Trust and Deception

Title: Empirical Applications (6 October 2015 Part 2)
Date: 06 October 2015 (09:00-12:30)
Duration: 53 mins

Speakers:

S1 - Dani Nedal
S2 - Ian Apperly
S3 - Eszter Simon
S4 - Nicholas Wheeler

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[Transcriber's note: Part 2 has numerous gaps in the text due to the low recording level]

S1 I wanted to echo Nick [0:00:04], thanking everyone for coming, especially for the speakers. I'm going to say very, very quick words about kind of what we meant with the workshop, other than just complementing the work that's already been done and basically furthering this multidisciplinary event [0:00:23] has but also trying to kick something off that I think has been sorely lacking in international politics in particular but also from, you know, an outsider's perspective in – the way [0:00:35] studied this is this explicit attempt to capture these multiple dimensions – multiple levels of analysis that we think play into the use of trust and deception in social contexts and trying to figure out better ways to incorporate insights from psychology and neuroscience into international politics without distorting them beyond recognition, but also trying to give something back and contribute to the experimental methods and the [0:01:09] development in psychology and neuroscience in ways that allow us to understand how these

mechanisms operate, but within the social context that we would want to understand in it. Right?

So I think political scientists have – well, I hope we have a good understanding of how these social contexts operate [and the role of - 0:01:30] institutions and interests and power and all these things and how that affects decision-making and how that affects outcomes and so on. So, in devising experiments and in devising empirical models, I hope that then there can be a more [0:01:43] interaction between political scientists and psychologists and neuroscientists in designing so as to actually get at the root of what these mechanisms are and how they operate. So part of what I think we're trying to do in this is get something started, and myself and Nick, as well, are very much open to carrying this forward and talking about possible collaboration in the future on such experiments and such studies. So, you know, hopefully we can get something out of this more than just a good day of debates, which we're, you know, at a very good start for that.

So I'm going to stop here and I'm going to let Ian talk for 15 minutes and I'll be [0:02:30] so.

S2 OK, fine. Well, thank you very much. A slight change of direction in that I don't directly work on trust or deception. What I primarily do are sort of laboratory experiments, primarily on behaviour but using neuroscience methods as well, looking at perspective-taking; often social perspective-taking.

And so what I've tried to do is – well, I've tried to do is to think about some of the phenomena that we see and others see in laboratory studies on perspective-taking, and think about how they might potentially be relevant for thinking about interactions between people in real-world contexts and bases for trust and perception.

So I think the best – if I've achieved something today, it will be that at the end of it you say, 'Hm…' because it's made you think rather than, 'Nah!' because you decide, actually, no, it's really not relevant at all. These are indeed just laboratory experiments but nothing to make us think about [outside - 0:03:27] of the laboratory. OK.

So I'm stepping outside of my comfort zone here, but this is, I think, a famous quote. This is Abba Eban talking about – I think talking at the end of a failed attempt at peace talks between Israel and Palestine, and I put this up just to illustrate a few things that I want to draw out in the talk, which is that the way – I mean, using a – not from a diplomatic context, that clearly the way we understand what people say and what they mean by what they say is very perspective [0:04:11]. It depends a great deal which side you're on, which side you might be on, what your preconceptions might be…these things have a great deal of influence on what you take him to be saying with this statement.

And not only that, but a statement like this, which I take it is potentially offensive or inflammatory, as well as perhaps meant as a serious statement or even perhaps a quip, that those – what this does to you when you hear a statement like this also influences the way in which you understand the statement has consequences for your perspective-taking.

So what I want to talk about briefly is that our own perspective – so it's on laboratory evidence that our own perspective influences our judgments of others. This is the well-known phenomenon of ego-centralism, which is pervasive in interpersonal interactions and which laboratory studies give us some unique insight into, I think.

Something which I think is less well-known but which is arising out of quite a bit of work that we and others have been doing, which is that, actually, the process of adopting someone else's perspective can

influence our own perspective without us necessarily realising that that's the case, and that statement actually [can - 0:05:37] change our perception of the facts, and that these effects are influenced by cognitive load, by emotions and by attributions that we make to the target [0:05:48]. And some of this is quite well-worn, but I think the laboratory phenomena exposed some questions that I hope might be of interest to this audience.

So I'm a lab scientist, so I'm going to give you quite briefly a couple of paradigms because I think it's important to see the paradigms in order to understand what you may or may not take from the conclusions.

So this is a test that Geoff's already mentioned where what you're doing – I mean, literally in this case – this is a stimulus from our experiment. These experiments can be run live/they can be run with computer avatars, which is what we do, and so what you're doing in this game is to follow her instructions and move these items around in the array, but in the instructions to the experiment you're familiarised with the fact that she can't see all of the items in the array and therefore doesn't know that they're there. You get to see virtually around the other side of the array and [0:06:41] would say – you know, are happy to say what she doesn't know about these items here. So when she gives you an instruction like 'nudge the large torch one slot left', what you should do in this experiment is take account of the fact that she can't see this torch here and select this one here, which is the largest torch she can see.

This is in many respects a trivially simple experiment. The necessary skills for understanding that her perspective is different from yours are very early-developing in children. This is not something that should tax adult participants. So if people are making mistakes in an experiment like this, it's not 'cause they don't understand that she has a different

perspective from you. You can test that and clearly people do understand that. They jolly well ought to 'cause they're grown-ups.

People are rubbish at this, it turns out, and I'll say a little bit more about the errors in a moment. But actually what's quite interesting in the work that we've done here, and Jess Wang and Ahmad Abu-Akel in the audience have been doing work with this paradigm in our group – what you find is quite interesting – that people are – show evidence of both ego-centralism and, if you like, well, non-ego-centralism in their assessment of the array.

So what we do is we get people to follow the instructions; we measure their response times and error rates. We also track their eye movements while they're completing the task. And what you see – so imagine there's a time course to hearing this instruction, so there's a period of time before you hear the instruction, and we can see what people do then; there's a period of time when the instruction starts – when you're listening to what she says but you still can't use her perspective to narrow down on what it is she's going to speak about; and then at this point, as soon as she says 'large', and certainly by the time she says 'torch', you're in a position to integrate information from what she's saying with information about what she could and couldn't be talking about, in order to identify [that this must - 0:08:41] be the reference. And what you see is, during the period up to the point where you can use her perspective, this does vary over experiments but actually very often what you see is that people actually tend to look more at items in common ground – so items that both you and she can see. So in the sense a non-egocentric person is responding. But at the point where they actually have to start using her perspective, you see people will often make eye movements to the incorrect item. So evidence of ego-centralism, and perhaps much more dramatically, in grown-up, adult participants – including you, if you did this experiment – and we see up to 50% of errors on these trials. And of course you're

not just doing trial after trial of where her perspective matters. These are embedded in a bunch of other trials where it doesn't, so it's…people are – if you give people all the time in the world and make it very, very obvious that they should be using perspective on every trial, then of course people won't make the same kind of errors at the same rate. But, rather shockingly, people make a large percentage of errors on these tasks, and this is originally work by Boaz Keysar, but we replicated the same level of errors, under certain [0:09:55] conditions. And this fits with the general [0:09:58] of adults not being terribly good at using perspective in everyday life.

Now, these tendencies – so it's easy to think, 'Well, this is just a lab task. Maybe it's going to tell us something useful on a sort of laboratory scale in terms of timescale of the cognitive processes; it might contribute to perspective-taking; but it doesn't have any real-world validity.' I wouldn't want to defend that overly – [0:10:30] over strongly but we do have now some quite nice evidence from Ahmad's work that people's success on this task can be predicted by their traits for autism and psychosis – questionnaire-assessed traits for autism and psychosis, and both of those clinical disorders at a clinical level certainly correspond with difficulty in social cognition, and so to the degree that these everyday variations in traits for autism and psychosis are picking up on variants of social cognition, that seems to be successful in predicting people's performance on this laboratory task.

Jess's work has shown that, if you're doing this task, it really does matter whether her instructions are more or less complicated. Now, that's a – so, for example, instead of saying, 'Nudge the small…' Sorry – 'Nudge the large torch', and you should pick this one. If she says, 'Nudge the large torch one slot down', people are significantly worse and more egocentric than they would be for the simpler instruction.

Now, no-one should care about that particularly except that, in the real world, people's discourse clearly does vary in complexity and so what this points to is that, actually, we can't take for granted that someone who can perspective-take will be successful in using that information. It will depend upon the cognitive context that they're in. If they're under high cognitive load, they're less likely to be able to do this successfully.

It's also more successful if you're in a positive mood. That's work from Boaz Keysar and colleagues. It's – people are more egocentric if you're – if the target – so this person here is the friend. I mean, in this case it's just a real, live interaction between the person and a friend versus the person and a stranger, and there's some evidence that egocentrism is greater in Western rather than Eastern (in that case, Chinese) participants, though any questions on that you can direct to Jess Wang because she's recently largely failed to replicate that finding in a study that we have conducted between British and Taiwanese participants. But in any case I think we should take that possibility seriously 'cause there's potential interest in that. And right at the bottom: 'trust, question mark'. We have just begun our own studies where we try to manipulate people's trust in the speaker in order to see what effects that might have on [rate of egocentrism - 0:13:08].

OK, second part: that perspective-taking can loosen your grip on reality. So this is a different paradigm. What it's doing here is simply making fast judgments about either what he sees in this room – how many discs on the wall he sees or how many discs you yourself see. And we vary the discs among small numbers and we also vary whether you're judging him or you or whatever your – his perspective or her perspective is the same, as in this case, or different, as in this case.

What we find is that when your perspective is different from his, judging what he sees is significantly more difficult. It's slower, you make more – a few more errors and this fits with the idea that you see basic

egocentric interference all over the place. In the great majority of our experiments we find egocentrism in these judgments.

What was a surprise to us was that we also observed, if you like, the inverse pattern, where when you're simply judging yourself – how many discs on a wall you see – so [0:14:23] you're just saying how many discs on the wall you see, the fact that he sees a different number from you seems to make a difference to your judgment of your own perspective, so you're slower, a little bit more error-prone at judging that you see two when he happens to see one, as he does at the bottom [over there - 0:14:43].

So this [0:14:48] that there's always controversy about these kinds of findings. People will agree or disagree over the specifics, and what's quite interesting is that this phenomenon – the general phenomenon here of what we call altercentric interference is quite pervasive. So you see it in a variety of different paradigms, using quite different stimuli, all pointing to the idea that someone else's task-irrelevant perspective, or somewhat task-irrelevant perspective, can actually lead you to be slower, more error-prone or biased in judgments that depend on your own perspective.

And some work that I've done here with Andy Surtees: in [0:15:31] we can even find in some cases that your own perspective no longer influences your judgments in the face of a salient, external – in this case external, spatial perspective. So we haven't found evidence yet that people lose themselves into somebody else but they can lose themselves in space.

And we find some evidence to suggest that this effect has some social credentials, so we can make it go away by telling people the avatar can't see, and that this effect but not this effect correlates to self-reported perspective-taking and empathy. So, again, there is some

reach from the lab phenomenon into something, at least a questionnaire measure of people's social cognition. So some validity associated with this.

Again, what's potentially interesting here is that, in this case, the level of interference has increased under cognitive load, so actually that's what I said for ego-centralism, as well. What's significant about that is that, in this case, placing people under load doesn't stop them from perspective-taking; in fact, what happens is that they appear to perspective-take and then suffer more interference from the other person's perspective when they're under load. They also show more interference when they're induced to feel shame, whereas if they're induced to feel angry they are faster at making judgments altogether for self – oops! That's where it's fast. It's faster for self. If they're made to feel guilty, they're faster for making judgments about the other person. So induced emotion in participants seems to make a difference in the – if you like, the attention or priority that they're giving to self or other in ways that are potentially influential in their decision-making.

So…what I hope I've shown you is that there's plentiful evidence that our own perspective influences our judgments of others and that there are various conditions attached to that. And perhaps what's less intuitive is that taking another person's perspective, whether deliberately doing so or whether in the experiments that I've been describing – doing it in a relatively unconscious manner appears to actually influence our own judgments solely from our own perspective and that these are conditional on [load - 0:18:01], emotions and [attribution - 0:18:02]. So – and I suppose – and just [0:18:05] if you really want to make it as hard as possible for someone to understand your point of view in a deception context, then what you should do is make them angry, try to be their friend and speak in long sentences, preferably as fast as you can.

Thanks very much.

[Applause]

S1 Thanks again. And now we have – I've lost my programme. OK, so now we have Marcus Holmes. Since Marcus isn't here, Nick, I think we should go ahead and have Eszter speak and then we'll have you—

S4 Yeah. Well, it's possible Marcus might still appear, so it would be good to—

S1 OK, so let's [give - 0:18:43] some time, then.

S4 Yeah, be good. But he wasn't well yesterday, obviously, so it may be that he won't.

[Muffled voices and laughter in background]

S3 Right, so where we are going to go now is perhaps a little too much empirics and a little – too little theory, but to give you an idea of the history of this project is that essentially I'm – this is the first time I was dealing with the Hot Line Agreement from the perspective of trust, so a lot of the work that went into this paper and goes into this presentation is based on sort of trying to figure out what is there in the historical material.

For those who read the paper, I have the bad news that I'm trying to put a slightly different twist on it, just because I realised that the original doesn't work really well, so I don't think the framework that I'm presenting here is still the one – the one – but I think it's probably moving a little closer to that one.

So, as you can see, sorry, it studies interpersonal trust – so I'm studying interpersonal trust in an interstate relationship, which was driven primarily by a high level of distrust and some rational distrust and to see how the creation and the symbolism of the Moscow-Washington hotline fit into this. Are we clear on what the Moscow-Washington hotline is? No. OK. So it was a telegram connection back when Moscow and Washington - between the Soviet premier and the American president, and it was created for times of emergency only. Now, it still exists today, but it's an email connection.

OK, so usually when the hotline is mentioned, its creation is attributed to the fact that in the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev had a hard time communicating. So essentially this solves a communication issue. I think it is true but I'm more interested in what, for example, [0:21:14] pointed out about the hotline, which was that it was also a trust-building measure. It wasn't just sort of building confidence in the sense that [0:21:25] because of miscommunication or lack of communication would be less likely to occur, but it was a trust-building measure between – and that leads to my next point. It was a trust-building measure between Kennedy and Khrushchev, so at the interpersonal level, and it was also a trust-building measure at the interstate level. And in itself the Agreement, as we shall see, was an act of trust. So I'm trying to add something to the international relations literature. It should be the study of interpersonal trust and especially how it plays out after betrayal and also to see – to be able to – I'd like to be able to say something about the interaction between interpersonal trust and interstate trust. I hope it's not too ambitious.

OK, so, just quickly, trust – I define trust as an act of making oneself vulnerable, or accepting vulnerability by believing that the trustee will do what is right or the trustee will act in the trustor's interest. I'm interested in the process of trust-building, trust-formation, trust-[0:22:40], and at the moment I think that trust and distrust are different

scales, and it's possible to have both at both levels. Somewhat strange relationships like high trust and high distrust at the same time.

Now, I prefer to see these as scales, although a lot of the literature just talks about high trust and low trust, and I'm not sure how much more precise I have to be in my research, but I would prefer to treat it as a scale.

I'm not going to waste too much time in discussing this because this is nothing else than a framework of me trying to figure out – so when you face the archival material, what is it that I should admit as a measure of trust, or a measure of distrust, for that matter? And of course we can focus on the direct approach: expressions of trust – 'I trust you', 'I have confidence in you' – something like that; smaller acts of trust as the relationship develops; or essentially some leap of trust at the beginning; but sometimes we just look – we can look for indirect indicators such as precondition. I'm thinking an important precondition to trust, and it partially, of course – this comes from the literature – is that these two people interacted in some ways. OK? It's very difficult to come up with a trusting or distrusting relationship without any kind of interaction. And my point will be that Kennedy and Khrushchev had plenty of time to interact with each other.

I'm looking for measures of trust/distrust [0:24:26], so to see whether they saw each other as honest/able and if they saw each other as having sort of normal intentions towards one another. And what – how the [0:24:41] level comes into this discussion at the moment is as a contextual factor, which…although I'm not sure this is the right conceptualisation of it in the relationship, but this is what – where I start – you'll see what comes out of it.

When the state of a – when I talk about state/interstate relations, to me it looks more like institutional relations between the state. It's not the

Soviet Union as is; it's more like the state institutions or interacting at the level of state institutions. OK. And essentially I see it as an on-going process of interaction where basically in every stage, there is a feedback [loop - 0:25:33] of the relationship – in the relationships. So if we're trying to judge or trying to see the Kennedy/Khrushchev relationship prior to the creation of the hotline, I think we should discuss that relationship in two periods: one before the missile crisis and one sort of during the missile crisis and in the immediate aftermath [0:25:57] with betrayal happening in between the two.

So I'm arguing that the relationship, by the time of, say, spring/summer '62 developed into something that looked like a low-trust, medium or high level – um, low-distrust, medium- or high-level trusting relationship. It starts out very badly in Vienna and we usually look at the verbal beating that Khrushchev gave Kennedy, but if you go back to the actual memos of those meetings, it was only the last one that turned out really badly. The rest of them was reasonably cordial, although there was an element of [0:26:46] gap between the two and they were essentially unable to see each other's perspective at all. It was just they were talking past each other. But, interestingly, what they – both men came away – brought away from Vienna is an intuitive judgment that this other person is not too bad. So essentially there may be something of a relationship there, but the initial…I think act of trust or leap of trust comes from Khrushchev, when he initiates the private pen-pal correspondence. So not the correspondence that – it is private in a way but is more like formal discussion between leaders, but it's a more informal dialogue between the two men.

And Kennedy responds in kind and it ends up in a very intense exchange in the year between the initiation of the correspondence and the realisation of deception, basically.

They build up some sort of a joint identity as – that would provide some source for empathy between the two men. They see each other as 'we, moderate voices in our societies', as opposed to 'some crazy people in our government who want war' and they also see each other as – in relation – or as opposed to the press, who are just wanting to cause trouble as the same Cold War reflexivity and so that's why we're talking in private. And essentially they trust each other that this conversation remains private because the things they say in this conversation are appalling. If they had been said publicly, that could have ruined, pretty much, both men.

They also both – on both sides they acknowledged they have a joint responsibility for mankind's survival, so there is at least a rationalist basis for trust. They think it's actually more.

When we are looking for trustworthiness indicators, both men describes the other outside of correspondence, and this comes from memoirs, memoirs of others, etcetera – Kennedy's description of [0:29:31] Vienna, etcetera – as 'frank and intelligent'. In Vienna, Kennedy was bothered by – that Khrushchev was too ideological – that he couldn't, essentially, say much. So he couldn't talk to him. But the correspondence shows that both men can see matters from a pragmatic direction and they can sort of at least talk to each other. Although, to be honest, it doesn't – the whole correspondence [says nothing else than - 0:29:58] sort of trying to understand each other – to know who the other side is.

There is a huge leap of trust, then, when Khrushchev asked Kennedy to stop reconnaissance flights around Cuba, promising that he's not going to create any trouble for Kennedy at the mid-term election in '62. And this is the – Kennedy agrees, and this is the deal that, basically, Khrushchev betrays, so when Kennedy faces deception, the choice he doesn't really have is to say that we are not going with this problem

because he realises we are – you know, I'm going – that nuclear war has a high chance if we are not talking, so [- in this - 0:30:46].

So what the missile crisis provides is an environment in which the two men are forced to talk to each other and try to see if they sort of can rebuild this trust, and in this way the missile crisis is a testing of trust which both Kennedy and Khrushchev, but more importantly Khrushchev, passes. He sticks to the agreement. So of course it has repercussions on the interstate level because whatever they agree to privately and the deal that essentially solved the crisis is a private, [0:31:18] deal behind the scenes about the removal of Turkish missiles. So it reinforces that there is at least sort of interest or professionally [0:31:31] trust at the interstate level and that maybe the whole trust that was built up before the crisis shouldn't be thrown away.

The Hot Line Agreement is the first agreement between the two states in the post-crisis period and, to be honest, within this period at all, besides smaller, less high-profile issues. It is personal in nature. It essentially extends the interpersonal relationship or trust between these two men to emergency situations. And what I'm arguing somewhere down the line that it essentially institutionalises this trust so future leaders (and this would be very important for Kennedy and – sorry, for [0:32:18] Johnson) that there is no trust or a very low level of trust between them, the hotline will be the mechanism that gives them that initial level of trust that would allow them to sort of start communicating and maybe start to build up some trust between them.

It was basically easy to make because it was also based on Kennedy's and Khrushchev's personal diplomatic philosophy that diplomacy should have a very strong interpersonal side or it should be based on interpersonal communication.

The agreement itself was an act of trust. It has no verification mechanism. It's a framework agreement. It essentially leaves the judgment of what is an emergency situation to the actors and it also leaves it to the agents that the symbol that – the story that was built around the hotline from the conception of this idea in 1959, that that symbolism of restraint and peaceful intentions will not be betrayed. Interestingly, it – because trust at the interstate level, it is very interesting because both the Soviet [0:33:48] and the State Department in the US were very, very much against this interpersonal exchange, both the correspondence – and it almost always highlighted the dangers of coming up with a hotline kind of link.

In 1955 it essentially torpedoed the idea of coming even to start any deep thinking about such a line. [0:34:17] was acceptable at the interstate level is because what looks like a high-trusting framework agreement is also what could be seen as a minimalist, smallest-common-denominator agreement between the parties where actors – everyone, basically, but the least [0:34:45]. And it very well fitted into the Kennedy administration's or the State Department's idea to build trust gradually and they saw that this may be the first step because, yes, it fitted into the whole disarmament negotiations – it was negotiated as part of disarmament negotiations in Vienna – but this wasn't a disarmament measure. So this could make that sort of leap at this level that was missing, that they couldn't find earlier. But at the same time, the State Department still doesn't approve the line and tries to limit the damage it might cause. It first tries to move away from the interpersonal direction to make it more a government-to-government thing, but the Russians say, 'No, we are not buying this. This is an interpersonal link and this is how we conceived it; we should stick to it.' Once the agreement is done, the State Department still thinks, 'So what verification mechanism we could come up with and sell the Soviets in order to make sure that what is communicated through their

hotline is actually true?' And I'm not going to get into detail over this. It is – I'm trying to figure out what have we learned here.

We've seen a possible scenario of working together up to betrayal, a possible scenario of trust [0:36:19] different level, it maybe show how trust could be institutionalised so that it could be used in the future by other decision-makers, and I'm wondering if this is true but perhaps it may be a third route to trust-based cooperation between the gradual approach and [Nick's - 0:36:38] approach of…of an interpersonal cooperation, which I think is more based on a bigger leap of trust rather than also feeding into this [0:36:52].

So thank you very much for your attention, and I'm really sorry to have run overtime.

[Applause]

S4 Thank you.

S1 That's OK. Thank you, Eszter. OK, and then finally we have – *in absentia*, we have Marcus Holmes, read by Nick Wheeler.

S4 Sorry, Marcus. So, yeah – so Marcus isn't appearing. So he'd gone down with the same thing yesterday, so it looks like he's still suffering. So he'd sent some notes, so I'm just going to read them out, and I'm not sure how long they're going to take to read, but Dani, you can keep an eye on the time.

So Marcus begins by saying, 'Apologies for not being able to be here in person. Sick wife and now sick me here at home. Thank you to all the participants and organisers.

Trust and Deception

‘I want to make six brief points about deception and its detection in international politics and then say something briefly about one of the more infamous cases of deception in modern-world history, Munich.

‘The first point is that in international relations theory, deception traditionally has been viewed as a critical and insurmountable problem. It serves as one of the main pathways to conflict, particularly in the realist paradigm. Even in minimalist conditions, before we get meaningful politics, deception in social interaction is viewed as a big problem.

‘Consider Alexander Wendt’s treatment of alter and ego. They know nothing about each other. They do not know if the other is trustworthy or threatening. Even in this minimalist social environment, the realists point out that deception looms large. As Dale Copland says, states have reason to be suspicious of diplomatic gestures. The other may be trying to deceive them. Copeland goes on, “Whedt does not account for the idea of impression management, where actors ‘exploit the problem of other minds for their own ends’. The problem of other minds and thus the problem of potential deception, therefore, looms large in any and perhaps every social interaction.”

‘Yet there are reasons to be more optimistic than this, which leads to my second point. Some realists, such as John Mearsheimer, find that empirically and theoretically, deception is much less prevalent than we assume. In *Why Leaders Lie*, Mearsheimer finds that, as it turns out, leaders don’t lie all that often to each other. Though they do lie and fib quite a bit to their domestic audiences. The reason is relatively straightforward. Leaders don’t want to get caught in a lie. To get caught would be to hamper one’s reputation and credibility. Leaders therefore try to stay away from lying. This means that leaders are aware of and calculate, perhaps strategically, the idea of deception-

detection. Lying has a cost and one of the costs is that lies may be detected through a variety of means, as I will touch on below.

'Third, deception can mean many different things. Mearsheimer is talking about lying. Copeland is talking about managing an impression that can raise a different type than the true self. Cecilia Box says that lying is "any intentionally deceptive message which is stated'. Intentionality is important here. It is the intention to mislead. I argue that it is crucial for deception, and in some sense defines precisely what we mean when we talk about deception.

'Fourth, deception-detection is hard. As some of the other panellists have undoubtedly discussed, many studies in psychology and neuroscience show a slightly-better-than-chance ability for most people to pick up on deception. There is no question that detecting deception is a difficult task. However, studies also suggest some predictable ways in which the ability to detect deception improves or the ability to detect deception is heightened.'

And then he talks about repeated exposure. 'Robert Frank argues that one severe detriment of many existing deception studies and one that hinders the external validity and the findings in diplomacy settings is that they involve subjects who interact only once. As Frank argues, deception-detection improves with repeated exposure because, "it takes time to recognise a person's normal pattern of speech, gesturing and other mannerisms".

'(2) Emotional and Social Intelligence. Some people are better at picking up on deception than others. Deception-detection is a manifestation of emotional and social intelligence. This type of intelligence refers to the ability to understand one's own and other's emotional states, and the capacity to successfully navigate social relationships. Indeed, the best individuals at detecting deception are

those that score highly on emotional intelligence measures—' [laughing] – not what Geoff said – 'and consequently are able to interpret non-verbal cues accurately.

'Interestingly, some studies show that successful leaders in general possess high levels of emotional intelligence. All of this suggests that there is variation in deception-detection and there is reason to believe that leaders, all else being equal, may be in a better position than most to pick up on it.

'(3) Narcissism. Narcissism is inversely correlated with successful deception-detection. The more narcissistic you are, the less likely you are to be able to detect deception in others.

'(4) Face to face is a useful tool for detecting deception. Alex Pentland has coined the term "honest signals". Paul Ekman talks about these as micro-expressions. The idea is that many signals are difficult to control and fake. Certain facial cues, gestures and other forms of expressive behaviour are honest because they are virtually uncontrollable. This is particularly true in high-stakes environments such as crisis diplomacy, where the deceiver has a strong motivation to be successful and consequently becomes less effective at controlling non-verbal behaviour and therefore is, all else being equal, worse at deceiving. Face-to-face interaction becomes a mechanism for viewing and interpreting the honest signals that are conveyed through behaviour.

'(5) Face to face is a useful tool for limiting deception. Perhaps because individuals possess the intuition that face-to-face can be used for detecting deception, they tend to engage in less of it in face-to-face contexts. Studies indicate that e-negotiators engage in more deception and less truth-telling than their counterparts interacting face-to-face, for example.

‘(6) Identity-[verse - 0:43:54] material. Dale Copeland’s concern is about deceiving type, which is a way of thinking about identity. A meta review of deception-detection studies suggests that deceivers have more trouble faking behaviour when communicating identity than monetary or material lies.

‘(7) There may be an evolutionary reason for all of this. As [Puckman - 0:44:15] has noted in his review of the values of social interaction, it seems possible that the ability to spot non-verbal signs of mendacity offered a significant survival advantage during the long course of human evolution, or as Jay explains, species who can’t tell the difference between what is true and what is not are unlikely to prosper for very long. The ability to detect deception is, after all, just as functional in evolutionary terms as the ability to deceive. Clearly, deception-detection capabilities help to ensure the survival of the species.

‘Bringing these insights together leads me to my fifth point. We should be thinking about deception-deception in a dyadic, interpersonal way. As Paul Ekman and others have shown, in economic, dyadic negotiations, individuals display better accuracy in detecting deception face to face than in computer-mediated conditions. This is because detecting deception is an interpersonal activity. Ekman and colleagues refer to this as interpersonal deception theory. A deception is modelled as a dyadic and dynamic process between individuals. Deceivers expend considerable cognitive resources in an attempt to mask deception and unwittingly perform unconscious, non-verbal actions during those attempts. It is these non-verbal actions that can provide evidence of detection—’ sorry – ‘of deception. These behavioural markers suggest that deception literally plays out in the deceiver’s physical expression. [The leakage of intention is part of the – according to some estimates, roughly 90% of meaning that is conveyed non-verbally.]

‘Finally, for my sixth and final point, all of this suggests, at least to me, that deception-detection is best accomplished not from afar but interpersonally – that you give yourself the best chance to detect deception by looking for the honest signals that you’ve gained through face-to-face diplomacy.’

How long is left?

S1 Six minutes.

S4 ‘Now, if time remains—’ as it does – ‘let me talk a bit about how all this plays out in the case of Munich.’ And, of course, I brought this up earlier. ‘First, while in retrospect the intentions of Nazi Germany do not seem to have been well-guarded secrets, particularly after the publishing of Hitler’s *Mein Kampf* in the 1920s, in the 1930s there was significant debate in Britain regarding Hitler’s intentions. Not able to derive Hitler’s intentions through approximation and theorising from London, diplomacy was chosen by the leadership as the preferred method of assessing Germany’s aims. This decision to pursue diplomacy with Hitler, while much-maligned as foolhardy appeasement by many scholars in retrospect, and indeed some policy-makers at the time, was one that the empirical record suggests was made carefully and not the product of naivety.’ He’s put this in bold: ‘Chamberlain wanted to get a read on Hitler; that is why he made the trip to Munich.

‘Second, however, the Chamberlain visit was just one important interpersonal interaction in a series of interactions between Hitler and high-level officials. While Munich is remembered largely for the interaction between Chamberlain and Hitler, an important part of the story involves the ambassadors, foreign officers and diplomats who engaged directly with Hitler in the years prior to the fateful meeting.

‘A couple of important points stand out in the case. First, while the eventual outcome of the meeting between Chamberlain and Hitler was one of disappointment for Chamberlain, there are important clues left behind from the interaction to suggest that Chamberlain may not have been as naïve and overly duped as many historians and political scientists assume. Rather, there is evidence that Chamberlain picked up on the behaviours, the tone, the words and so forth that deception-detection experts say are critical clues to picking up on lies. In addition, in their first face-to-face encounter, Chamberlain does successfully understand Hitler’s intentions. Before Hitler revises them in the conversation, the transcripts of the meeting suggest that Chamberlain in fact read Hitler quite well in their encounter, only to be eventually persuaded of different intentions subsequently. This is not to say that Hitler’s intentions were crystal clear in the face-to-face encounter – they were indeed murky – yet this does bely the notion that Chamberlain was merely duped and gained no correct and actionable insight from his encounter with Hitler. Further, while Chamberlain provides only passing evidence of what he picks up on, others in his government, particularly the ambassadors stationed in Berlin and foreign officers who made multiple trips to see Hitler, are much more explicit in the lies that they are able to detect and the ultimate deception that Hitler tries to get away with in these encounters.

‘There are, of course, many potential explanations for the variation in why the diplomats read Hitler correctly while Chamberlain did not. I would argue that Chamberlain’s narcissism is an important personality characteristic that likely played a significant role. His narcissism and hubris worked against successful deception-detection.

‘Consider some of the things Chamberlain said over time. On saving the Czechs: “I am sure that someday the Czechs will see what we did was to save them for a happier future and I sincerely believe that we have at least opened the way to that general appeasement which alone

can save the world from chaos." On saving the world: "I could hardly have moved a pebble. Now I have only to raise a finger and the whole face of Europe is changed." On the publication of a world history book: "At the present moment I am too busy trying to make the history of Europe to read about it."

'What does this tell us? David Reynolds argues that these help us get at his personality and it's really one of hubris, and some of this is written before he goes to meet Hitler. This is not trying to overcompensate.

'Nevertheless, Chamberlain, despite all this, was able to pick up on clues. Let's compare his public statements with his private statements. To the BBC he says, "I feel satisfied now that each of us fully understands what is in the mind of the other." To his cabinet: "Herr Hitler can be trusted." But privately to his sister: "In spite of the hardness and ruthlessness I thought I saw in his face, I got the impression that here was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his word. Hitler is half-mad and a lunatic.' And in his diary, a checklist of the honest signals that hint at deception: tirades, emotional outbursts, hardness in face. Right out of interpersonal-deception theory,' Marcus says.

'What went wrong? How come he did not act on these insights? First, there is reason to believe that Chamberlain wanted to believe Hitler. Chamberlain colluded in Hitler's deception because the alternative (recognising he had been lied to and the strategy of appeasement he had such a great stake in had failed) would be difficult to deal with psychologically and practically.

'As a condition for understanding the true intentions of another, wanting to believe that one is being told the truth may serve as a strong motivating factor for collusion. Hitler was able to construct a social

setting that made deception easier. Hitler invoked Chamberlain's narcissism – made him feel important and strong. Chamberlain believed that Hitler liked him, respected him, empathised with him and trusted him. All this made deception easier. As Chamberlain's letters suggest, Chamberlain was greatly impressed and intimidated by Hitler's stature. Hitler was able to utilise this by playing to Chamberlain's ego, suggesting to Chamberlain that he was glad to be negotiating with a man and showering praise upon him. According to Self, Chamberlain's biographer, this had a significant effect on Chamberlain as Hitler became more approachable and likeable.

'As mentioned above, Chamberlain illustrated many of the characteristics associated with narcissism. Rampant confirmation bias excluded the possibility of other perspectives. As Chamberlain's biographers points out, while Chamberlain occasionally suffered from doubt, once he had made a decision he stuck with it unfailingly. As appeasement had been in the works for the better part of a decade, it is relatively easy to see how the decision regarding how to approach Germany generally and Hitler specifically would have been formed from early on in the conflict.

'Finally, a lack of repeated exposure.' Nearly there. 'Those stationed in Berlin and those who made more than one trip before drawing conclusions like Phipps, Rumbold and even Eden see through Hitler. They had time to learn the mannerisms, while Chamberlain did not. We focus on the Chamberlain-Hitler interaction, perhaps rightly so because it was the definitive one, but if you want to see deception-detection at work, the interactions of Hitler with Phipps, Rumbold and Eden are illustrative.'

End. Thank you.

END OF RECORDING