.uk)

Listening with familiar ears

In philosophy of auditory perception, taxonomic works such as O'Callaghan (2021) and O'Callaghan & Nudds (2009), consider the perception of music as a distinctive case. Yet, the current literature on the matter does not provide a standardised and generally accepted reason for which this should be the case. In this talk, I am going

to propose a new account of this distinctiveness routed in philosophy of action and epistemology.

I start clarifying what I take to be the phenomenology of the perception of music that should be explained considering philosophical (Scruton 1997, Davies 1994), psychological (Huron 1998) and sociological literature (Green 2008). I then show how this phenomenology emerges just in specific circumstances, by comparing cases of inculturated and uninculturated listeners perceiving a piece of music and noticing their differences.

From the comparison, I draw the conclusion that for the interesting phenomenology of music to emerge two conditions need to be present: 1) the familiarity of the perceiver with the piece of music, 2) their active participation in listening and not just merely hearing the musical piece. I then proceed presenting an analysis of the nature of these two conditions.

On one hand, through an argument by cases based on the experiences of inculturated and uniculturated listeners, I show that familiarity with a piece of music should be understood as a set of abilities, a form of know-how, that perceivers acquire through prolonged and repeated exposure to music. On the other, following the work of O'Shaughnessy (2000) and Crowther (2009a, 2009b), I take listening to be a mental action that perceivers can perform in different ways.

Ultimately, I conclude that the distinctiveness of the perception of music is due to the exercise of a set of abilities (familiarity) in the mental action of listening to a piece of music.

Rebecca Lowe (rebeccamarylouiselowe@gmail.com)

Are There Prisons in Utopia?

As an exemplar of the intentional deprivation of freedom, putting someone 'in captivity' (i.e., seriously limiting their ability to choose where they're located) requires strong moral justification, on any liberal account. A further complication, arising in response to the use of captivity for punitive reasons (i.e., to punish bad behaviour) as opposed to non-punitive reasons (e.g., to prevent the spread of disease, or to prevent people with diminished responsibility unintentionally acting harmfully) pertains to long-held freedom-focused objections to deterrence and retribution justifications. Nonetheless, it's hard to imagine a possible peaceful society that doesn't feature captivity as a response to intentional crime threats. Here, I argue that, on a rights-based liberal account: 1) punitive captivity is always impermissible; but that 2) highly-conditional non-punitive captivity can be a justifiable response to intentional crime threats, even in the 'best possible society'. First, I make a case for Utopian thinking, on which the constraints of ˜best' and ˜possible', when set objectively (contra, e.g., Nozick), help us determine the moral value/disvalue of societal features. I also accept Utopians must be: 1) free to make bad choices; 2) free to permissibly defend themselves; 3) free to determine how they live together, including how to (permissibly) address crime threats. Second, I engage with Tommie Shelby's discussion of prison's function and justification, arguing that, if (as per Shelby) prison is not only necessarily focused on addressing crime but also

necessarily punitive, then there can be no prisons in Utopia. But that if a non-punitive 'prison-like' institution can prevent serious intentional crime, then it can be conditionally justifiable on defensive grounds. I finish by engaging with Shelby's discussion of prison's essential characteristics, arguing that: 1) recent and possible technological developments can enable the liberalisation of all forms of captivity; 2) meeting captives' needs is necessary to any justified captivity.

Andrea Lupo (andrea.lupo@usi.ch)

A Puzzle for Aristotelian Universals

According to *Aristotelianism* about universals, there is an *asymmetry* in the relationship between a universal and its instances: universals are immanent in their instances, but the opposite is never the case. In this paper, I present a puzzle for this view: some immanent universals appear to be *self-instantiating*; but if they are, then a violation of asymmetry follows – for these universals will be immanent in *themselves*. I shall also provide a precise formulation of this puzzle through the notion of *metaphysical ground*. By doing so, it will become apparent that it is an instance of an unrecognized family of the *puzzles of ground* – I shall call it "*the puzzle of maximality*". It will also emerge that the puzzle of maximality is resistant to all of the standard ways of blocking the puzzles of ground available in the literature, thereby highlighting their limitations. In this way, the puzzle becomes a novel point of intersection for the study of universals and that of metaphysical ground.

Agata Machcewicz-Grad (a.machcewicz-grad@uw.edu.pl)

A miracle of mindreading. On Adam Toon's mental fictionalism

Adam Toon in his recent book Mind as metaphor. A defence of mental fictionalism (2023) formulates the up to now best developed account of mental fictionalism. Yet, in my talk I argue that Toon's fictionalism is still unsatisfactory. The central thesis of Toon's fictionalism is that FP discourse is metaphorical. The vocabulary of contentful, causally efficacious mental states originates from the domain of public representations where it is used literally. The FP attributions cannot be paraphrased to the literal discourse. Hutto (2022) formulated the explanatory gap problem to Toon's fictionalism: since we observe a great predictive success of FP, fictionalism needs to reconcile this success with irrealism about the mental states. Hence, the fictionalist faces a dilemma: she either admits that FP metaphors have literal paraphrases which explain the predictive success or she denies the possibility of paraphrasing and ends up in mysterianism. Toon refuses to accept the dilemma and argues that the explanatory gap problem can be dealt with otherwise: by pointing out that the success of FP is largely due to its regulative role. Mentalistic predictions are accurate because social agents adapt their behaviour to the norms of FP. I suggest that the regulative dimension of FP can be explicated in terms of a looping effect discussed in philosophy of social sciences. The behaviour of social agents is shaped in part as a result of FP generalisations and, in turn, the change in a behaviour affects the psychological generalisations. The mental states are to be understood as interactive kinds. Yet, there are good reasons to admit that interactive kinds can form natural kinds. If so, then the regulative role of FP does not prevent its realistic

interpretation which explains the predictive success. Hence, the dilemma introduced by the explanatory gap problem is still to be faced by fictionalism.

Nuno Maia (nunofilipe2016@gmail.com)

Arithmetical Pluralism, Consistency and Omega-consistency

According to arithmetical pluralism, every sentence independent of arithmetic is indeterminate. A well-known objection claims that the view is committed to indeterminacy about whether arithmetic is itself consistent. Clarke-Doane in (2020, *Morality and Mathematics*, Oxford University Press) and in (2020, Set-Theoretic Pluralism and the Benacerraf Problem, *Philosophical Studies*, 177(7), 2013–2030) argues that the objection is circumvented by requiring that all and only Σ1-sound extensions of arithmetic are intended. Here, I argue that this reply is not successful since it leads to contradictory statements about omega-consistency. I also explain how both problems— about consistency, and about omega-consistency — are solved by adopting a requirement stronger than that of Clarke-Doane's.

Raamy Majeed (raamy.majeed@manchester.ac.uk)

Love as a Four-Dimensional Worm

This paper explores the ways certain metaphysical assumptions in empirical emotion research might be hindering our ability to properly investigate long-term emotions or sentiments (e.g., love and hate). I argue implicit in emotion research is the assumption that sentiments are enduring states, wholly present, in their instances, which explains why we are (allegedly) able to investigate them by focussing on a few instances. I challenge this assumption and argue that a more fruitful way to approach a science of sentiment is to treat them as perduring states, which have different parts at different times, and are never wholly present in any given time. In other words, we should treat them as four-dimensional worms, which extend in time, as well as space. I argue a psychological science of sentiment premised on such a treatment is better placed to capture the ways our sentiments, such as love, develop and unfold over time.

Michael Markunas (michaelmarkunas6@gmail.com)

Cognitively Homeless Russell

In ‘Russellian Acquaintance and Frege’s Puzzle’, Wishon agues that a number of Bertrand Russell interpreters incorrectly attribute to him what Wishon calls ‘the received view of acquaintance’. The received view is that when one is acquainted with an object, one cannot fall prey to misidentifying the object. Wishon highlights portions of Russell’s corpus that cast doubt that Russell ascribed to the received view. Wishon makes a key contribution to the understanding of these discussions. But I argue that the analysis can go even further. If we compare these passages in Russell to passages from Williamson’s (2000) anti-luminosity argument, we find striking similarities hitherto unnoticed. What’s more, if Wishon is right about the received view of acquaintance, and I think he is, then we also have reason to think that Russell was committed to anti-luminosity about mental states, or, to use Williamson’s phrase, Russell thought that we were ‘cognitively homeless’. In this paper, I highlight the connections between Williamson and Russell, and also offer a novel interpretation of Russell’s theory of acquaintance that helps make sense of these otherwise puzzling passages.

Giulia Martina (giulia.martina@tutanota.com)

Perceiving and misperceiving properties

What does it take to perceive a sensible property, such as an object’s colour? It has been argued that there conditions on perceiving a property which are not conditions on perceiving an object (e.g. Millar 2022, 2023). We may count as seeing an object no matter how it looks to us or how little we can tell about it; but seeing its colour is, the view holds, more demanding. If a blue bead in pink light looks black, we surely see the bead, but do we see its colour? If intuitions diverge, how do we decide? In this paper, I present a challenge to any conditions on perceiving an object’s property that appeal either to how the object appears to us or to what we can judge about it. The challenge turns on the difficulty of drawing a line between cases of ordinary perceptual variation, where everyone agrees that we perceive the target property even though it looks a bit different across conditions, and cases where perception is deeply misleading as to the nature of the property, as with the black-looking bead. There are many kinds of failures involved in property perception which do not fit the traditional category of illusion and are not cases of failing to perceive the target property (Kalderon 2011, Macpherson & Batty 2016, Alford-Duguid 2020). Minimal conditions on property perception allow for a better account of both ordinary perceptual variation and the variety of failures in property perception. I conclude by outlining a distinction between perceiving as a perceptual relation and attributions of states of perceiving a property P to subjects (e.g. ‘she could see the bead’s colour’) which we make in everyday discourse. This distinction, I suggest, helps us make sense of the diverging intuitions about limiting cases like the black-looking blue bead.

Michal Masny (mmasny@berkeley.edu)

Work and the Good of Detachment

Recent literature in the philosophy of work emphasises the importance of non-monetary goods of work. For example, Anca Gheaus and Lisa Herzog (2016) argue that, for many people, work is the most important context in which they can attain excellence at something, experience community, make a social contribution, and gain social recognition. This claim has important upshots for our understanding of the badness of unemployment and the desirability of particular jobs, among other things.

In this paper, I argue that there is a further important non-monetary good of work that has been overlooked. To illustrate the core idea, I refer to a recent memoir by the acclaimed actor, Patrick Stewart (2023), where he reflects on his traumatic childhood and says that his primary attraction to acting was that he could forget about being Patrick Stewart, if only for a few hours a week.

I believe that Stewart's remark highlights two important issues. The first issue concerns the nature of well-being: we all seek out opportunities to regularly distance or detach ourselves from what we feel, think, aspire to, and are responsible for in our private lives. The second issue concerns the importance of work: for many people, work is the most important context in which they can do that, regardless of whether they are an actor, a construction worker, or a philosophy professor.

In the paper, I expound on these issues. Specifically, I argue that we have a basic need to regularly detach ourselves from the central aspects of our private identities, that work tends to provide better opportunities for that than some of the obvious alternatives (such as athletic, artistic, and spiritual activities), and that because of this, we should be concerned about some recent labour market trends and the prospect of widespread technological unemployment.

David Matthew (davidmatthew96@outlook.com)

Role Ethics and consequentialism

In this paper I address a key question for contemporary role ethicists. Can a role-based theory of our ethical lives set itself apart from its major rivals, deontology, consequentialism, and virtue ethics, or will it inevitably collapse into one of these more popular positions? Role ethicists claim that though it may share certain features with other ethical theories their view is nonetheless unique. I believe that they are correct. I will restrict my attention to just one of role ethics major rivals, consequentialism, and will argue that while role ethics is able to accommodate some of the core intuitions that lie behind consequentialist ethical theories, it is also substantially distinct. I will suggest therefore that role ethics cannot be reduced to a form of consequentialism, despite some notable similarities.

Taylor Matthews (T.Matthews@soton.ac.uk)

Courage in Defeat

The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories online. In the face of these pollutants, epistemologists have increasingly claimed that close-mindedness or dogmatism are justified responses (Battaly, 2018, 2021; Fantl, 2018; Levy, 2022). What justifies these responses, they

claim, is that the traits reliably produce good epistemic effects: they help agents retain true beliefs and knowledge in epistemically polluted environments.

In this paper, I argue that this strategy is misguided. Even if we grant that these traits do preserve true beliefs, I claim that the resulting beliefs do not amount to knowledge because they are not justified. I do this by showing how traits like close-mindedness and dogmatism act as two kinds of epistemic defeater. First, these traits are widely taken to be epistemically unreliable and/or blameworthy in ordinary environments. These outside considerations, I argue, provide agents within polluted environments with evidence against the reliability of these traits. In turn, I suggest that close-mindedness and dogmatism can doxastically defeat the justification for an agent's true beliefs. Second, insofar as agents have second-order evidence of these traits' unreliability/blameworthiness in ordinary environments, not only are they ignoring counter-evidence when exercising them in polluted environments, but they are failing to believe something they ought to. Thus, these traits can undermine the justification of true beliefs in virtue of being normative defeaters. Rather than preserve knowledge, then, I argue that these traits destroy it in epistemically polluted environments

I conclude by sketching an alternative strategy that appeals to an epistemic motivation to avoid error. I argue that this motivation not only underpins a species of virtuous intellectual courage, but that this courage helps to restore the justification of our true beliefs in polluted environments. As such, it allows us to reclaim knowledge when we need it most.

Sadie McCloud (sadie.mccloud@yale.edu)

A Problem for Moral Reformation in Seneca's Epistles

In his Epistles, Seneca commits himself to the position that moral reformation is possible for the morally bad person. However, his 25th letter raises a problem for the possibility of this moral reformation. From that letter we can derive an account of how moral reformation occurs. A person can be morally healthy or ill. Since moral illness is bad, the morally ill person would be better off becoming morally healthy. To do so, they must first recognize their faults and then eliminate them by striving to become virtuous. But the morally ill person is not aware that they have faults: their moral illness precludes them from being able to recognize these.

The problem arises because Seneca allows for the existence of a bad person who seems unable to gain knowledge that they have faults. This person recognizes a difference between virtuous and bad actions but, by some act of reasoning, arrives at the conclusion that those actions which are called bad actions are in fact virtuous actions. They develop a way to self-justify their bad actions. According to Seneca's account of moral reformation, for this person to change, they must gain the knowledge that their bad actions are bad.

I will argue that Seneca's various proposals for how such a person can gain this knowledge show that he does not have the resources to explain how they can reform independently of the application of external coercion. Because his commitment to the possibility of moral reformation takes philosophy as the initially motivating force,

philosophy is what exerts this external coercion. But, I will argue, for Seneca, philosophy can't successfully exert external coercion so as to provide the bad person with new and changed beliefs about which actions count as virtuous. This leaves the plausiblity of his account of moral reformation unsupported.

Phillip Meadows (phillip.meadows1@gmail.com)

Plural Instantiation and Parsimony

Here I consider the prospects for plural instantiation, compared to the view that property instantiation can only be by individuals. Plural instantiation is the idea that more than one individual might, taken together or collectively , stand in a relation of instantiation to some property, but without it being true that any of those individuals, taken by themselves, stand in a relation of instantiation to that property. Moreover, the phrase s ˜taken together' and ˜collectively' should not be taken to imply the existence of some further entity which the individuals compose or constitute.

Plural instantiation has found application in various important metaphysical debates, though thus far only at the margins: e.g., Yi (2002) appeals to it in defense of numbers as properties, as a means of explicating how two individuals could have the property of being two, while avoiding the embarrassment of invoking sets, which each have the property of being one; Caves (2018) notes its value for mereological nihilists to account for mental causation.

The central criticism of plural instantiation offered in this paper is that unless you are committed to mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite individuals but only mereological simples, plural instantiation is theoretically unmotivated when it comes to accounting for true plural predications. This means that, if mereological composites exist, plural predication is superfluous in contexts central to the prima facie case for plural instantiation outlined in the previous section. If these complaints are justified, then what this means is that plural instantiation is not an unproblematic piece of descriptive metaphysics, but a theoretical device only useful for a particular kind of eliminativist project. The upshot of this is, if not the outright vindication of views which reject plural instantiation, at least clarity about the steep costs of plural instantiation.

Raphaël Millière (raphael.milliere@mq.edu.au)

Mechanistic Explanation in Deep Learning

Deep learning has recently achieved impressive results across many domains of artificial intelligence, such as computer vision and natural language processing, including complex tasks that seem to require abstract knowledge and reasoning. However, there is a broad disagreement about the kinds of cognitive capacities one can meaningfully ascribe to deep neural networks, if at all. Behavioral performance on standardized benchmarks is not sufficient to warrant such ascriptions, which should ultimately be grounded in an account of how neural networks processes information internally. One approach that holds promise for opening the "black box" of neural networks is mechanistic interpretability, which aims to uncover their abstract causal structure.

In this paper, I consider whether the pursuit of mechanistic interpretability in deep learning can generate genuine mechanistic explanations that satisfy common epistemic standards from the philosophy of science. In fields like molecular biology and neuroscience, researchers elucidate mechanisms by decomposing them into parts, activities and organizational structures that generate the phenomenon of interest. Explanations must establish that identified components are causally implicated in the behavior of the system, which is typically achieved through targeted interventions on these components. Mechanistic interpretability in deep learning aspires to emulate this methodological framework.

This raises two questions: (1) Are causal claims made about neural network components based on existing intervention methods adequate to achieve mechanistic explanation of behavior at least in principle? (2) Does the focus on human-interpretable computations risk mischaracterizing how neural networks process information by imposing anthropomorphic biases? Drawing upon specific case studies from recent empirical research, I argue that the methods of mechanistic interpretability can meet the standards of mechanistic explanation in the life sciences. In particular, I consider an ongoing challenge known as interpretability illusions, and argue that it is not an insurmountable threat to the validity of mechanistic explanation in deep learning.

Joseph Millum (jrm39@st-andrews.ac.uk)

Proportional chances for scarce health care resources

Health care resources are scarce, such that not everyone who could benefit from treatment for their condition can receive it. Sometimes one group of patients is more expensive to treat than another, while the benefits they would receive are of similar magnitudes. How should allocation decisions be made between such groups? On a maximizing view, the group that is cheaper to treat gets priority, even if this means that none of the more expensive group receive treatment. To some, this appears unfair. An alternative gives each individual an equal chance at treatment, no matter the cost difference. But ignoring opportunity costs like this leads to very counter-intuitive verdicts. A compromise option is sometimes proposed whereby a patient's chance of receiving a scarce benefit should be inversely proportional to the opportunity cost of providing it. For example, if it would cost twice as much to extend the life of patient A as patient B, then in a context where not all can be treated, B should have twice the chance of treatment that A receives. This proportional chances view has a plausible ring to it but has received little principled defense. In this paper, I outline a principled basis for the view and critically evaluate it. I argue that the best justification for proportional chances is that it instantiates a form of equality of resources. On the grounds that resources matter only in virtue of what can be done with them, I then evaluate the outcomes of implementing proportional chances in terms of efficiency and equality. Looking at outcome equality within a pool of patients in need of treatment, proportional chances appears preferable to maximizing. However, if we expand the pool to include a healthy population, this advantage disappears. Proportional chances should therefore be rejected on both efficiency and equality grounds.

Thomas Mitchell (thomas.mitchell@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

Distinguishing Persuasion from Manipulation

It is often difficult to make a clear distinction between different methods of influence. When does an offer of rescue become a threat of abandonment? Where do we draw the line between bargaining and blackmail? At what point does a negotiation become coercive? These distinctions matter because there is a prima facie moral difference between these various ways of influencing others.

One such distinction is that between persuasion and manipulation. It is commonly thought that it is presumptively impermissible to manipulate someone into doing or thinking something, but persuading them of the same is permissible. It is therefore of moral importance to tell them apart. Unfortunately, this is often difficult to do.

Part of the problem is that there is an overlap between the concepts; there is such a thing as manipulative persuasion. Our aim, therefore, is to bring clarity by dividing up the conceptual space: ˜pure' manipulation; manipulative persuasion; ˜pure' persuasion. It is the latter in which we are most interested. What is it to persuade someone in a way that is not manipulative and so does not carry the presumptive wrongs of manipulation?

We adopt Robert Noggle's account of manipulation, according to which it is inducing the target to make a mistake, which is either akratic behaviour or an attitude inappropriate to the situation. Accordingly, persuasion is a kind of influence that does not lead its target to make mistakes so characterised. Taking this as our starting-point, we construct an account of persuasion that distinguishes it not only from manipulation (our primary goal), but also from other important forms of influence, such as informing, coercing, and deceiving. An interesting upshot is that the ethics of persuasion are more restrictive than is often assumed, since there are important limitations on persuasion being non-manipulative.

Andreas Mogensen (andreas.mogensen@philosophy.ox.ac.uk)

How to resist the Fading Qualia Argument

Chalmers' Fading Qualia Argument is perhaps the strongest argument supporting the view that consciousness is substrate independent. Chalmers presents a purported reductio of the possibility that a functional isomorph of a conscious system could be unconscious by virtue of having the ˜wrong' substrate. We imagine a sequence of cases - X_{1},…,X_{n} - where more and more components of the original conscious system are replaced with alternatives of the ˜wrong' substrate. If consciousness is substrate dependent, argues Chalmers, we should expect either a sudden loss of consciousness at some arbitrary point or that later parts of the sequence are associated with implausible failures of introspective access to the 'faded' character of experience. I show how we can resist the argument. In particular, we are able to go between the horns of the dilemma by supposing that as more and more of the original system is replaced, what happens is that it becomes more and more indeterminate that the system has the same experience, E. Assuming we reject bivalence, we can say that there is no true instance of the sentence schema 'X_{i}

has E and X_{i+1} does not have E'. In that sense, there are no suddenly disappearing qualia. While we may allow that the sentence schema 'X_{i} has E' decreases in its degree of truth as more and more material is replaced, since we are able to deny that 'X_{i} does not have E' has any true instances apart from in those cases where the system is unconscious, we do not have 'faded' qualia in the way Chalmers imagines. I discuss the assumptions needed to sustain this line of response and how they relate to contemporary debates about vagueness and phenomenal consciousness, as well as to debates about holism and atomism in the philosophy of consciousness.

Auke Montessori (aukemontessori@gmail.com)

Mixed Views and Multisensory Experience

Once upon a time within the philosophy of perception, vision was the only game in town. Almost all examples were vision-based, and theories that applied well to vision were assumed to apply equally well to the other senses. In recent decades, the other senses, like hearing, touch, smell and taste, have started receiving individual attention.

Despite this, it is still an almost universal assumption that all senses have the same metaphysical nature. For example, all the senses might be intentionalist in nature. I discuss an alternative family of views, which I call mixed views. On a mixed view, not all senses have the same metaphysical nature. An example mixed view is one where vision and touch are intentionalist, while smell, taste and hearing are naive realist.

The possibility of mixed views has been suggested, but it has never been discussed in detail. The goal is to do so here. I show that certain commitments make mixed views attractive. For instance, the senses feel quite different, and a mixed view can reflect these differences. Any philosopher dedicated to capturing the phenomenology of perception should take mixed views seriously. Other commitments that lead to mixed views are also be noted.

A potential problem for mixed views is that the senses often closely interact, and sometimes even create single multisensory experiences together. The multisensory nature of perception might be difficult to account for if the senses differ metaphysically.

For interaction, I argue that senses with different natures can still help each other focus on novel features in the environment. For creating unified experiences, I argue that the sub-personal perceptual processing of various senses can together create unified experiences with metaphysical features of all contributing senses. While rough, this account can show us the way to fully accounting for multisensory experiences on mixed views.

Alice Monypenny (alice.monypenny2@nottingham.ac.uk)

Tactical Testimonial Smothering and Epistemic Agency

Testimonial smothering (Dotson, 2011) occurs when an individual curtails their own testimony (by not testifying about certain things, or in certain ways) because they

believe that the content or way in which their testimony is expressed will be deemed incomprehensible by their audience. Testimonial smothering is typically thought to limit epistemic agency because it reduces the extent to which the individual participates in shared practices of knowledge production and dissemination (Catala et al., 2021).

However, I will argue that engaging in testimonial smothering can be an exercise of epistemic agency by which an individual navigates relationships in their epistemic community. Consider the kinds of practices which are sometimes adopted by those seeking treatment for underdiagnosed chronic health conditions to navigate patient/healthcare professional relationships. Often, patients' testimony is not given due credibility by healthcare professionals (Kidd and Carell, 2014) and descriptions of symptoms which do not closely Jit existing medical models may be regarded as unintelligible by medical professionals and lead them to distrust the patient as a testifier. An individual seeking diagnosis and treatment may reason that ensuring that medical professionals view her as an intelligible testifier by limiting the symptoms which she reports is a worthwhile strategy because it allows her to effectively report at least some of her symptoms and have some degree of voice in discussions of her diagnosis and treatment. Her choice involves sacrificing some goods (the ability to testify on certain topics) for the sake of others (maintaining the level of credibility she is assigned by medical professionals).

Such cases highlight the potential mistake in universally understanding those engaged in testimonial smothering as lacking agency – some such individuals may be exercising agency in resistant ways by 'bargaining' with oppressive systems by making intentional choices as to how they will engage with interlocutors.

Todd Moody (tmoody@sju.edu)

AI and the Multiple Realizability of Understanding

Lisa Miracchi Titus argues that current popular AI systems such as ChatGPT do not possess semantic understanding, despite the claims of some that these Large Language Models (LLMs) do possess at least a proto version of it. Titus argues that the fact that current-generation AIs are "statistics-of-occurrence machines" undercuts any claim that they have semantic understanding. I argue that, in at least one important sense, LLMs do possess a kind of semantic understanding of what they say and what is said to them. That is, they are able to make plausible abductive inferences. We should not let the covert architecture of AIs or the undisputed fact that SOMs sometimes misunderstand count against the attribution of semantic understanding to them, especially in light of the fact that the covert architecture on which human understanding supervenes is mostly unknown. The ability to make plausible abductive inferences in answering questions about described cases and problems across a broad range of contexts ought to be sufficient. In support of this, I adduce two actual examples of AI making abductive inferences.

Matyas Moravec and Peter West (matyas.moravec@cantab.net)

What is 'Western Philosophy'?

Our paper will examine the concept of ‘Western Philosophy.’ Specifically, it will address the question of whether that concept should be used in the history of philosophy. In contrast to some recent historiographical scholarship, we argue that the concept ought not to be abandoned.

In two recent peer-reviewed papers and one co-authored public outreach article, Lea Cantor and Josh Platzky Miller have argued that the concept of ‘Western Philosophy’ should be rejected. The concept, they argue, has politically suspect origins, excludes a whole host of non-Western thinkers and approaches to philosophical theorising, and is historically and geographically inaccurate. More importantly, in their view, talk of ‘Western Philosophy’ is also misleading since there is no such thing as Western Philosophy in the first place.

Our aim is not to refute the suggestion that the concept is suspect. But ultimately, we argue, the concept must be retained for that to happen.

We will start by outlining what we call the Cantor/Platzky Miller Thesis (CPM), that is, the claim that the concept of ‘Western Philosophy’ should be abandoned. We will argue that the CPM has both a descriptive (D) and a normative (N) dimension and that each requires separate assessment. We will provide this assessment by drawing an analogy between ‘Western Philosophy’ and ‘Analytic Philosophy.’ We will propose that even though the concept has politically dubious origins, we can nonetheless use it in a non-problematic way. We argue that many of the concerns raised by Cantor and Platzky Miller only arise if one employs the concept ‘Western Philosophy’ in one specific way, which we call a ‘realist’ approach. We offer another way of using it, which we call the ‘functionalist’ approach, that addresses these concerns.

Mohammad Amin Mostajir (mam1u23@soton.ac.uk)

Nida-Rumelin’s View of Phenomenal Transparency: A Defence

This paper challenges the claim that the transparency of perceptual experience supports either representationalism or the impossibility of attending to the intrinsic phenomenal character of experience. I defend Nida-Rumelin’s view (2006) that the transparency of experience is compatible with the existence and accessibility of intrinsic phenomenal features. By the transparency of experience, I mean the phenomenological insight that when we attend to our perceptual experience, we only seem to be aware of the properties of the objects we perceive, and not of any properties of our experience itself. By the intrinsic phenomenal character of experience, I mean the qualitative aspect of experience that is independent of its representational content.

To support Nida-Rumelin’s view, I appeal to Boghossian’s (1994) argument against the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge, showing that his argument targets the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness and phenomenological reflection, but not Nida-Rumelin’s account. According to the perceptual model of phenomenal awareness, to be aware of one’s own experience is like visually perceiving an object - the experience is present to the mind and seems to have certain qualitative properties, just as a perceived object seems to have colours. I

attempt to show that Boghossian's argument, which relies on the perceptual model, fails to undermine Nida-Rumelin's account, which does not assume the perceptual model.

I conclude that the transparency of experience does not entail any substantial philosophical consequences for the nature of phenomenal states or our capacity to attend to them.

Clarissa Muller (clarissa.muller@warwick.ac.uk)

This paper denaturalises the taken-for-granted view of space and interrogates its role in the production and perpetuation of othering, here understood as the perceptual and interpretative oppressive practice through which certain subjects are constructed as the devalued non-normative 'other', through a disability studies perspective.

I investigate the relationships between space, otherness, and belonging, by bringing the phenomenology of spatiality into conversation with narrative accounts of the lived experience of disabled bodyminds. This approach, I suggest, renders the spatiality of othering visible insofar as the hierarchical differentiation captured in the ordinary experiences afforded to disabled persons, resulting from dominant ableist orientations, demonstrates how the spaces that we occupy shape and are shaped by the relationships and bodies that constitute and inhabit them and the interplay between them. The view of disability and 'the other' I offer here expatiate aspects of materialist feminism by taking seriously how particularities of embodiment interact with the environment in its broadest sense, inclusive of both its spatio-temporal and nonphysical (i.e., social, affective, political, cultural etc.) dimensions. In this way, phenomenological descriptions of othering help reveal the interrelated dynamic relationships between body and world involved in material-discursive becoming.

The paper makes two arguments for the spatiality of othering: (1) space is defining in that it informs both the possible experiences afforded to us and how we come to perceive and interpret both ourselves and others; and, connected to this, (2) that spatial orientations and arrangements represent the ossification of relations of othering. These arguments and the aspects of spatiality they speak to aren't to be understood as separate or entirely independent from one another, but as deeply interconnected and co-constitutive aspects of the spatiality of othering that feed into and bear upon one another.

Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (k.l.murphy-hollies@bham.ac.uk)

Confabulation and reasons for love

Most of us believe that our love for others is not random: we love them and not others, and our love for them has to do with something about them specifically. Sometimes we are prompted to think about why we love someone. Friends might ask us "what do you see in him?", or we might ask ourselves during a relationship crisis or unrequited love.

In this paper, I argue that paying close attention to what real agents actually say in these reason-giving stances erodes long-standing binaries in the literature on

reasons and love, particularly across those who believe that love can be justified (Rationalists) and those who do not (Non-Rationalists). Both sides have assumed perfect epistemic agents, while real agents have limited epistemic access to reasons for love and are therefore unlikely to give accurate answers. At the same time, they are unlikely to say nothing at all. I suggest that they are likely to confabulate: to (unknowingly) come up with reasons which are post-hoc, ill-grounded, and overlook other efficacious factors.

In confabulation, people are trying to give answers which they themselves find satisfying and satisfy those around them. Whereas, philosophers are trying to identify normative reasons which render love justified or not, regardless of people's feelings about that. However, I show how these matters are actually interrelated, through closer discussion of confabulation. Wanting to feel justified in our loving both gives rise to and drives confabulation. In bringing us to pay closer attention to the reasons for our love, confabulation can shape how that relationship develops, and in fact contribute to forming the very things which make love justified according to rationalists. Non-Rationalists also overlook the importance of felt justification in focusing on [the lack of] explicit justifications for love.

Finally, I discuss whether this confabulation is therefore desirable.

Hichem Naar (hm.naar@gmail.com)

The Puzzle of Emotional Reasons-Responsiveness

The idea that emotions display genuine responsivity to reasons is commonplace in contemporary philosophy of emotion. Emotions, according to this common thought, are – like belief – responses one can acquire and regulate on the basis of reasons, rather than being merely caused in a non-rational way, in turn making the agent a suitable target of rational praise and criticism. Emotions thus can be justified or unjustified in a sense analogous to that of belief and action when they are based on adequate reasons. That emotions can be justified in this way has been taken by many philosophers as a piece of datum that any adequate theory should accommodate. In this paper, I argue that the possibility of a genuinely rational acquisition and regulation of emotions can be cast into doubt, in light of both the nature of reasons-responsiveness and the nature of emotions. The puzzle of emotional reasons-responsiveness, as I call it, asks us how emotions can count as rational (in the sense of reasons-responsive) given that in crucial respects they look like arational mental entities. I discuss possible solutions and sketch my own. I argue that to secure the idea of emotional reasons-responsiveness while accommodating the apparent arationality of some emotions, we should attend to the various ways we can relate to emotions, in particular the question of the source of our emotions in our minds.

Hadeel Naeem (hadeel@hadeelnaeem.com)

Responsible and seamless reliance on technology

Sometimes we carefully and reflectively employ technology, and at other times we seamlessly and automatically rely on it. While it is clear that the agent manifests

cognitive agency when reflectively and carefully employing technology, it isn't clear how one's seamless reliance manifests cognitive agency. For this reason, it is also unclear why beliefs formed by such reliance ought to be attributed to us.

The existing literature is concerned with how our seamless reliance on technology produces *knowledge* and therefore emphasizes how we responsibly form beliefs that can become knowledge. Since the focus is on knowledge, the literature's notion of belief attribution only concerns the kinds of beliefs that can potentially be knowledge. More precisely, the literature implies that only beliefs that are formed responsibly can become knowledge, and therefore, only such beliefs should be attributed to the agent (Pritchard 2010).

I argue that the existing concept of belief attribution cannot account for some of the beliefs we form when we seamlessly rely on technology. We sometimes form beliefs that may not be in the running for knowledge but can still be attributed to us. I explain this in terms of different degrees of epistemic responsibility. A lower degree of responsibility is needed to simply trace the belief back to its owner, while a much higher degree is necessary to form beliefs that can be knowledge.

I aim to develop a framework that shows when we ought to attribute beliefs formed through our seamless dependence on technology -- such as AI systems. My research can help address the moral responsibility gap (Matthias 2004) by filling the belief gap: understanding who is responsible for the beliefs formed by our reliance on technologies can help address moral responsibility.

Niccolò Nanni (niccolo.nanni1999@gmail.com)

Multimodality and the Emotional Lives of Others

The view that we can have direct perceptual awareness of the emotions of other people has been recently gaining traction. One important limitation of contemporary discussion of such a view is that it has completely been set within a unimodal, visuocentric framework. Philosophers have focused on establishing whether the emotions of other people can be seen in their facial expressions, gestures, and bodily posture while ignoring the role played by other sense modalities. In the first part of the presentation, I will contend that, in light of the profoundly multimodal nature of perception, any complete theorizing about the direct perception of emotion should aim at giving different sense modalities equal weight. I will discuss two ways in which this kind of project can be developed further. The first is by simply asking the question of whether we can have direct perceptual awareness of the emotions of other people via each non-visual sensory modality taken in isolation from the others. The second is instead by focusing on the interactions between different sensory modalities, and the role played by those interactions in making us perceptually aware of the emotions of other people. In the second part of my presentation, I will highlight some of the merits of the latter approach. More specifically, I will take such an approach to develop a novel argument in favor of the view that we can have direct perceptual awareness of the emotions of other people. The argument will be built around some recently discovered adaptational effects that involve an interaction between visual and vocal stimuli expressive of emotions I will make the case that,

due to the multimodal nature of the evidence it is built around, such an argument overcomes some of the challenges typically raised against similar arguments developed within the visuocentric framework.

Chenwei Nie (chenwei.nie@outlook.com)

Why Rational People Obstinately Hold to Irrational Beliefs: A New Approach

Normal individuals, who are otherwise rational, sometimes obstinately hold to a belief that p, despite acknowledging that the totality of available evidence speaks against p. For example, a mother may obstinately believe that her son is innocent of any crime in the face of a mass of counterevidence. She might say: I am aware that all the evidence points to the contrary, but I cannot but believe that my son is innocent. This phenomenon, known as clear-eyed believing against the evidence, has drawn increasing attention in the studies of a wide range of beliefs such as superstitious beliefs, religious beliefs, delusional beliefs, and beliefs in conspiracy theories.

Current approaches explain the irrational beliefs by denying the individuals' rationality: the individuals are thought of as suffering from reasoning biases (e.g., Flores, 2021) or forming beliefs based on practical considerations (e.g., McCormick, 2015). These approaches, however, have difficulties in explaining the fact that the individuals are clear-eyed.

Based on recent work in dogmatism (Pryor 2000; Huemer 2006) and Cartesian clarity (Paul, 2020; Nie, forthcoming), this paper will develop a new approach, according to which the irrational beliefs can be explained by the individuals' compelling seeming experiences, without denying their rational capacity. Specifically, I will argue that (1) non-evidential factors, such as emotions and practical considerations, may contribute to the formation of the individuals' seeming experiences; and (2) the seeming experiences may have a brute causal force that persistently compels belief, even when their justificatory force is defeated by counterevidence. In the case of the mother, this new approach will suggest, first, that the mother's intense and unconditional love for her son could be one of the non-evidential factors that cause and sustain the seeming experience that her son is innocent and, second, that the resultant seeming experience could persistently compel her belief.

Sergi Oms (sergi.oms@ub.edu)

A Dialetheist Solution to the Problem of Change

Change has always been a perplexing phenomenon. One of the puzzles surrounding it is the so-called Problem of Change, according to which change is problematic because it apparently involves a single object having incompatible properties at different times, seemingly contradicting Leibniz's Law. Solutions to this problem can be categorized based on whether they involve directly relativizating of some of the metaphysical categories present in the Problem (objects, properties, and exemplification) to time, or whether they adopt a non-tensed approach that does not involve any direct relativization to time. While most proposed solutions fall into the

former category (e.g. Lewis 1986; Sider 2001, among many others), there has been recent original work on solutions of the latter kind (e.g. Pickup forthcoming and Bottani 2016).

This paper aims to contribute to this discussion by proposing a new dialetheist non-tensed approach to the Problem of Change. While the possibility of a dialetheist solution has been considered in the literature, and Priest (2006) has applied dialetheist solutions to some problems surrounding the notion of change, a fully developed dialetheist approach to the Problem of Change has not been put forward. I will argue that, given an object o undergoing change, o both has and does not have all the accidental properties it possesses throughout its history. Given Leibniz's Law and the behaviour of the conditional in paraconsistent logics such as LP, it follows that, if we consider the object o at a time t (call it o') and at a time t' (call it o'') after undergoing some change, o' and o'' are both the same and not the same. I will spell out a formal semantics of change in second-order LP.

James Openshaw (jamesopenshaw0@gmail.com)

Referential confabulation: A new case for post-causal theories of remembering?

Episodic memory enables us to consciously 'relive' events in our personal past. For example, you may remember a hike you took last weekend, re-experiencing a view from the summit in the form of rich, visual mental imagery. Successful remembering of this sort is about particular past events. As we will put it, such mental states *refer* (perhaps in a distinctively ˜mnemonic' way).

In this talk, we argue that the following two questions ought to be clearly distinguished in philosophical inquiry about memory:

(Q1) Under what conditions does remembering occur?
(Q2) Under what conditions does mnemonic reference to particular events in one's past occur?

Theories that provide the same answer to (Q1) and (Q2) will be unable to predict and explain cases in which there is mnemonic reference to past events without remembering (and vice-versa). In particular, if (mnemonic) confabulations are errors because they lack an appropriate causal link to any event in the subject's past (Bernecker 2017; Robins 2020), and if mnemonic reference to an event requires such an appropriate causal link (Soteriou 2018; Werning & Liefke, forthcoming), then referential confabulation should not be possible.

Reviewing the psychological literature, we examine cases of confabulation that do appear to involve successful mnemonic reference. Besides being of independent interest, these peculiar cases suggest we should indeed separate our answers to (Q1) and (Q2). As a result, one major apparent advantage of causalist theories of remembering – that they can use the notion of appropriate causation both to distinguish remembering from confabulating and to explain mnemonic reference – is in fact a defect. Far from questions about reference-fixing presenting an insurmountable challenge for post-causal theories of remembering, these theories illuminate a neglected class of memory phenomena (namely, referential

confabulations) which present a serious challenge to causal theories of remembering.

Angela O'Sullivan (angela.osullivan@glasgow.ac.uk)

Don't Trust ChatGPT! The Epistemic Problem of Stochastic 'Testimony'

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and BARD generate a unique epistemic problem: we cannot acquire knowledge that P from an LLM's 'testimony' that P because LLMs are neither sources of information from whose outputs we may draw inferences, nor candidates for trust. If LLMs are set to become frequent interlocutors, we will end up epistemically impoverished.

In human testimonial exchanges, if H trusts S then H can know that P on the basis of S's testimony that P. Indeed, H's trust explains how H may gain knowledge from S's testimony, in spite of there being some risk of S betraying H's trust (see Baier 1986, Faulkner 2014, Carter 2024). Furthermore, H expects S to recognise H's trust, and incur a reason to fulfil it. This is markedly different from acquiring knowledge from non-human artifacts. H comes to know a tree's age by counting tree rings, viz., by treating the tree stump as a source of information from which to draw inferences (Craig 1999). H would be seriously mistaken to attempt to acquire knowledge by trusting the tree to communicate its age.

Unlike typical artifacts, LLMs produce outputs in human language: when ChatGPT answers your question whether P, there are no inferences to draw with regards to whether P, beyond the P text outputted by ChatGPT. Yet, unlike human testimony, we cannot use trust to bridge the risk of the output being false and thereby acquire knowledge. LLMs are unsuitable candidates for trust because:

(i) LLMs are stochastic (Bender and Koller 2020): their outputs are normed for probabilistically plausible sentence completion, and not for truth.
(ii) LLMs are not responsive to reasons: they cannot take trust in them as a reason to fulfil that trust.

The solution: don't trust LLMs. Instead, we should design LLMs to be reliable information sources.

Eleanor Palafox-Harris (exh692@student.bham.ac.uk)

Epistemic Hypervigilance and the Psychiatrist

In psychiatry, epistemic trust (trust in someone's capacity as a knower) is important for good therapeutic relationships. An excess of epistemic vigilance (hypervigilance) towards the testimony of others is a barrier to epistemic trust, and thus could be detrimental for the therapeutic relationship. Recent work applying the notion of epistemic vigilance to psychiatry has so far focused only on the vigilance of the patient towards others (such as their psychiatrist). However, the vigilance of the psychiatrist towards their patient is also important, and this dimension of the therapeutic context has not yet been explored. This paper fills this gap in the literature by arguing that psychiatrist-hypervigilance towards patients with psychiatric conditions can negatively impact the therapeutic relationship and consequently

patient outcomes. I argue that negative stereotypes and implicit biases about certain psychiatric conditions deflate perceptions of the patient's trustworthiness. This might cause the psychiatrist to be hypervigilant towards the patient's testimony, hindering a beneficial therapeutic relationship. I suggest then that psychiatrist-hypervigilance facilitates epistemic injustice in clinical settings.

Ross Patrizio (r.patrizio.1@research.gla.ac.uk)

Apples, Oranges, and Trust

How should philosophers of trust think about the relation between therapeutic (TT) and non-therapeutic trust (NTT)? This is the key question of this paper. I argue that the literature on this question is unduly restricted to two opposing camps, which I'll call the apples and apples approach (AA) and apples and oranges approach (AO). AA involves a type-identity claim – that TT and NTT are essentially the same type of attitude – and AO denies this identity claim. Neither approach, it is argued, can give a satisfying answer to our key question. The former falls short insofar as it cannot account for the important differences between TT and NTT; the latter, on the other hand, fails to account for their undeniable similarities. In this paper I offer a third option: the function-first approach, which, drawing on insights from teleological accounts of meaning and mental content, delineates instances of trust according to their function, or purpose (Wright 1973; Millikan 1984; Neander 1991). I argue that the function-first approach can accommodate what's enticing, whilst avoiding what's ultimately unsatisfying, about each of the extant approaches. I close by considering the upshots of the function-first approach beyond the debate over TT. In particular, I discuss some reasons to think that it might bear further fruit when applied to other 'borderline' cases of trust, that is, cases over which there is a similar lack of consensus regarding whether they ought to be considered bona fide trust.

Jonathan D. Payton (jonathanpayton@bilkent.edu.tr)

Imagination and Arbitrary Reference

Two standard logical rules, Existential Elimination and Universal Introduction, allow us to use 'arbitrary names' in order to reason about 'arbitrary objects'. If we think of logical consequence in terms of truth-preservation, then sentences containing arbitrary terms should be (capable of being) true, and so these terms must refer.

Some philosophers think that arbitrary terms refer to a special class of arbitrary objects, where an arbitrary F is, roughly, something with all and only those properties shared by all ordinary Fs. But arbitrary objects are strange beasts. An arbitrary natural number has the property being either odd or even (since each ordinary natural number does), but has neither being odd nor being even (since neither property is shared by all ordinary natural numbers).

Other philosophers think that arbitrary terms refer to ordinary objects which have somehow been arbitrarily selected. This view avoids commitment to strange beasts, but makes our reasoning hostage to empirical fortune in ways it shouldn't be. Suppose I want to prove that all cats have the property being either mammals or insects by proving that some arbitrary cat does. Intuitively, it shouldn't matter if my

arbitrarily-selected cat dies halfway through the proof – the whole point of reasoning with arbitrary cats is that it doesn't matter which cats there are, and hence that it doesn't matter which cat (if any) I'm talking about. But according to the view in question, the death of the cat undermines my proof.

We do better to deny that arbitrary terms refer. Reasoning about arbitrary objects isn't reasoning about any particular objects. It's better understood as a kind of imagining, or thought-experiment, where there's no such thing as the object being imagined. On this view, sentences containing arbitrary names aren't true, and logical consequence shouldn't be understood in terms of truth-preservation. (298 words)

Martin Pickup (m.pickup@bham.ac.uk)

Leibniz on Contingency, Analysis, and Infinite Divisibility

Leibniz has well-documented trouble distinguishing necessary and contingent truths. One of his attempts to separate them involved infinite analysis: necessary propositions have a finite analysis whereas the analysis of a contingent proposition is infinite.

Two sorts of issue have been raised with his account: (i) a set of related problems I will call ˜the problems of proof' which suggest that Leibniz cannot avoid some contingent propositions having finite analyses, and so his account misidentifies them as necessary and is not even extensionally adequate; (ii) a general concern that contingent truths shouldn't have any analysis at all, not even an infinite one, and so this way of drawing the distinction is bound to fail.

I will argue in response to (i) that the problems which are raised mischaracterise the nature of analysis, for Leibniz, and that attending to the reasons the analysis of a contingent truth is infinite will dissolve these problems. This will involve discussing the type of infinity that infinite analysis displays, as well as the parallels Leibniz himself draws with mathematical cases, e.g. incommensurate proportions.
I will also then suggest that this gives a Leibnizian additional resources to address (ii), though whether these are sufficient to save his account of contingency is not clear.

Karol Polcyn (karol.polcyn@gmail.com)

Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem

Materialism is held to entail the thesis that phenomenal truths are necessitated by physical truths, and this thesis is challenged by arguments inferring the possibility of zombies from their conceivability. I argue that the most influential conceivability argument, developed by Chalmers (1996, 2010), does not succeed.

According to this argument, conceivable statements are verified by scenarios (coherent maximal hypothesis about the actual world), and there is no good reason to think that scenarios do not correspond to possible worlds. As a result, there is no good reason to think that zombie scenarios do not correspond to possible worlds.

In reply, I agree that there may be no good reason to think that scenarios from outside the mind-body domain do not correspond to possible worlds. However, our

intuitions about the possibility of scenarios break down in the case of zombie scenarios due to a certain peculiar structure of such scenarios.

Scenarios outside the mind-body domain are alternative descriptions of the actual world. But zombie scenarios are equivalent to hypotheses about the distinctness of conscious states and physical states, and such hypotheses are not alternative descriptions of the actual world. For example, consider the scenario according to which my physical duplicate does not feel pain when I do. This scenario is equivalent to the hypothesis that the feeling of pain is not identical with a physical property, and that hypothesis is not an alternative description of the actual world – rather, it is a hypothesis about the nature of the actual pain. But the coherence of the above distinctness hypothesis gives me no good reason to think that there must be a possible zombie world. Consequently, there is no good reason to think that my zombie scenario corresponds to a possible world.

Costanza Porro (c.porro@lancaster.ac.uk)

What is care? A practice and attitude-based account

Why should we take care into account when thinking about what a just society looks like? Which kinds of care matter from a political perspective? While the theorising of care was initially conceived and presented as a contribution to moral philosophy, in recent decades there has been an increased interest in elaborating a political theory of care addressing these kinds of questions (Bhandary 2021; Engster 2007; Held 2006; Kittay 1999; Tronto 1993). Care is understood as mattering politically because it is essential for our survival and flourishing, for the continuation of society and the pursuit of justice, and because the allocation of care and care-giving responsibilities is the source of some of the most pervasive gender, racial and class inequalities. Despite the growing attention to the political dimension of care, I argue that an account of care that can be the basis of a political theory of care has not yet been developed. Should care be understood only as the work we do to meet the basic needs of our dependents, such as our children, or as a much broader set of practices in which people in different kinds of relationships partake? If the latter, what distinguishes care from other values, political ideals, and practices? In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of care are either too narrow as they exclusively focus on dependency care (Kittay 1999; Bhandary 2021) or too broad such that they fail to capture the distinctiveness of care (Engster 2019; Tronto and Fisher 1990). I address this challenge by presenting a practice and attitude-based account of care that captures a wide-ranging set of politically relevant practices of care, while at the same time making sense of what is distinctive about care.

Francesco Praolini (francesco.praolini@gmail.com)

Beliefs, Reasons, and Positive Epistemic Obligations

Do we have a genuine epistemic obligation to hold any of our beliefs? Few philosophers think we do. In fact, most philosophers sympathize with those who think we do not. Swimming against the tide, I advance a new argument for what I call ‘Epistemic Positivism’; that is, the thesis that we have epistemic obligations to hold at least some of our beliefs. More perspicuously, the argument I develop is a reductio

ad absurdum of Epistemic Positivism and it rests on the following two additional premises: (P1) Our reasons determine what is rational for us to do; (P2) Our reasons supervene on our beliefs. By premises (P1) and (P2), ceasing to hold one of our beliefs can change what rationality demands of us. At the same time, on the assumption that we have no genuine epistemic obligation to hold any belief whatsoever, it will always be epistemically permissible for us to cease to hold all of our beliefs. Crucially, it follows that no course of action is ever rationally obligatory for us: whenever rationality demands that we pursue a course of action we find bothersome, we could instead take a powerful mind-altering pill that would erase those beliefs that supply us with the reasons for that course of action. However, that feels wrong: we have rational obligations to pursue certain courses of action and we are not rationally permitted to change what rationality demands of us by ceasing to have an inconvenient belief. We should therefore reject the assumption of the reductio ad absurdum. Accordingly, I submit that Epistemic Positivism is true. After presenting this argument, I defend (P1) and (P2) against objections. In conclusion, I explore the implications of and seek a tentative explanation for Epistemic Positivism.

Thomas Raleigh (thomas.raleigh@uni.lu)

Witnesses, Beliefs and Rule-Coherentism

One feature in common to both traditional philosophical debates about coherentism and the recent formal literature on coherence is the important role played by comparisons with the case of multiple witness reports. Formal models of how agreement amongst witness reports can raise the probability that those reports are true almost always make the crucial assumption that the witness reports are independent. Given the independence of the witness reports, the most likely explanation for their unanimity is that they are true – since it would be a miraculous coincidence if independent testifiers just happened to all generate the same false testimony. But when it comes to our beliefs, these are not formed independently of each other – and nor should they be! We are rationally required somehow or other to take our existing beliefs into account when forming new beliefs. So it is highly unclear what relevance the example of independent witnesses has for understanding the epistemic value of coherence amongst beliefs. It is, I suggest, remarkable how little this crucial disanalogy between the cases of witness reports and beliefs has been discussed.

I also discuss some difficulties with spelling out the crucial notion of independence, focusing in particular on Olsson's (2002) formalization of independence for the case where the multiple witnesses each report different propositions. To finish, I consider whether there may be other ways to think about the epistemic role of coherence. In particular: could it be that whilst coherence amongst beliefs does provide some kind of positive epistemic status, nevertheless a subject should not aim for coherence when forming beliefs? We could call such a view 'rule-coherentism' by analogy with rule-utilitarianism (as opposed to act-utilitarianism). I briefly explore how such a view might require a more or less radical re-think of the basing relation.

Drishtti Rawat (dr.rawat19@gmail.com)

Moral motivation and the virtuous person

Most virtue ethicists hold that if a person is virtuous, she is motivated to do the virtuous thing in the de re sense – that is, she is motivated to perform such actions for the reasons that make it a virtuous thing to do as opposed to merely the fact that it is a virtuous thing to do (the de dicto sense). This commitment limits how virtue ethicists explain certain moral phenomena. In this paper, I first discuss one such problematic phenomenon, namely, that a virtuous person's appropriate affective states in response to moral situations can appear to conflict with the requirement that she also experience pleasure from virtuous activity. For example, a philanthropist who otherwise enjoys helping people may feel sorrowful while helping his sick child. I argue that this conflict can be resolved by explaining away the virtuous person's pleasure as the pleasure derived from doing the virtuous thing in the de dicto sense. However, this explanation is not available to the virtue ethicist on pain of admitting an inconsistency within her framework. Therefore, I recommend a desire-based account to explain how moral pleasure has to do with a de re conception of virtuous activity. I argue that even though the virtuous person's affective states and pleasure seem contradictory, they indicate the same kind of value (positive or negative) to the same objects of concern. Furthermore, because the virtuous person's affective states indicate the value of virtuous activity for her, they are necessary for a person to experience moral pleasure and to be considered a virtuous person in the first place.

Zain Raza (zain.raza@mail.utoronto.ca)

Reasoning is Coercive

Plausibly, to be responsible for our reasoning requires the freedom to have reasoned otherwise. However, I argue that reasoning has no room for freedom. Reasoning is coercive: we move from premises to conclusion on the basis of an entailment relation outside of our control. In each individual inferential step, it is this entailment relation which settles what follows. We might have thought that determining what follows is a normatively constrained process, with room for responsible behavior. On my view, inference is metaphysically constrained. We have no choice.

The most plausible domain of reasoning in which we might expect to find room for control is reflective reasoning. I target a version of this view on which full rationality requires that we vet and reflectively endorse our inferences (Boghossian 2014). This is how we take control. However, vetting an inference presumably requires making a new inference with its own entailment relation delivering a conclusion. A vicious regress ensues: if no inference is fully rational without reflective vetting, and vetting requires making more inferences, then we are never fully rational.

To halt this regress then requires vetting an inference without making a new inference with its own entailment relation; that is, it requires determining for ourselves what follows from our premises. But, we lose the distinction between inference and other---irrational or arational---movements in mind if the thinker gets to eschew the deliverance of an entailment relation and stipulate their own conclusion. What distinguishes inference as a special movement in mind is precisely that it is not stipulative in this way. If we interfere in the movement between premises and

conclusion then we are no longer reasoning. A movement that a thinker arbitrates for themselves is an arbitrary movement: we ought not call this inference. If right, then there is a metaphysical constraint on reasoning: we are coerced towards our conclusions. Hence, to retain what is distinctive about inference, it cannot be a process we control. Even in reflection we do not settle what follows. So, we cannot be responsible for our reasoning, in this particular way, at least.

Ellie Robson and Peter West (ellie.robson@nottingham.ac.uk)

Aristotelian Naturalism: A Counter-Tradition in Twentieth-Century British Philosophy

In this paper, we argue that Aristotelian naturalism should be thought of as a counter-tradition in ethics present throughout twentieth century British philosophy. In doing so, we provide a counter-narrative to the current view of Aristotelian naturalism as a self-contained, idiosyncratic movement, limited to thinkers like Philippa Foot, Rosalind Hursthouse, Alastair MacIntyre and John McDowell. We contend that Aristotelian naturalism spans a broader time frame and extends beyond these figures. We do so by locating Aristotelian naturalist views in the earlier work of thinkers, like Susan Stebbing (1885-1943), and later thinkers, like Mary Midgley (1919-2018).

To argue for this counter-narrative, we first extend the Aristotelian naturalist tradition backwards by examining the ethics and meta-ethics of Susan Stebbing, a philosopher who is increasingly recognised as a key figure in early analytic philosophy. There has thus far been virtually no sustained discussion of her moral philosophy. We address that gap by analysing her 1944 text Men and Moral Principles. We argue that in that text, Stebbing defends an Aristotelian naturalist approach to moral theorising, on which moral ‘facts’ are grounded in facts about human nature. We then extend the Aristotelian naturalist tradition forwards, by focusing on the work of Mary Midgley. We argue that Midgley’s ethics and meta-ethics can also be fruitfully aligned with that of so-called ‘Neo-Aristotelian Naturalists’ like Hursthouse and McIntyre (as well as Foot). In Beast and Man (1978), Midgley offers a sustained meta-ethical naturalism which sees human nature as a kind of animal nature, with goods grounded in many of the traits that we share with other creatures.

The upshot of this paper is that, rather than being a self-contained movement in the second-half of the twentieth-century, Aristotelian naturalism was present, as a counter-tradition, throughout the century.

James Ross (J.C.Ross@soton.ac.uk)

Grounding and Causation: A Metaphysical Analogy

Grounding and causation are similar kinds of relational dependence. They share formal features and play similar roles in the explanations that track them. Through grounding, metaphysical explanations ‘vertically’ trace levels of fundamentality in reality’s hierarchical structure. Through causation, causal explanations ‘horizontally’ trace order in reality’s temporal structure. The striking resemblances between grounding and causation invite talk of unity. Metaphysicians in recent years have

cashed out this unity in a few different ways. Schaffer (2016) argues that grounding and causation are both relations that back a particular explanatory pattern. Wilson (2018) thinks they're species of one causal genus. Zhang (2023) puts forward a view on which they're identical; any apparent differences are explained in terms of differences between the relata. Each theory has its merits. But I argue that none has the virtues of metaphysical analogy, which hitherto hasn't even been explored as an option. Metaphysical analogy is a form of unity. On my particular view, grounding and causation are specifications of an analogous relation called 'bringing-about'. They exemplify bringing-about's features according to a governing logic and bring things about in a characteristic way. I raise some significant challenges to this view and deal with each one in turn. Notwithstanding these challenges, I think that the metaphysical analogy is a good way to account for a fundamental connection between grounding and causation. My theory (i) satisfyingly explains the systematic sharing of features by grounding and causation through a substantive metaphysical framework; (ii) explains their differences through the notion of modes; and (iii) gives an account of ontological priority in terms of naturalness, according to which bringing-about is a highly natural relation and grounding and causation are less-natural relations which are to be understood in terms of bringing-about.

Carlo Rossi (carlo.rossi@usach.cl)

Events and the Individuation of Powers

The Pure Powers view (PP) holds that every property is individuated just by its dispositional nature, which consists in its connections to manifestations and stimuli (Coates 2022: 647). Many authors have resisted (PP) on the grounds that it leads to a vicious explanatory regress (Lowe 2006, Bird 2007, Ingthorsson 2015). Now, Taylor has recently argued that this regress objection is only successful if (PP) entails that pure powers' identities are fixed entirely by their relations to other pure powers, but not if their identities are fixed partially by these relations, together with other elements of our ontology such as events (2021: 714-5). Taylor's thought here is that we can treat stimuli and manifestations as events, which are plausibly not reducible to the powers they are related. Given that the regress objection only targets the former thesis, supporters of (PP) may opt for the latter. However, there are at least two problems with (PP)'s weaker version (Coates 2022: 649-52): (i) it still allows for a partial a regress and therefore the existence of entities with indeterminate identity conditions and (ii) it brings further dispositional elements granted that we include events in the identity conditions of powers, regardless of our preference for a Kimian or Davidsonian account. In this paper, I discuss the prospects of a further alternative to the Kimian and Davidsonian accounts of event individuation and the advantages it carries for the supporters of (PP). This account combines a spatio-temporal criterion of individuation with a processual component, resulting in a hylomorphic conception of events as previously put forward by Crowther (2011, 2018) and Evnine (2016). Given that the view seemingly does not rely on any dispositional element, it allows the (PP) defender to block Coates' second objection and to address to some extent the concerns raised by the first one.

Thomas Rowe (thomas.rowe@kcl.ac.uk)

What's Wrong with Imposing Risk of Harm?

When, and why, is it wrong to impose a pure risk of harm on others? A pure risk of harm is a risk that fails to materialise into the harm that is threatened. In this paper, I argue that the imposition of pure risk is wrongful when and because it amounts to a harmless trespass on the victim. Most recent accounts of the wrongfulness of imposing pure risk have argued that pure risks are wrongful because they harm the victim (Finkelstein, 2003; Placani 2016; Oberdiek 2012). Building on recent work which claims that risk of harm itself cannot be harmful, I argue that harm-based explanations for the wrongness of risk are misguided because they fail to account for how risk interferes with the victim. I argue that alternative approaches grounded in freedom or the avoidance of domination also suffer the same drawbacks as the harm approach.

In light of the failure of these approaches, I defend an alternative proposal called the trespass account. I argue that the wrongness of imposing risk can be explained by a form of harmless trespass on the normative life of an individual. The account develops the idea that pure impositions of risk are often instances of harmless wrongdoing. Because the wrongdoing amounts to a form of trespass, there is interference with the victim, unlike the harm and freedom accounts. Unlike existing views of the wrongfulness of risk, the trespass account is appropriately sensitive to the presence of risk, because, as I argue, impositions of risk can tamper with the normative life of the victim by interfering with their sphere of authority.

Benedict Rumbold (Benedict.Rumbold1@nottingham.ac.uk)

Careful What You Wish For: Consequentializing and Falsifiability

Much of the debate on consequentializing focuses on whether or not it succeeds (cf. Portmore, 2009). The assumption is that act consequentialists (hereafter just 'consequentialists') have an interest in ensuring that it does: where it succeeds, consequentializing enables consequentialism to embrace verdicts of commonsense morality it might otherwise reject. In this paper, however, I argue that consequentialists have good reason to hope that it does not: where it succeeds, consequentializing reveals consequentialism to be unfalsifiable. In making this argument, I show first, what constitutes successful consequentializing; second, following Popper, what it means for a theory to be falsifiable; third, why, if successful, consequentializing shows consequentialism to be unfalsifiable; and fourth, why unfalsifiability is a problem. Towards the end of this paper, I also argue that this finding has implications for theories other than consequentialism: some writers (cf. Suikkanen, 2020, 33) have argued that other moral theories – e.g. contractualism – can make a similar argumentative move.

Andrea Salvador (andrea.salvador@usi.ch)

Mereological Harmony and Higher-order Identities

How is a material object related to a region at which it is located? Monists answer that material objects are identical to their location, while dualists claim that they are distinct. Monists argue that monism should be endorsed instead of dualism because

monism explains several principles about material objects and their locations that dualists cannot explain. These principles are, for example, Geometrical Harmony, i.e., necessarily, a material object has shape S iff its location has shape S, and Mereological Harmony (MH), i.e., necessarily, if a material object x is located at y, then the parts of x are located at parts of y. For monists, these principles follow from Leibniz's Law for identity.

Leonard (2021) and Calosi (2022) have recently proposed two dualist explanations of MH by deriving it from some background assumptions and the following principles: for x to be located at y just is for x to have y's shape and for them to overlap the same things (Leonard) and for the material objects x and y to be such that x is part of y just is for x to be located at a part of y's location (Calosi). Unfortunately, their theories are not jointly consistent with (i) the anti-symmetry of parthood and (ii) the possibility of co-located objects. But parthood is often taken to obey anti-symmetry and there are several reasons one may have to believe in the possibility of co-location. I thus propose a better explanation of MH. I show that MH follows from the principle that for x to be located at y is in part for all of x's parts to be located at a part of y and argue dualists should endorse this principle since it is consistent with dualism, (i) and (ii). I conclude by anticipating and rejecting two objections.

Livia von Samson (livia.samson@hu-berlin.de)

Queer, Marxist, Black and Indigenous feminists call for the abolition of the family (Gleeson & Griffith 2015; Gumbs 2016; Redecker 2017; Nash 2021; TallBaer 2021; Weeks 2021; Lewis 2022; O'Brien 2023). But what exactly do they want to abolish, and why? If „family" refers to any group of kin, the call to abolish the family loses its appeal. If it refers only to arrangements which systematically harm women and children, it becomes trivial. I thus propose to understand the call to abolish the family as applying to benign families.

Such families are, I argue, defined by the following three features: i) the privatisation of social reproduction, ii) the reinforcement of the romantic couple form, and iii) the prioritization bio-genetic kinship. These characteristics are neither morally outrageous nor ethically neutral. This makes their wrong hard to detect.

This paper focusses on the wrong of the privatisation of social reproduction in the nuclear household. Reproductive labour is privatised, in this sense, if it is primarily organized in nuclear households as opposed to communal spaces and if there is little to no sharing of resources between households. I argue that this impairs citizen's autonomy, even if the labour is*, within* households, divided equally and in a non-gender-specific fashion. It limits the capacity to identify with alternative forms of life, participate in experiments in living, and develop an 'imaginary domain'. In other words, the wrong of the privatisation of reproductive labour exceeds both the wrong of its unequal *division* as well as the wrong of the division being *gendered*.

I offer two lines of argument for this claim. First, parents hold immense power over their children's access to role models, especially when they are young. This limits not only the visibility of alternative lifestyles as well as the child's capacity to identify with deviant forms of life as *role models*. Second, in a society which is organized in

nuclear households, the imaginary domain is stifled in a way that undermines the development of comprehensive autonomy with regard to forms of life. This is problematic insofar as these capacities are crucial aspects of autonomy, in particular the kind of autonomy the modern family promises to foster in children.

Wolfgang Sattler (sattlerwolfgang@yahoo.com)

Ontological Priority without Separation in Aristotle

It is controversial what Aristotle means, when he characterises substances as being separate/separable. A central dilemma underlying this controversy concerns the forms of sensible substances. There is reason to hold (1) that forms are primary substances, and (2) that what is ontologically primary and thus prior to everything else is separate (from everything else); hence forms should be separate, it seems; however, there is also reason to hold (3) that forms are not separate. Ways to resolve this dilemma suggested so far (cf. e.g. Peramatzis (2011), Wedin (2000)) fail to accommodate crucial textual evidence and are thus unconvincing. I suggest that the problem lies with an influential, so far unchallenged assumption underlying (2): A is ontologically prior to B iff A is separate from B and B is not separate from A (cf. e.g. Fine (1984), Corkum (2008), Peramatzis (2011)). I argue that this assumption is mistaken in its unqualified form, since forms are clearly ontologically prior to matter, however, forms are not separate from matter, contrary to what is standardly assumed. For example, in *De Anima* 2.1 the soul, i.e. the form of a living being, is said not to be separate from the body, i.e. the matter of the living being. In *Physics* 1.2 accidentals are said not to be separate from substance as their substrate, hence form should not be separate from matter as its substrate. Moreover, Aristotle contrasts being separate with being 'in' something, arguably in the sense in which a form is 'in' a substrate (cf. e.g. *Metaphysics* 5.23, 6.1, 13.2, *Physics* 4.3). Hence, forms, being 'in' matter as their substrate, are not separate from it. Furthermore, Aristotle rejects Plato's conception of Forms as entities separate from matter. Hence, Aristotle's forms should, in contrast, not be separate from matter.

Thomas Schmidt (t.schmidt@philosophie.hu-berlin.de)

Contrastive Normativity Without Contrastivism

Sometimes, we have a reason for x-ing rather than y-ing, but no reason for x-ing. Contrastivists about reasons (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, Snedegar 2017) take such cases, and related ones, to suggest that all reasons are contrastive: there are no reasons for/against x-ing simpliciter, but only reasons for x-ing rather than y-ing. Against this view, I offer a reduction of contrastive reasons to non-contrastive reasons that accounts for several noteworthy normative phenomena, including ones that non-contrastive orthodoxy about reasons has been claimed to be at odds with.

My starting point is the observation that in all cases in which there intuitively is a reason for x-ing rather than y-ing, there is a reason against y-ing, but that the converse is not true. Plausibly, there is a reason for x-ing rather than y-ing only if y-ing is disfavourable in a respect in which x-ing is not. As I argue, this is so if, and only if, there is a reason against y-ing that is not provided by a reason against [x-ing

or y-ing] (on related principles of reasons transmission, see Kiesewetter 2018 and Schmidt 2024). On the basis of this, I suggest:

(1) A reason for x-ing rather than y-ing is a reason against y-ing that is not provided by a reason against [x-ing or y-ing].

This account returns the intuitively correct results on paradigm cases that involve contrastive reasons. Moreover, when (1) is combined with

(2) one ought to x rather than y if, and only if, the reasons for x-ing rather than y-ing are weightier than those for y-ing rather than x-ing,

the account's explanatory power extends to contrastive oughts. It entails, e.g., that, in the much-discussed Gentle Murder case (Forrester 1984), one ought to murder gently rather than brutally, without entailing that one ought to murder.

Vanessa Seifert (seifertvan@phs.uoa.gr)

Metaphysics of Chemistry: What are chemical reactions?

I consider whether chemical reactions can be understood as causal relations by examining three features to them. The first concerns reaction mechanisms; the second equilibrium states; and the third catalysis. From their analysis I conclude that establishing reactions as causal relations is far from obvious. First, the prevalence of reaction mechanisms suggests that a mechanistic account of causation is plausible for chemical reactions. Nonetheless, a typical reaction isn't an event where chemical substances irreversibly transform into other substances (just like- say- a rock would irreversibly cause the shattering of a window). Instead, it is a dynamic process which- once reaching equilibrium- results in a state where the system transforms into the products and reverses back into the reactants. When viewed from the perspective of causation, this suggests that reactions exhibit causal loops and as such they either shouldn't be considered as genuine causal relations, or they pose a challenge for those accounts of causation that require the temporal priority of causes. Moreover, the presence of catalysts can be said to partly cause a reaction (as their absence often explains why a reaction doesn't take place), even though they don't substantively participate in the reaction (because they don't transform into products). So, it is unclear whether they should be construed as genuine causes or part of the environment which accommodates a reaction's realisation. While I do not offer an answer as to these puzzles, this analysis shows that construing reactions as causal relations is far from uncontroversial. Some features to reactions offer evidence for understanding them as causal relations, yet others make the question around their precise nature quite hard to answer

Maciej Sendłak (m.sendlak@uw.edu.pl)

Unification of Dependence

Some believe that the aim of explanation is to understand why the world is the way it is. Some also believe that to achieve this aim is to reveal the dependence relation between explanandum and explanans (Ruben 1990; Kim 1994; Skow 2016). In this sense, notions of causation, supervenience, grounding, existential/ontological

dependence, etc., are considered explanatory, because each is an exemplification of the dependence relation. The explanatory role of this relation is a good reason to move attention to the notion of dependence. What might be an obstacle in the exploration of it is the variety of its types. Accordingly, while there is a plenitude of outstanding works dedicated to causation, supervenience, grounding, mereological/ontological dependence, etc., few consider the broader picture, i.e., the question of what these notions have in common. The aim of this paper is to address that question and to propose a general account of the dependence relation. The view is inspired by Humean supervenience and shows that acceptance of the so-called Best System Account (Lewis 1973; Loewer 1996; Schrenk 2014) approach towards laws of nature makes it possible to picture the common feature of different dependence relations.

Adham El Shazly (ae497@cam.ac.uk)

Moral Understanding & Humility in Iris Murdoch

In this paper I develop Iris Murdoch's notion of moral understanding and the pivotal role *humility* plays in its achievement. I aim to show (1) Murdoch's account as a strong contender to recent accounts of moral understanding, and (2) articulate her underlying conception of epistemic agency and its limits.

Some philosophers think moral understanding is knowledge of why an action is right or wrong (Riaz 2015, Sliwa 2017). Others think moral understanding is an ability to explain why an action is right or wrong (Hills 2016). Core to Murdoch's moral philosophy is the rejection of a conception of morality that reduces it to actions or rules for action. Instead, she prioritises a conception of morality where the locus of moral activity is vision, or a 'subject's total way of looking at the world'*.* I argue that an alternative view of moral understanding follows from this conception.

First, I argue that according to Murdoch moral understanding is not a matter of propositional knowledge or ability to explain or infer moral propositions, but a matter of having apt moral perspectives. These include, among other things, apt conceptual schemas, metaphors, attentional and inquisitive dispositions. These have an important moral but also *epistemic* status in Murdoch's view. Second, I explain how for Murdoch humility is a precondition for moral understanding. To her, the ego and fantasy distort genuine moral understanding by distorting our perspectives, for instance by directing away our attention from the good and inhibiting moral imagination. Humility is required to free the epistemic limitations imposed by our ego.

According to this picture, humility is at once a corrective moral *and* epistemic virtue, thus playing a central role in her view of moral understanding and her overall notion of epistemic agency and its limits. What results is a picture of epistemic agency not as essentially a matter of rationally responding to one's reasons for belief (or action), but a continuous effort to form a good vision against a backdrop of the limits of the human ego, giving us a rich picture of the relationship between moral psychology and epistemology.

Alec Siantonas (aisiantonas@gmail.com)

For Knowledge-Governed Full Belief

Belief is a mental state that aims at knowledge. This view, defended in Williamson 2000, departed both from the mainstream of analytic epistemology, which had been much preoccupied with defining knowledge in terms of belief, and from a counter-tradition which had seen knowledge as a mental state cleanly separated it from the state of belief (Cook Wilson 1925).

This account of belief has come under significant criticism from multiple directions. Some, such as Aidan McGlynn (2023), reject it from a position closer to the epistemological mainstream; the late Maria Rosa Antognazza (2020) has called for a return to the counter-tradition which distinguishes knowledge and belief more sharply; and even several philosophers (Hawthorne 2016; Goodman 2023) broadly sympathetic to Williamson's epistemological programme have questioned whether there is any unified mental state playing the role alleged for belief within it.

This paper defends the Williamsonian conception of belief as a mental state aimed at knowledge and governed by the knowledge norm (KN): believe that P only if you know that P. Crucial to this defence is the distinction between believing that P and believing that probably P. In cases where subjects seem to believe rationally that P, without knowing that P, what they fully believe is that probably P, which they do know. In cases where subjects really do believe outright that P, closer reflection suggests that such beliefs are indeed defective, since they are not fully proportioned to their evidence.

Relatedly, this paper defends a particularly thoroughgoing externalism about the content of belief: there are many cases where the difference between believing that P and believing that probably P is a matter of the subject's epistemic situation: whether they are in a position to know that P, or merely that probably P.

Kenneth Silver (kennethmsilver@gmail.com)

Attending to a Reason's Weight

The standard picture is that successful practical reasoning involves agents who weigh their reasons and acting accordingly. There are much-discussed complications, but what remains unchallenged is this idea that our obligations follow purely from this competition between the reasons themselves (or competition between a certain type of reason). In this paper, I challenge this assumption by recognizing certain obligations we have regarding how we attend to our reasons, which can shape the ultimate competition between our reasons.

The standard picture seems to assume that equal attention is (or can be) given to all reasons. But this is an unreasonable idealization. In making decisions, there may be very many reasons that bear on it, and agents must determine which reasons deserve attention, and how much. Some have understood attention in terms of our cognitive prioritization, and so it is an open question what our priorities should be in reasoning. I argue for a defeasible norm according to which we ought to attend to a

reason in proportion to its weight. However, I suggest that one significant context in which this norm is suspended is when rights are at issue.

There is an ongoing thorny problem about how to represent rights in practical reasoning, and I argue that asserting rights has the rhetorical role of commanding our attention when reasoning. This is in stark contrast to standard proposals, on which rights provide extra weighty reasons or else exclusionary reasons. This explains why certain reasons appear off-limits when a right is at issue; it would be wrong to attend to them unless they are so weighty that they cannot reasonably be ignored. Thus, what an agent ought to do depends on the competition between her reasons, but it also depends on how the agent ought to prioritize her reasons within that contest.

Toby Solomon (tcpsolomon@gmail.com)

Options must be internal (but don't blame me if I don't always do what I ought)

Many people believe that ought implies can. However, when the "ought'' in question is the "ought'' of "rationally ought'' there is a tension between this thesis and another – that the demands of rationality should be first-person accessible. Or, in other words, that what an agent rationally ought to do depends only on how the agent views things to be and not on how the world, unbeknownst to them, happens to be. Unfortunately, as I will show, this tension cannot be avoided – uncertainty about whether we can actually perform our options is unavoidable (contra Hedden, "Options and the subjective ought", Phil. Stud., 2012). Koon has argued that we should resolve this tension in favour of ought-implies-can ("Options must be external", Phil. Stud., 2020). Here I will argue that, on the contrary, we must resolve it in favour of first-person-accessibility – at least when "rationally ought'' is intended to play an action guiding role. Things are somewhat more complicated when it comes to the roles that "rationally ought'' might play in prediction and ascribing responsibility. I will argue that to capture all the uses we want to put rational-oughts to we will need a whole spectrum of them, varying in which inputs to a decision they take to be objective or subjective. What you ought rationally do in the action guiding sense can come apart from what you rationally ought to have done in the responsibility sense – you can't always be blamed for failing to do what you ought.

Will Stafford (willstafford@ksu.edu)

Theory equivalence and the question of whether computation is arithmetic

There has been some recent debate about what notion of theory equivalence should be used in mathematics and the sciences. Candidates vary from Morata equivalence to biinterpretability. All these notions consider a theory in the context of a logic. And whether or not two theories are equivalent is often dependent on the logic. Because of this free use of logic, theories of string concatenation (or syntax), arithmetic and computation will often be identified. But for this class of theories the behavior of the terms independent of the logic is most important. The talk will argue that we shouldn't accept any of the going candidates for theory equivalence in these cases and proposes an alternative notion which allows for much more fine-grained

distinctions between these theories which respect the differing behavior encoded in the terms.

Bastian Steuwer (bastian.steuwer@ashoka.edu.in)

When We May Not Experiment: On the Ethics of Randomized Controlled Trials in Policy and Development

When are governments or public actors permitted to perform policy experiments to better learn how to implement policy? Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in social science and government policy have gained increasing weight – especially in development research. Philosophers have started to look into the ethics of RCTs and provided justifications for randomizing policy. I examine three justifications and conclude that none of them provides a sufficient condition for justifying an RCT.

First, suppose it is unclear of two which policy option is better. If it is permissible for some citizens to be subjected to policy A and permissible for the other citizens to be subjected to policy B, then what is the objection if some are subjected to A and others to B? I point to reasons of inequality between the treatment groups as a ground for objecting to the experiment using school closures in response to Covid-19 as an example.

Second, suppose one policy is better than another but presently unfeasible. The new policy can be interpreted as a scarce good and randomization as a demand of fairness akin to a lottery. However, one important constraint on this argument is that practically policy changes often involve transition costs and teething problems which speak against randomization and in favor of minimizing such costs.

Third, NGOs or academics pursuing RCTs are often not required to help at all. So how can one fault them for only helping some and not others? I argue that arguments for conditional obligations apply to such NGOs and governments in many cases. Given that they decide to intervene, they acquire obligations to do so effectively in ways that runs against the spirit of randomization.

Martin Sticker (martin.sticker@bristol.ac.uk)

A Defence of Overdemandingness Considerations in Climate Ethics

We argue that under certain circumstances climate ethicists can successfully appeal to the problem of overdemandingness in order to mitigate demands on individuals.

Recently, a number of climate ethicists have argued that those living in high per-capita emitting countries ought to have fewer children. Opponents of this view believe that it is permissible to procreate given that agents cannot be reasonably required to sacrifice goods that make their lives worth living, including having children. Chad Vance recently criticised this appeal to overdemandingness, i.e. that certain supposed duties must be mitigated because they are unreasonably demanding. He argues that under the assumption that the additional emissions created through having a child cause harm to others, appeal to overdemandingness is unsuccessful.

We agree with Vance that demandingness considerations are much weaker in cases of directly harming others, but think that he is mistaken in characterising procreation as a straightforward case of causing harm. Instead, if procreation makes others worse off due to the additional GHG emissions it causes, then this effect is created through the actions of intermediaries which are the primary bearers of responsibility for the harm caused: We collectively create social structures which make it the case that having a child causes large amounts of additional GHG emissions, as well as social structures that make people vulnerable to climate impacts that arise from these emissions. If someone forgoes procreation to prevent these harms, then this is best described not as avoiding to harm, but as avoiding to enable harm that we collectively would otherwise wrongly cause. This is a form of taking up others' slack, and thus bearing an unfair level of cost. Slack-taking duties, we argue, are constrained by demandingness considerations.

Finally, we discuss to which areas of climate ethics, other than procreation, the idea of slack-taking applies.

Piotr Szalek (piotr.szalek@gmail.com)

Intellectual Humility

The paper seeks to analyse the concept of intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue in the context of the dispute between theism and atheism. It reconstructs the origins, structure, and functions the concept plays in both philosophical and theological standpoints.

Intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue, along with the other epistemic and moral virtues such as open-mindedness, intellectual courage, insightfulness, and integrity, and is regarded as one of the essential components of a fruitful scientific investigation. Moreover, intellectual humility is essential as a practical tool to deal with the so-called deep disagreement between different theories or worldviews. The paper is interested in the applicability of intellectual humility in religious disputes. It explores how the concept of human knowledge limitations is formulated and exercised both in theism and atheism in a form of an epistemic attitude which might be described the best by the conceptual mechanism of intellectual humility as the intellectual virtue. The strategy used in the paper's analysis concerns the three following aspects of the concept:

(i) a genetic aspect: the paper explores the origins of the concept of intellectual humility taking into consideration their theistic and atheistic connotations;
(ii) a structural aspect: the paper tries to outline the conceptual structure of the concept of intellectual humility: what categories and arguments about human knowledge limitations are used both in theism and atheism;
(iii) a functional aspect: the paper will reconstruct the functions intellectual humility plays both in theistic and atheistic arguments.

The analysis of those three aspects will help the paper to understand the nature of intellectual humility as it is characterised and applied in both theism and atheism. It hopes to shed some light on the common elements shared between these two philosophical and theological standpoints as well as the real differences between

them. A good heuristic example of the close affinities between those arguably different positions is a striking similarity between atheism and apophatic theism as regards the limits of our knowledge of God.

Henry Taylor (j.h.taylor.1@bham.ac.uk)

Attention is a Patchwork Concept

Attention is one of the most important concepts in modern cognitive science. However, recently many scientists have suggested that attention is a concept that is so ambiguous that it has outlasted its scientific usefulness, and should be eliminated in favour of more precise concepts (e.g. Hommel et al. 2019 and Anderson 2021).

The standard philosophical response to this worry is to claim that the concept is not ambiguous (e.g. Wu forthcoming). My approach is different: I agree that the concept is ambiguous, but resist eliminativism by suggesting that its ambiguity is actually useful to science. Specifically, I argue that attention is a patchwork concept (Wilson 2006, Novick 2018). On this view, attention has many alternative meanings (what we might call 'subconcepts'). These subconcepts differ systematically in their meaning as a result of the scale they operate at, the properties that something must have to fall into the extension of the concept, and the referent of the subconcepts.

I argue for this 'patchwork' view of attention by examining two paradigms that measure attention in contemporary psychology: the Posner paradigm (e.g. Kentridge et al. 2008) and the 'looking' paradigm used to study attention in prelinguistic infants (e.g. Gliga et al. 2009). I then use this patchwork view to argue that the concept attention is useful for psychology for two reasons. First, the ambiguity between alternative subconcepts of attention allows the concept to take on different meanings depending on the epistemic goals of the experimental context, and the constraints placed on practicing psychologists. Second, attention is associated with important and widely accepted sets of tacit guidelines that provide psychologists with ways to test for and manipulate attention.

For these two reasons, we can accept that attention is ambiguous, whilst rejecting the slide to eliminativism.

Sami Tayub (qc22443@bristol.ac.uk)

Repealing Naturalised Metaphysics and Liberating the A Priori

This paper argues that naturalised metaphysics bears no better epistemic prospects than a priori metaphysics. Therefore, it is proposed that a methodological pluralism in metaphysics should be advocated: wherein both methodologies, and the many grades in between, can be used to populate an epistemic modal space of the way reality might be, constrained only by science's empirical content. This account is motivated by assessing contemporary naturalistic accounts of metaphysics. Naturalised metaphysics seeks to identify those metaphysics which are appropriately related to science, and privilege them as our only contenders which tell us how reality actually is. In contrast, a priori metaphysics does not bear this relation so they argue it cannot tell us about the nature of reality; as such naturalists repudiate it, or at least repurpose it as a pragmatic tool for naturalists. However, it is shown that

contemporary naturalism bears a prior commitment to scientific realism, but scientific realism itself is established on naturalistic grounds. To resolve this vicious circularity, which begs the question against legitimate empiricist ontologies from science, the naturalist need only commit to a bipartisan claim in the scientific realism literature; that science provides at least empirically adequate accounts of reality. However, it is shown a priori metaphysics can too be empirically adequate, since they can be characterised as models just as scientific theories are. The naturalists' argument that this empirical adequacy is inferior to science's is rebutted and qualified, by positing a ˜no-conflicts principle' which dispenses the metaphysics which conflict with science's empirical content. This leaves a plurality of metaphysics, a priori and naturalistic, on an epistemic par since they are all empirically adequate. Metaphysical realism is then preserved by employing epistemic modality to undergird this plurality. Hence, both naturalistic and a priori metaphysics provide epistemic possibilities about the way reality might be.

Emily Thomas (emily.e.thomas@durham.ac.uk)

G. E. Moore's Common Sense Time Realism, Presentism, and A-Theory

This paper explores the development of early analytic philosopher G. E. Moore's realism about time, focusing on his 1910-1911 lectures (published as Some Main Problems of Philosophy). I offer new readings of Moore: he marshals Common Sense to advance new arguments for time realism; offers the earliest sustained defence of presentism in the history of English-language philosophy; and, just as Bertrand Russell is the 'father' of B-theory, Moore is the 'father' of A-theory. I have discovered a 1909 archival letter showing that J. M. E. McTaggart took Moore to be an A theorist.

The paper is structured as followed. Following introductory material, §2 digs into Main Problems. Its Common Sense time realism is packaged with presentism and A-theory: Moore is explicit that past, present, and future are integral to time, and only present things exist. §3 argues that Henry Sidgwick's 1905 posthumous Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant was a major source of Moore's newfound views. Moore was closely familiar with this book, for he reviewed it in 1906, discussing its key arguments. Sidgwick also hints at presentism and A theory, perhaps borrowing from Hermann Lotze.

§4 investigates the legacy of Moore's views on time. §4.1 argues that Moore bundled the rejection of anti-realism about time with the rejection of British idealism, setting the stage for vociferous 1900s idealist-realist battles over time. §4.2 argues for the importance of Moore's place in the history of presentism and A-theory. §4.3 considers Moore's influence over subsequent debates. With regard to B-theory, I suggest that Russell's 1915 paper The Experience of Time was partly a response to Moore. With regard to A-theory, I show that Moore's characterisation of A theory and presentism as 'commonsensical' remain current today, and may have descended from him.

Daniel Vanello (d.vanello@soton.ac.uk)

The Authority of Moral Witnesses

Moral witnesses are people who suffered harm at the hands of evil and commit to tell those who did not experience it about the evil done. A paradigmatic example of a moral witness is a Holocaust survivor. Moral witnesses possess an epistemic authority about the evil done that makes them a crucial source of moral learning for those who did not experience the relevant evil. Yet, philosophers have had little to say about moral witnesses. The aim of this paper is to start filling in this gap by arguing for two constraints on any account of the epistemic authority of moral witnesses. The argument proceeds by considering and rejecting two proposals about the epistemic authority of moral witnesses. I do so in critical dialogue with Avishai Margalit's *The Ethics of Memory* (2004).

Proposal 1: the epistemic authority of moral witnesses comes from the fact that they experienced evil. I reject this proposal on the basis that there are people who experience evil done but who do not experience the evil done as a harm done deliberately to them. This delivers Constraint 1: for someone to be a moral witness, they must have experienced suffering at evil inflicted deliberately on them.

Proposal 2: the epistemic authority of moral witnesses comes from the fact that they experienced suffering at evil inflicted deliberately on them. I argue this is incomplete because there are people who experience evil done as a harm done deliberately to them but who are not moral witnesses. That is because moral witnesses must be able to communicate their experiences and their understanding of evil to those who did not experience the evil done. This delivers Constraint 2: moral witnesses must be able to communicate the evil done deliberately to them to those who did not experience it.

Jan Westerhoff (jan.westerhoff@lmh.ox.ac.uk)

Idealist implications of contemporary science

Recent developments in contemporary natural science (including fields as different as cognitive science and interpretations of quantum physics) incorporate central idealist positions relating to the nature of representation, the role our minds play in structuring our experience of the world, and the properties of the world behind our representations. My presentation describes what these positions are, and how they are introduced in the relevant theories in terms of precisely formulated scientific analogues. I subsequently consider how this way of looking at philosophical idealism through selected parts of contemporary science can help us to pursue new ways of developing key idealist questions in a way that is integrated with a naturalistically supported endeavour to understand central features of reality.

My presentation focuses on predictive processing and quantum Bayesianism, investigating their relation to three philosophical principles:

1. Representation: The idea that we do not encounter the world in a direct manner, but through representations.
2. Formation: The belief that the way the world appears to us is extensively and essentially shaped by structural features of the human mind.
3. Non-correspondence: The rejection of the assumption of a world of mind-independent represented objects behind our representations that correspond, at

least in broad structural outlines, to the entities featuring in contemporary physical and mathematical theories.

Heather Widdows (heather.widdows@warwick.ac.uk)

Body shame as moral shame

A dominant way to think about shame, is to think that shame is a response to moral wrongdoing, or moral wrongdoing found out. On such accounts for someone to feel shame is for X to construe herself as having done, or being, something bad (O'Brien, 2020, 546). Lucy McDonald describes this form of shaming as a form of blaming, as holding an individual morally responsible for some wrongdoing or flaw (McDonald, 2020, 1). Moral shame has been thought inapplicable in certain familiar cases of shame. In particular, it is thought not to apply to body shame. This type of shame is recognised as a genuine type of shame, but not one which can be fitted into an account of moral shame. For example, Susannah has committed no wrongdoing which merits blame, when she is spied on by the elders (O'Brian, 2020). It is this wish to recognise body shame as shame, but not moral shame, which has motivated different accounts of this type of shame, for example, accounts which focus on exposure, or on the diminution of social standing (O'Brian, 2020); or on non-agential shaming, that recognise that the target of body-shaming has no moral responsibility for the appearance of her body (McDonald, 2020, 14). Here I draw on arguments about the changing value of beauty, and its fundamental connection to personal identity, to argue that people often do feel morally responsible and blameworthy for real and perceived bodily flaws. Moreover, in many cases, those who body shame are seeking to blame the victim, and hold them accountable for their flaws. Accordingly, the phenomenon of body shame presents no barrier to a unified treatment on which all cases of shame are treated as cases of moral shame.

Jeremy Williams (j.s.williams@bham.ac.uk)

A being has moral status, broadly speaking, if it matters morally, such that agents are under at least pro tanto requirements to constrain their conduct for that being's sake. This paper contends that, on our settled understanding, moral status is *objective*, in the sense that whether a being possesses it is a fact, which obtains independently of whether others are in an epistemic position to recognise it, or the properties of the being which ground it. The paper then asks what a commitment to the thesis that moral status is objective implies for the longstanding question of whether and to what extent moral permissibility and wrongness are themselves objectively or subjectively determined.

I argue first that *subjectivism* — the view that an act's permissibility is determined by the agent's beliefs or evidence about their circumstances — is incompatible with the objectivity of moral status. And I similarly reject the more qualified view that *rights* are subjectively determined: that the content of our rights depends on what we can 'reasonably' demand of others, given their epistemic limitations. More tentatively, and again on moral status-based grounds, I oppose what we might call the *dual standards view*, on which objective and subjective standards of wrongness apply to agents concurrently. These arguments together support *objectivism*: the view that

permissibility and wrongness depend on the facts, irrespective of whether an agent is, or could be, cognisant of them. On objectivism, we can act wrongly through conduct whose harmfulness was entirely unforeseeable. That claim is more natural and intuitive, I think, than is often thought. But more importantly, it is inseparable, I conclude, from the claim that we and others have moral status whether the fact of our having it, and the facts about us in virtue of which we have it, are accessible to others or not.

Tom Williams (tom.williams@nulondon.ac.uk)

Acquaintance, Singular Thought and Descriptive Names

Acquaintance views hold that acquaintance with an object is required for singular thought about that object. If the notions of acquaintance and singular thought are understood in a particular and careful way, I suggest some acquaintance views are pretty plausible. However, any acquaintance view will have to deal with two kinds of counterexample case: cases of thought that purports to be singularly about the non-existent, and cases of apparently singular thought enabled via use of descriptive names. In this talk I focus on how an acquaintance view should respond to the problem of descriptive names. I survey a few options, and recommend what I call a 'description-externalist' account of descriptive names. According to this account, a subject can entertain a proposition that is descriptively about an object, without realising that this is what they are doing. A subject can even do this when the proposition concerns properties that are not in their conceptual repertoire. At first sight, this account is a little odd. I try to mitigate these worries by (a) giving some independent motivation for the account; and (b) arguing that (contra a recent paper by Mark Sainsbury) the kinds of uses of descriptive names that cause genuine problems for acquaintance views are uncommon in our linguistic communities.

Mark Windsor (windsor.mrj@gmail.com)

Beauty Unframed: An Argument for Aesthetic Anti-Realism

This paper presents an argument for aesthetic anti-realism using everyday aesthetic phenomena. Arguments for aesthetic anti-realism generally have taken impetus from the cultural or individual diversity of aesthetic taste. However, realist accounts can accommodate diverse aesthetic tastes by specifying normative requirements for the correct apprehension of an object's aesthetic qualities; for example, that some actual or ideal audience must have certain background knowledge, competences, or experiences to be able to experience an object correctly. While these strategies may work for art works and artefacts that are intended to be experienced in a certain way, I argue that they fail in the case of a class of objects that, following Yuriko Saito's work on everyday aesthetics, I call ˜unframed' aesthetic phenomena. An aesthetic object is ˜framed' in the sense that it is prescribed which of its features one should attend to and how one should attend to them. For example, we know to look at a painting, not smell it, and to look at it from the front, not from behind. In contrast, 'unframed' aesthetic phenomena are not normatively constrained with respect to how one should engage with them. Consider a shell found on a beach: one is free to attend to any of its sensuous qualities in whatever way one chooses. I argue that

since the aesthetic qualities that an object manifests depend on which of its features one attends to and how one attends to them, there is in the case of these objects no fact of the matter as to what aesthetic qualities they possess. More specifically, I aim to show that three main approaches to aesthetic value that have been used to support a realist view – aesthetic empiricism, aesthetic primitivism, and Dominic McIver Lopes's 'network theory' – fail to do so in the case of unframed aesthetic phenomena.

Bill Wringe (billwringesemail@gmail.com)

Never Mind the Gap: Forward-Looking Collective Responsibility and the Quantum of Blame Error

Many arguments for the existence of non-distributive backward-looking collective responsibility appeal to 'responsibility gaps': situations where it seems as though some entity must be responsible for a bad outcome even though no individual is. Many such arguments rely on the idea that in these situations we can know that there is some blame to be assigned without knowing how who it should be assigned to. Reflection on the functions of blame suggests this is a mistake. Call this mistake the 'Quantum of Blame' error.

Bill Wringe (Wringe 2014) and Christine Korsgaard (Korsgaard 2018) have put forward arguments for the existence of non-distributive forward-looking obligations which seem to be analogous to 'responsibility gap' arguments. They rely on the idea that we can see that there are obligations which fall on the world's population non-distributively, by seeing that there is an obligation to see that certain rights are respected, and establishing that there is no other agent, either individual or collective, on whom this obligation might fall. Call these 'accountability gap' arguments.

It is natural to think that accountability gap arguments involve an error analogous to the Quantum of Blame error. However, I shall argue that careful attention to differences between the practices of blaming and holding accountable show that we have no reason to think that 'accountability gap' arguments are vulnerable to an objection of this sort.

Tarek Yusari (Tarek.Yusari-Khaliliyeh@liverpool.ac.uk)

What is (Distinctively) Wrong with Entrapment?

Entrapment occurs whenever one party, the agent, intentionally brings it about that another, the target, commits a criminal offence, intending to have the target prosecuted for committing the offence (the 'law-enforcement aim').

It is commonly agreed that at least some instances of entrapment by state agents are morally problematic, warranting a 'remedy', i.e., a judicial response that is usually to the target's benefit.

Typically, however, the fact that an individual is induced by another party to commit a criminal offence – an ordinary complicity scenario – is not considered to warrant any similar judicial response.

To date, no convincing philosophical justification has been provided of the differential treatment of state entrapment and complicity scenarios.

We contend that: (i) the differential treatment is warranted only if there is a wrong-making feature that is distinctive to entrapment, and (ii) the distinctive wrongfulness of entrapment depends upon entrapment's distinguishing feature: the law-enforcement aim.

We critically engage with several accounts of entrapment's wrongfulness. These accounts suffer from such failings as (i) taking the wrongfulness of entrapment to inhere in a feature that is (often) common to entrapment and complicity, (ii) misidentifying what is distinctive about entrapment, or (iii) although acknowledging entrapment's distinctive feature, misconstruing its moral import.

We identify the distinctively objectionable feature of entrapment as residing in the anticipatory character of the agent's intention to prosecute and punish the target for an offence yet to be committed. One upshot is that entrapment, contrary to many accounts, is always (and distinctively) pro tanto wrongful, no matter the target.

Focusing on the law-enforcement aim also helps us identify the factors that may defeat the above objection, thereby making some acts of entrapment permissible and inapt for remedy.

Lastly, we develop an account of such a defeater, based on the target's liability to punishment.

Maya von Ziegesar (mvonziegesar@gradcenter.cuny.edu)

Animality as Racialization and Resistance

This paper explores the central role of animality in racial formations. I contrast the analytic of animality with Charles Mills' use of subhumanity to designate those racialized people that are necessary for the functioning of the modern global economic and political system while simultaneously being excluded from "humanity" and its accompanying privileges. I argue that this binary framework—between (white) humans on the one hand and (non-white) subhumans on the other—is inadequate in at least three respects. First, it fails to capture the varieties of dehumanization encountered by differently racialized peoples. Indigenous, enslaved, and (im)migrant peoples are not a monolith, and in fact have been subject to both sub- and super-human characterizations. This latter type of racialization, of racialized people as somehow superhuman, is lost in Mills' framework. Second, although Mills compellingly accounts for the ways some humans are exploited by global economic systems, his framework does not acknowledge how animals are captured in these very same systems. I argue that, both materially and ideologically, it is helpful to adopt a more expansive frame that acknowledges the interwoven exploitation of both racialized humans and non-human animals. Finally, the analytic of animality is better able to capture the intuition common to many metaphysicians and historians of race that pseudo-biology and scientism are preconditions of modern racial formations. The modern concept of race developed alongside modern biology and the post-

Darwin reconceptualization of man, meaning that race and animality have been conceptually linked throughout the modern epoch.

I conclude by arguing that animality has great radical potential in resisting racist oppression. To support this claim, I turn to the MOVE Organization, a radical Black collective that was bombed by Philadelphia police in 1985. I argue that MOVE resisted dehumanization by rejecting the category of human altogether, instead embracing animality as a radical alternative.

palgrave
macmillan

New Palgrave Philosophy books published out of London

For more information on any of these books, please visit https://link.springer.com/

Available for your library to acquire:

The Springer Nature Philosophy & Religion Annual E-book Collection

Publisher: Brendan George at brendan.george@palgrave.com

(If you wish to, please forward this list to others.)

- Garry L. Hagberg (ed), **Fictional Worlds and the Political Imagination** (May 24)
- Catalina Elena Dobre/Rafael García Pavón/Francisco Díaz Estrada (eds), **Human Flourishing, Spiritual Awakening and Cultural Renewal** (April 24)
- Åke Wahlberg, **Resolving Disagreements** (April 24)
- João Romeiro Hermeto, **The Paradox of Intellectual Property in Capitalism** (April 24)
- Lantz Miller, **The Rationality Project** (April 24)
- Jagdish Hattiangadi, **Francis Bacon's Skeptical Recipes for New Knowledge** (March 24)
- Luce Irigaray, **The Mediation of Touch** (March 24)
- Landon D. C. Elkind/Alexander Mugar Klein (eds), **Bertrand Russell, Feminism, and Women Philosophers in his Circle** (Feb 24)
- Hon-Lam Li (ed), **Lanson Lectures in Bioethics (2016-2022)** (Feb 24)
- Martin E. Turkis II, **The Metaphysics of Michael Polanyi** (Feb 24)
- Nicholas Maxwell, **The Philosophy of Inquiry and Global Problems** (Jan 23)
- Pavlos Kontos, **Introduction to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics** TEXTBOOK (Dec 23)
- Perry Hendricks, **Skeptical Theism** (Dec 23)
- Maggie Schein, **Cruelty** (Dec 23)
- Leszek Koczanowicz, **The Emancipatory Power of the Body in Everyday Life** (Nov 23)
- Nishad Patnaik, **Modernity and its Futures Past** (Nov 23)
- Jacques M. Chevalier, **The Ethics of Courage Vol. 2** (Nov 23)
- Jacques M. Chevalier, **The Ethics of Courage Vol. 1** (Nov 23)
- Dustin Lazarovici, **Typicality Reasoning in Probability, Physics, and Metaphysics** (Nov 23)
- Michael H. DeArmey, **The Constitution of the United States Revised and Updated** (Nov 23)
- James Chambers, **Marx and Laozi** (Nov 23)
- Bradley Kaye, **Zizek and Freedom** (Nov 23)
- Paul Bishop, **Discourses of Philology and Theology in Nietzsche** (Oct 23)
- Richard Dien Winfield, **Rethinking the Arts after Hegel** (Oct 23)
- Jan Faye, **The Biological and Social Dimensions of Human Knowledge** (Sept 23)
- Niklas Toivaikainen, **Self, Other and the Weight of Desire** (Sept 23)
- Manuel Camassa, **On the Power and Limits of Empathy** OPEN ACCESS (Sept 23)
- Martin Stokhof/Hao Tang (eds), **Wittgenstein's Tractatus at 100** (Sept 23)
- Deborah K. Heikes, **Epistemic Responsibility for Undesirable Beliefs** (Sept 23)
- Ayşenur Ünügür-Tabur, **Divine Free Action in Avicenna and Anselm** (Sept 23)
- Geoffrey Scarre**, Judging the Past** (Sept 23)
- Martin Donougho**, Hegel's 'Individuality'** (Sept 23)
- Guy Jackson, **Understanding Anselm's Ontological Argument** (August 23)
- Viktor Ilievski/Daniel Vázquez/Silvia De Bianchi (eds), **Plato on Time and the World** (August 23)
- Charles William Johns, **Hegel and Speculative Realism** (August 23)

- Moujan Mirdamadi, **A Phenomenological Study of Depression in Iran** (August 23)
- Susanna Saracco, **Plato, Diagrammatic Reasoning and Mental Models** (August 23)
- Miles Leeson/Frances White (eds), **Iris Murdoch and the Literary Imagination** (July 23)
- Wayne Deakin, **Modern Language, Philosophy and Criticism** (June 23)
- Laura Caponetto/Paolo Labinaz (eds**), Sbisà on Speech as Action** (June 23)
- Miguel Garcia-Godinez (ed), **Thomasson on Ontology** (June 23)
- Tilottama Rajan/Daniel Whistler (eds), **The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Poststructuralism** (June 23)
- Stephen Rainey, **Philosophical Perspectives on Brain Data** (May 23)
- Miguel Garcia-Godinez/Rachael Mellin (eds), **Tuomela on Sociality** (May 23)
- Conny Rhode, **The Burden of Proof upon Metaphysical Methods** (May 23)
- Max Ryynänen/Paco Barragán (eds), **The Changing Meaning of Kitsch** (April 23)
- Brian Lightbody, **A Genealogical Analysis of Nietzschean Drive Theory** (April 23)
- Steffen Steinert, **Interdisciplinary Value Theory** (April 23)
- Lucy Weir (ed), **Philosophy as Practice in the Ecological Emergency** (March 23)
- T. H. Brobjer**, The Close Relationship between Nietzsche's Two Most Important Books** (March 23)
- Matthew C. Altman (ed), **The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment** (March 23)
- Tiddy Smith (ed), **Animism and Philosophy of Religion** (Feb 23)
- Nathaniel F. Barrett, **Enjoyment as Enriched Experience** (Feb 23)
- Giacomo Turbanti, **Philosophy of Communication** TEXTBOOK (Jan 23)
- Emma R. Jones, **Being as Relation in Luce Irigaray** (Jan 23)
- James Blachowicz, **The Bilateral Mind as the Mirror of Nature** (Jan 23)
- Susanne Lettow/Tuija Pulkkinen (eds), **The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Feminist Philosophy** (Jan 23)
- Mathijs Peters/Bareez Majid, **Exploring Hartmut Rosa's Concept of Resonance** (Dec 22)
- Mark Coeckelbergh, **Digital Technologies, Temporality, and the Politics of Co-Existence** (Dec 22)
- Sharada Sugirtharajah (ed), **John Hick's Religious Pluralism in Global Perspective** (Dec 22)
- Ferenc Horcher, **Art and Politics in Roger Scruton's Conservative Philosophy** (Dec 22)
- James Kellenberger, **Religious Knowledge** (Dec 22)
- Eric Charles Steinhart, **Atheistic Platonism** (Dec 22)
- Tobias Schlicht, **Philosophy of Social Cognition** TEXTBOOK (Nov 22)
- Mehdi Parsa, **A Reading of Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense** (Nov 22)
- Garry L. Hagberg (ed), **Literature and its Language** (Oct 22)
- Anja Heister, **Beyond the North American Model of Wildlife Conservation** (Oct 22)
- Idan Breier, **An Ethical View of Human-Animal Relations in the Ancient Near East** (Oct 22)
- Felipe G. A. Moreira, **The Politics of Metaphysics** (Oct 22)
- Antony Fredriksson, **A Phenomenology of Attention and the Unfamiliar** (Oct 22)
- O. Bradley Bassler, **The Legitimacy of Poetic Reason** (Sept 22)
- John T. Maier, **Options and Agency** (Sept 22)
- Amalendu Misra, **On Beheading** (Sept 22)
- Dan O'Brien (ed), **Hume on the Self and Personal Identity** (Sept 22)
- Shaun Gallagher, **Phenomenology 2e** TEXTBOOK (August 22)